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Capital budgeting, from the viewpoint of a businessman/decision
maker, is the allocation of a scarce resource (money) among competing
alternative uses (investment opportunities) in such a manner as to
maximize the future wealth of the firm. (Although other goals have been
proposed, the goal of profit maximization is espoused by many authorities
and is the objective assumed by this research.) The businessman must
choose some measure of worth by which he will measure the relative
attractiveness of an investment opportunity and he must have some model
or method, based on this measure of worth, by which he will decide
whether he should invest money in the proposal. If he expects that the
cost of financing attractive investment opportunites will typically be
greater than the money-budget, his decision method must provide him with
a mechanism for choosing among the various opportunities. Furthermore,
his method ought to be efficient: it should return more to the firm in
the form of better investments selected than the method itself costs.
Scope of the Problem
The capital budgeting process in most cases is a dynamic process:
the choice of proposals made today will affect the amount of cash
available for reinvestment in future periods, just as the decisions made
in the past determined the present budget amount. This dynamic quality
adds to the complexity of the budgeting process. The uncertain nature
of the world further compounds the complexity. Further complications
which should be considered in the budgeting model are taxes, possible
short- and long-term borrowing, and possible physical and financial
interdependencies among the investment opportunities.

Through most of the nineteenth century, the budgeting problem was
regarded strictly as a business "art" and decisions were made solely on
the basis of managerial insight. Around the turn of the century,
theorists began applying a scientific approach to the problem (81). The
time value of money and the necessity of basing decisions on incremental
cash flow differences were recognized in the literature although, in
practice, somewhat les3 scientific methods were more popular (23, 24).
In earlier studies, some gross simplifications were assumed, not so much
because they were perceived as yielding an accurate model but because
they permitted solution by the computational tools of the day. The
volume of literature devoted to capital budgeting increased tremendously
in the post-World War II years with the rapid development of the
mathematical tools of management science and operations analysis. As the
mathematical tools of analysis became more sophisticated, the models of
capital budgeting became more complex and approximated the actual
business world more and more closely. Despite this, many of the older
models and methods apparently remain in popular use.
Considering the importance of the capital budgeting process to
society and the complexity of the total problem, it is not surprising
that there is a wealth of technical literature on the topic. Indeed, the
business manager is likely to be somewhat overwhelmed when he discovers
the multitude of methods that have been proposed, each purporting to be
either the "best" or the "most practical" method to use.
Why is there so much disagreement among the recognized authorities
as to which is the "best" method? Each decision process is based on a set
of assumptions that generally differs in some particulars from the sets
of assumptions on which other decision methods are based. This set of
assumptions may closely approximate the actual situation facing a
capital budgeter, it may be only a fair approximation of the situation,
or it may be a crude approximation that differs from reality in some
crucial way. Theorists often argue as to the practical importance of a
defining set of assumptions.

Some capital budgeting methods have faded from popularity, some
never have been popular; but surveys have indicated that several methods
that are considered decidedly inferior on theoretical grounds remain in
popular use (14,39,78).
Clearly, many outmoded capital budgeting models remain in use due to
inertia, or to the conservative nature of some practitioners. Some
methods are still used because of proprietership. Disagreement among the
theorists as to which model is superior may lead to perpetuation of older
models. Finally, even when it is generally conceded that one method is
theoretically superior to another, proponents of the inferior model may
claim that both models would perform equally well in practice.
Presentation of the Research
Istvan, in his 1961 survey of industry, found only ten percent of
the firms he studied were using any of the time-discounted cash flow
methods as their primary decision rule; eight percent still used
intuition as their primary criterion, and all firms surveyed reported
they used intuition as at least a supplementary decision criterion (39).
The firms using time-discounted measures were "of the opinion" their
profitability had increased after adoption of these measures, but this
could not be proven. Over 80 percent of the firms not using these
measures did not plan to adopt them because either they felt they got as
good results without them or they felt they were too complicated to use.
Viafore conducted a similar survey in 1973-74 and found much wider
acceptance of the theoretically more correct methods than Istvan found
twelve years earlier: 19 out of the 23 firms studied by Viafore used one
of the major time-discounted measures of worth as their primary decision
criteria (78). Christy, in his 1966 survey, attempted to discover some
correlation between the performance of the firms he questioned and the
capital budgeting method they used (14). He was unable to find any
general relationship between criterion and performance. Chapter II
presents a brief description of the capital budgeting situation and the
more popular measures of worth and decision rules. A brief review of the
more important books and articles dealing with the capital budgeting

problem is also presented in that chapter.
The relation between a decision rule and the results to be expected
from it in practice by a particular firm is much too complex to allow
exact solution by any analytical techniques currently available, unless
some extreme simplifying assumptions are made. Any attempt to derive
performance rules from comparative empirical data probably would run into
the same difficulties that beset Christy: differences in performance due
to decision rule are likely to be completely obscured by other
differences among the firms to be compared. Due to the costs and risks
involved, it is very unlikely that any experimentation with an actual
firm will ever be done. Besides, the non-repeatability of real world
events would greatly complicate any such analysis. Simulation by a
computer model appears to be the only practicable way of estimating the
performance differences that would be experienced in using the different
decision criteria.
Throughout the capital budgeting literature, many examples have been
presented that compare one decision rule with another when applied to a
specific set (usually a very small number) of proposals. These examples
have not been very convincing as to the differences in results to be
expected from the use of the varying decision rules in practical
situations when applied repeatedly to large numbers of proposals. Parra,
in his dissertation, described a large-scale computer program that could
simulate the application of a particular decision rule to sequences of
proposals generated by a hypothetical firm. The proposals were generated
by random sampling from a multivariate probability distribution of the
attributes of an investment proposal (60). This model is described in
detail in Chapter III.
Insofar as Parra's model is conceded to be a reasonably accurate
representation of reality — especially, insofar as one accepts as
realistic the model's depiction of the firm as a random generator of
proposals whose attributes (cost, life, cash flow pattern, etc.) are
drawn from independent, stationary probability distributions — then the
results of simulations run using this model can be viewed as representing

the results one would expect to observe in actual practice. Assuming
acceptance of the model as realistic, one could then use the model to
achieve a reasonably inexpensive answer to the question: What practical
differences in growth of the wealth of a firm could be expected from the
long-term use of one capital budgeting decision rule compared to another?
The research described herein assumes that Parra's program is a
reasonably accurate model of many of the capital budgeting situations to
be found in real life. The intention of this research has been to use
Parra's model to explore some of the relationships among the capital
budgeting situation faced by a firm, the decision rule used by that firm,
and the resultant growth in wealth of that firm.
In order to arrive at results that were as general as possible
within the budget restraints of unsponsored research, it was necessary
first to conduct extensive sensitivity testing to determine those
parameters delimiting the situation to which the results are sensitive.
For example, one could imagine two firms facing capital budgeting
situations that are identical except for differences in the distributions
of costs of proposals (but both having equal expected (mean) costs). To
what extent would the results experienced by one firm reflect the results
that would be experienced by the other? These topics are explored in
Chapter IV.
Having determined those parameters which have a statistically
significant effect on the results, one may then run a number of
simulations, varying each parameter in turn over what seems to be a
reasonable range of values. Then, from the set of results one may
extract those patterns that are common and consider these, with some
confidence, as being general results. This was the major goal of this
research; the results and the series of simulations on which they are
based are described in Chapter V.
Chapter VI concludes the presentation of this research. That
chapter summarizes the overall conclusions reached during the research,





In general terms, a firm's capital budgeting process is usually
construed as follows:
A decision maker — either an individual or a group (e.g. a
committee or board) — is presented with a set of investment
proposals. The decision maker must decide whether each proposal is
"desirable" and, from the set of desirable proposals, must select
the "most desirable" subset of proposals, subject to perceived
constraints on the firm's resources. This process recurs through
time — that is, new proposals arise and new decisions must be made
— either on a regular periodic basis or at random intervals.
Through this process the decision maker seeks to maximize the
wealth of the firm.
Of course, the above statement of the problem is quite simplistic.
In smaller firms, the decision maker may be a single entity; in larger
firms, decision making is often diffused throughout the firm to some
extent. In this latter case, some standard procedure is usually
promulgated to ensure uniformity in the decision process. A measure of
worth (MOW) must be selected by which to gauge the desirability of a
single proposal. A method of applying the MOW to compare alternatives
must likewise be selected. In defining decision rules, different views
may be taken of a "set of proposals," of the resource limitations of a
firm, and of the "wealth" that is to be maximized. The relative
riskiness of a proposal may be taken into consideration, as may possible
interrelationships among proposals. Considering both the complexity and
the importance of capital budgeting, it is little wonder that a large
diversity of formulations of the problem exist in literature.
A simple hierarchy can be constructed of the various situations that
might face a businessman with respect to the decision as to whether to
accept investment proposals. The simplest case to consider is that of
the independent proposal: a proposal with no alternatives except "do not

accept;" with no dependency relationships with other proposals; and which
has no substantial effect on the capital resources of the decision-maker.
Truly independent proposals rarely, if ever, occur — except in trivial
cases — but many investment situations are treated as though they were
independent cases. The independent case is handled simply by taking some
measure of the worth of the proposal and basing the accept/reject
decision on a comparison of the measure of worth to some standard. The
next case to be considered is that of a choice between alternatives,
again without budget restrictions. This can easily be reduced to the
independent case by forming the incremental cash flow series representing
the difference in cash flows between the two alternatives, treating it as
an independent proposal, and basing the choice of alternatives upon
whether the increment is accepted or rejected. If there are more than
two acceptable alternatives in the set, the set may still be reduced to a
series of independent cases by repeated pairwise comparisons. The third
case is the most realistic: the case of capital budgeting. If capital
restrictions are present and the decision-maker batches his proposals,
this can be reduced to the second case by forming a set of alternatives,
each of which is some affordable subset of the entire batch of proposals.
For a large firm this may result in a very large number of alternatives,
but in theory the solution is then simple: reduce the choice to a series
of independent cases by the pairwise comparison process outlined above.
If the decision-maker in the capital budgeting situation makes his
decisions sequentially then the solution is even simpler: defer or
reject proposals which cannot be afforded; treat affordable proposals
with no alternatives as independent proposals; and treat affordable sets
of alternatives as simple choices among alternatives (the second case
described above) to be reduced in turn to the independent case by
pairwise incremental analysis.
Measures of Worth
"As the contents of The Management of Corporate Capital bear out,
economists are far from unanimous on the implications of various
measures used in evaluating capital expenditures and on the
assumptions which underlie their use. The 'popular' literature,
such as the Harvard Business Review
, also reflects this confounding
when it publishes successive articles proposing one measure and

criticizing the immediately prior one advanced in almost endless
variation." (79, p. 5)
A measure of worth can be considered a model of the capital
budgeting problem at its simplest: comparison of the MOW to a standard
is the basis of the invest/don't invest decision for a single proposal.
More realistically, a MOW used in the framework of a specified
methodology is the basis for the complete capital budgeting decision
problem sketched above. A number of MOWs have been proposed over the
years; some of the more common ones are described below. Confusion often
results because several different methods of computation have been
proposed for computing some of the MOWs. More confusion has been
generated because the same MOW may appear in the literature under several
different names.
In his notable 1961 survey, Istvan determined the primary MOW in use
by 48 large firms: 8% reported they used "subjective judgment," 27 %
payback period, 50$ some simple rate of return, 4$ the Machinery and
Allied Products Institute (MAPI) method, and only 10$ one of the time-
discounted methods (internal rate of return or net present worth). An
additional 19$ used one of the time-discounted MOWs in a "supplementary
manner", while 92% made supplementary use of "subjective judgment" (39,
p. 96). Christy did a somewhat similar study in 1966. Of the 108 firms
that responded to his mail questionnaire, 12 reported they used
subjective judgment, 55 used payback period, 46 some simple rate of
return, and 15 used a time-discounted method (note that these categories
are non-exclusive) (14, p. 15). Although all of Istvan's 48 firms
admitted to using "subjective judgment" in some way as a MOW, such a
measure would be extremely difficult to model and will not be considered
further. The little-used MAPI method will similarly be disregarded.
In a much more current study, conducted in 1973-74, Viafore reported
the primary MOW used by the 23 large firms that he studied in detail. He
found there appeared to have been extensive adoption of the theoretically
more correct measures of worth since the earlier studies cited above. Of
the 23 firms studied, 83$ used either internal rate of return (16 firms)

or net present value (3 firms) as their primary MOW, although there
continued to be extensive use of such measures as payback period in a
secondary role (he reported 18 cases in which some form of payback period
was used as a secondary MOW) (78, p. 135-136).
Payback Period
The payback period was found by all three studies to be one of the
more popular MOWs. Generally, the payback period is defined as "the
number of years required for net cash flow to equal zero" (29, p. 3^7).
Sometimes the total cash flowbacks are converted to uniform annual
flowbacks before calculating the payback (or "payoff") period. An
investment is deemed desirable if its payback period is less than some
cutoff period.
Payback period as a MOW has been heavily criticized in the
literature since it does not take account of the time value of money and
does not consider cash flows after the payback period (2, 21, 69). Also,
it is undefined for proposals requiring more than one outflow of cash.
(Viafore reported 8 cases in which firms used a "discounted payback
period" as a measure of worth (78, p. 136). Presumably this represents
an attempt by the users to modify payback period so as to obviate the
first-listed objection). The popularity of this measure may be due in
large part to its simplicity. It does have the advantages of promoting
the liquidity of the firm, and of serving as a crude measure of the risk
of a proposal (29, 66).
Simple Rate of Return
Christy's and Istvan's studies also showed simple rate of return to
be a very popular primary MOW, although Viafore did not report it used by
any of the firms he studied. There are many different versions of this,
but the most prevalent definition is probably the ratio of average annual
income to average investment (66, 8). A common variation is the ratio of
average annual income to initial investment (22, 30). This has also been

called "average annual return," "return on investment, " "rate of return,"
and "accounting rate of return." An investment is deemed acceptable if
its simple rate of return is greater than some criterion rate.
This MOW is simple to compute, and it has been pointed out that,
under certain conditions, the second version can be a fairly good
approximation to the internal rate of return (28). Like payback period,
however, it does not account for the time value of money. Also, it is
usually based on accounting (book) values of cash flows instead of true
incremental flows.
A somewhat similar MOW that has been proposed is Solomon's "over-all
rate-of-return", which is defined as that rate of interest, r, on the
initial investment which would result in the same total wealth at the end
of a proposal's life as the sum of the incremental returns from the
proposal compounded at the firm's reinvestment rate (70). Mathematically,
the "over-all rate-of-return" is proportional to the n-th root of the
familiar "benefit-cost ratio" (see, e.g. 59, p. 21, for a definition),
where n is the year in which the last cash flow of the proposal occurs.
This MOW seems to have fallen into disuse; indeed, Solomon himself has
argued against it (71). Although "over-all rate-of-return" does take
account of the time value of money, it possesses no advantage over the
present worth method, while it has the decided theoretical disadvantage
of compounding the initial investment at rate r and the returns at the
assumed reinvestment rate (? r) during the sane time period. A more
thorough examination of the deficiencies of this MOW appears in Renshaw
(65).
The measures of worth to be considered below fall into Istvan's
category of "time-discounted" methods.
Prospective Growth Rate
This measure of worth is usually defined to be that discount rate
which makes the present worth of all incremental cash flows of a proposal
zero. That is, the prospective growth rate of proposal j, gj, is
10

gj = fsjl o = I sjt d + g)-M
t=o
(see Table I for the definition of the symbols). To determine whether a
proposal is desirable, gj is compared to some criterion rate: accept an
investment if gj > criterion. This measure has also been called "rate of
return," "internal rate of return," "solving rate of return,"
"profitability index," "investor's method," and "yield of an investment,"
among others.
This was one of the first time-discounted MOWs to be popularly
accepted, gaining relatively wide popularity after Dean's work was
published in 1951 (21). As shown by Viafore's study, this remains one of
the most popular MOWs, despite a large volume of literature criticizing
it for various theoretical deficiencies.
The most common criticism of g. as a MOW is that, as defined above,
it may have multiple values (6, 42, 72). Since g is the root of a
polynomial of degree nj, there are exactly nj values of g. Economically,
the only values that have meaning are real values of g such that -1 < g,
and it is generally only positive, real values of g that are of interest.
Another weakness is that the definition apparently suggests to some
people that cash released by the proposal will be reinvested at rate gj
(71, p. 226). Oakford rewords the definition given above by defining gj
to be the discount rate that makes the capital function, Kj^, equal to
zero (58). He then qualifies this definition by requiring gj to meet the
additional requirements that:
a. There exist a g > such that Kjh = 0.
b. The proposal is identifiable as either a pure investment (sjq <
and Kjt j> for all T) or as a pure borrowing (sjo > and
Kj T < for all T).
In other words, his gj is undefined in the "mixed" region where there may
be multiple real, positive roots to the defining equation. In any event,

Table I
Definition of Terms Used in Chapter II
j: Index identifying a specific proposal.
t: Index identifying the time period of a cash flow
t = 0, 1, ..., H.
H: Horizon time for planning
s jt ! Cash flow from proposal j at time t.
> 0: cash flows from proposal tc
< 0: cash flows from firm (cost).
s. o firm (benefit)
3t
i. : Interest rate earned by highly liquid investments.
g: An interest rate.
m: Marginal growth (investment) rate.
g: Average growth rate of the firm.
g.: Prospective growth rate of proposal j; the "internal
3 rate of return" at which capital invested in (bor-
rowed from) proposal j grows.
K._: Capital involved in proposal j at time T
T
S T-t H T-tKjT = " Z s jt (1+ g j ) - E s (1+g )J 1 t=0 J J t=T +1 J J
e
where T = entier (T)
.
T: A time of interest to the decision-maker,
n .
:
Life of a Proposal: s. = for t > n..

no coherent decision rule based on gj vs. criterion can be formulated for
a "mixed" proposal. (It has been suggested that mixed proposals arise
relatively infrequently in actual practice. However when considering the
increment between two alternatives, mixed cash flow series may occur more
frequently)
.
Some authors have adopted the convention of using an auxilliary
interest rate for mixed proposals: using one compounding rate for
periods of investment and a second rate for periods of borrowing (29, 73,
74).
Other objections to the use of gj have been based on the difficulty
of its use to compare alternatives. This will be discussed below.
Net Present Value
This MOW is defined as the sum of all the incremental cash flows of
a proposal discounted to the present at rate g
n
J
Pj(g) = I sjt (1 + g)" fc
t =
This measure is also called "net present worth," "present value ," or
"present worth." A proposal is deemed acceptable if the net present
value is greater than zero.
Net present value has appeal both on an intuitive (30, 77) and a
theoretical (40, 82) basis. An objection to this MOW from a practical
standpoint is that the rate g must be estimated prior to calculating the
net present worth (66). The implicit assumption in net present worth is
that cash throwoffs would be reinvested at rate g (65, 70). Theorists
have identified g with the cost of capital (40), the minimum acceptable
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Note that prospective present worth is identical to net present value if
and only if g = m = i*. Prospective value is based on the assumptions:
a.. Decisions are made periodically, e.g., annually.
b. Money not invested in proposals is invested in a highly liquid
form at rate i, until the next decision time.
c. Cash released from present investments at future decision times
are reinvested in the firm at rate m.
Applying the Measures of Worth
Under the assumptions of strict independence among proposals and a
perfect capital economy — that is, a firm may either borrow unlimited
amounts or lend unlimited amounts of capital at constant rate ra — the
rules for capital budgeting are simple: accept all proposals which the
MOW indicates are acceptable, and reject all others. Since these
assumptions are not a good approximation of the situation actually faced
by many business enterprises today, a variety of other models have been
formulated. These models will be described in approximately the order in
which they were proposed — that is, in order of increasing complexity.
The first models to be discussed considered sets of technically-
independent proposals with budget constraints imposed on the selection.
The next group of models were designed to deal with sets of technically-

interdependent proposals with no budget constraints. The third group of
models considered sets of technically-interdependent proposals with
imposed budget constraints. Models in these first three groups were
based on the assumption that all future cash flows could be predicted
with certainty at the time of decision. Models in the fourth group to be
discussed consider risk in the sense of assuming future cash flows can be
estimated but not with certainty. Models in the fifth group account for
future proposals, not presently known to the decision-maker, by
simulation: random generation of proposals from specified probability
distributions. The final group of models to be considered are models
that approach the firm from a human-behavioral viewpoint; these models
are discussed only very briefly.
Independent Proposals, Budget Constraints
Proposals are considered independent when "... the worth of the
individual investment proposal is not profoundly affected by the
acceptance of others" (M7, p. 229).
Theoretically, a firm that could borrow money at rate g would
borrow as necessary to invest in all proposals having a prospective
growth rate greater than g, or equivalently , all proposals with Pj(g) > 0.
In practice, management may impose some lesser limit on the amount of
capital available for investment.
The earlier models proposed were ranking models: proposals were
ranked by the MOW in decreasing order of desirability, then were accepted
according to this ranking. Dean's model, which ranked on prospective
growth rate and accepted all proposals with returns greater than the cost
of capital, is the best known of these (21). Oakford proposed a
variation of this, called the Rank on Growth Rate (ROGR) criterion:
accept proposals according to Dean's ranking until the fixed budget is
exhausted (59). Pearson Hunt described another model that ranked upon a
complicated factor, in which one interest rate was used to compound cash
flows considered as "return of invested capital" and a second interest
rate was used to compound the remaining returns, or "income" (38). Lorie
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and Savage proposed ranking on the ratio of net present value to first
cost (47). However it was soon demonstrated that " different
measures will only accidentally give identical rankings to a set of
investment proposals" (8, p. 9). Imposition of a binding budget
constraint on a set of independent proposals — i.e., the money available
for investment is less than the sum of required cash outlays for all
desirable proposals — in effect creates a financial interdependence
among the proposals. The schedule of independent proposals can be
considered as a schedule of mutually-exclusive subsets: the set of all
affordable combinations of proposals.
Interdependent Proposals, No Constraints
Proposals are considered mutually exclusive when "... acceptance
of one proposal in such a set renders all others in the same set
unacceptable — or even unthinkable" (47, p. 229). The problem is to
select the best from a set of mutually exclusive proposals. As noted in
the preceding paragraph, this is equivalent to the selection problem with
independent proposals, binding budget constraints.
Lorie-Savage (47) and Fleisher (25) gave complementary examples that
demonstrated ROGR may not select the alternative which maximized the
firm's capital. It is now generally accepted, at least among theorists,
that incremental analysis of the cash flow differences between
alternatives is necessary to apply correctly prospective growth rate as a
MOW (36, 48); "...it is demonstrably incorrect to rank two alternatives
in descending order of rates of return and to conclude that the
alternative having the highest rate is superior to the other," (25, p.
205).
The Lorie-Savage model referred to above also dealt with this
problem. They formulated the problem as a Lagrange multiplier problem
and solved it by a trial-and-error technique (47). Several other models
were built upon theirs. Kaplan attacked the Lagrange multiplier problem
in a more rigorous, mathematical way (43). He showed the problem is
always solvable only in the case of a single budget constraint, but
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defended the method because of the insight it gave, especially with
regards to improvements realizable from slight relaxations of budget
constraints. Bellman and Dreyfus (4) and Nerahauser (55) proposed models
that solved the Lorie-Savage problem by dynamic programming. Charnes,
Cooper, and Miller proposed a linear programming formulation by
interpreting the dual of the warehousing problem as the capital budgeting
problem (12). Reiter formulated a quadratic programming model of the
problem (64). All these models were designed with net present value as a
MOW.
Interdependent Proposals, Budget Constraints
A more realistic model to consider is that of a firm faced with a
schedule of proposals which may include subsets of mutually-exclusive
proposals, technically-independent proposals, proposals which are
contingent upon the acceptance of another proposal, budget constraints
that may be binding in future decision periods (i.e., some proposals
require cash outlays in more than one period) as well as the current
decision time, possible short-terra and long-term borrowing, payment of
dividends from cash flowbacks, and possible delays in accepting a
proposal. The models for technically-interdependent proposals without
budget constraints could all be extended to the situation of
interdependent proposals with constraints, many could handle multiple
budget restrictions, but none could cope with the other complications.
Weingartner, in his landmark 1962 dissertation (79), attempted to
model most of the situation described above. His Basic Horizon Model
with extensions maximized the firm's capital at a specified horizon time.
Specifically, it maximized the sum of cash on hand at the horizon plus
any values then remaining in the investments discounted to the horizon.
He showed that this formulation is equivalent to maximizing the net
present value of the firm using an appropriate discount rate. The
complete set of proposals to be considered is assumed known at the start
and all cash flows are assumed known with certainty. An arbitrary
network of interrelationships — exclusivity, dependency, or independency

— can be specified. Budget constraints, which can be for multiple
periods and in more than one resource, are specified at the start. The
model assumes proposals can be deferred as necessary to maximize capital
at the horizon time. Short-term (single period) borrowing is allowed.
Equality is assumed between the interest rate charged for borrowing and
that earned by the firm on uninvested funds. Limits to the amount of
money that can be borrowed may be specified. The model is formulated as
a linear programming problem. Although Weingartner recognized that his
accept/reject variables ought to take on only integer (0, 1) values, the
state of the art of integer programming at that time made solution of
such a large problem as Weingartner 's utterly impractical. Weingartner
had, perforce, to rely strictly on linear programming for a solution. As
a result, his original model could indicate fractional acceptance of a
proposal. Fleisher has described a similar model (25).
Oakford and Thuesen developed the Maximum Prospective Value (MPV)
Criterion in a similar model (56). MPV is formulated as an integer
linear programming problem in a format very analogous to that of
Weingartner's Basic Horizon Model (extended), except that prospective
present worth is used as a MOW instead of net present value (76). An
extension of the model allows short-term borrowing at rates different
from the firm's reinvestment rate (56).
Baumol and Quandt formulated an LP model similar to Weingartner's in
order to examine the problem of the proper choice of discount rate to use
in discounting cash flows (3). Weingartner himself updated his model in
1966 to take advantage of the integer programming techniques that had
been developed since his original model (80). Geoffrion's algorithm, for
example, made mixed integer/linear programming solutions to problems on
the scale of Weingartner's model practicable, if still expensive (27).
Parra examined the cost of the integer programming solutions to such a
problem, using Geoffrion's algorithm, in some detail (60, pp. 81-86).
Bernhard further extended Weingartner's original model to allow for
different interest rates for borrowing and lending of funds (7). He also
formulated an objective function that included dividend payments as well
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as cash position at the horizon time. Bernhard's model treated all
proposals as divisible -- i.e., fractional acceptance of a proposal is a
possible outcome.
All the models described thus far in this section were designed to
maximize the total net present value or prospective present worth of the
firm. A different viewpoint was taken by Daver, who developed his ALCAB
algorithm to select proposals using prospective growth rate as a MOW
(20). This algorithm used incremental analysis and consideration of the
amount of initial investment to select proposals. Daver admitted that
his model might lead to a non-optimal solution in the fixed budget case,
but dismissed this problem by assuming the firm will always borrow
whenever feasible.
Proposals with Stochastic Cash Flows
All the models considered above have assumed perfect knowledge of
the future in that all cash flows associated with a proposal were treated
as deterministic. Such an assumption is unrealistic. The models are
still adequate to deal with situations where all proposals have equal
risk 1 , or with risk-indifferent decision makers, or with situations where
the decision-maker expects to make many similar decisions, so that
overall returns are determined by the law of large numbers (1); but other
models have been developed to help the decision-maker cope with a
decision among alternatives with different riskiness. These models
assume the viewpoint:
"The profit outcome, in short, has become a random variable and as
such its maximization no longer has an operational meaning. Nor can
this difficulty generally be disposed of by using the mathematical
expectation of profits as the variable to be maximized. For
decisions which affect the expected value will also tend to affect
the dispersion and other characteristics of the distribution of
outcomes. "(50, p. 263).
No attempt is made in this work to differentiate between the concepts
of "risk" and "uncertainty"; instead, they will be treated as synonymous.

Simpler models meant to deal with risky proposals generally took one
of two forms: either "risky" proposals had to exceed a higher cutoff, or
hurdle, rate r (equivalently , they had to have a positive net present
value, calculated at rate r) than did proposals judged "non-risky"; or
"risky" proposals were reduced to a "certainty equivalent" by multiplying
all future cash flows by a factor 3t < 1 (8, 50, 77). These models had
two drawbacks: they generally forced all proposals into the dichotomy of
"risky" vs. "non-risky" proposals, with no real recognition of the
actual degree of risk of an individual proposal; and the selection of a
proper value for r (or 0^), even for an individual proposal, turns out to
be very difficult. Properly to set a single value for all "risky"
proposals is generally impossible. Even if it were, it could lead to
selection of the alternative with lower expected net present value in a
choice between two equally risky alternatives. In other words, these
simplistic models suppress information regarding the specific risk of a
proposal, leaving this estimate up to the intuition of the decision
maker.
For decision-makers with a linear utility function, i.e., those who
are risk-indifferent, maximization of expected returns is a valid
objective function. However, research has indicated that many decision
makers would prefer a safe investment to one with a somewhat higher rate
of return but much more risk (33). Given the utility function of the
decision-maker, and the distribution of expected returns from alternative
proposals, decision theory can recommend a choice to maximize expected
utility (61). However, deriving the utility function of a firm of any
size has proved extremely difficult, if not impossible. Markowitz, in
his model of investment in the stock market, took a simpler approach
involving only the expected value and variance of the return, and
developed what he called the "efficiency boundary" — the maximum
expected value for a given variance or the minimum variance for an
expected return (*J9). Markowitz showed his efficiency boundary is
approximately equivalent to maximizing expected utility if the utility
function of prospective growth rate is quadratic or if the distribution
of returns is normal. Several subsequent authors have made use of
Markowitz 's efficiency boundary concept.
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Hillier proposed a model for determining analytically the mean and
standard deviation for the net present value of a proposal from the
distribution of the cash flows (33). He assumed independent proposals
and normally-distributed cash flow variables and developed expressions
for the mean and variance of the net present worth for the cases of ( 1
)
complete independence, and (2) perfect correlation among cash flows in a
proposal. He looked also at partial correlation but conceded that it is
unrealistic to expect that reliable estimates of the correlation
coefficients can be obtained. Later, he extended his model so that
prospective growth rate can be used as the MOW (3^). Oakford has
formulated a somewhat similar model for random cash flows except that
correlation between flows is modeled by adding a multiple of an auxiliary
stochastic (normal) variate with zero mean and unit variance to the
interrelated flows (59). A final well-known example of a model used to
construct the distribution of a MOW from cash flow distribution is
Hertz's model (31, 32). This model assumed that distributions of certain
factors that affect cash flows — e.g. size of market, firm's share of
market, etc. — can be estimated, and that cash flows are determined by
algebraic relationships with these factors. The model then estimates the
distribution of an investment's return by Monte Carlo simulation.
The models described above were designed to give either a
"risk-adjusted" MOW or the estimated distribution of a MOW for a risky
proposal. Several models have been formulated to determine the optimal
combination of proposals to select in the face of risk. Three basic
techniques have been followed:
Stochastic Linear Programming
Salazar and Sen have attempted to modify Weingartner's Basic Horizon
Model to allow for uncertainty (67). Briefly, they model uncertain cash
flows as functions of stochastic factors in a manner similar to Hertz. A
realization of values by simulation is constructed and the optimum
selection for this realization is determined by integer and linear
programming. This process is replicated, proposals are ranked according

to how often they appear in the optimal solutions, and acceptance by this
ranking is the final solution.
Linear Programming Under Uncertainty
Dantzig proposed a two-stage solution method (19). Levels of
activities are determined in the first stage by some decision rule such
as maximizing total expected net present worth. Levels of variables for
the second stage are then determined by the decision of the first stage
and by chance. Values for the second stage decisions — e.g., short-term
borrowing to meet realized shortfalls — are then determined by
optimization. The process is replicated; the final objective is the
minimization of total expected cost by linear programming.
Chance-Constrained Programming
This is the most popular technique. Charnes and Cooper proposed a
theoretical model for investment under risk by assuming values of future
cash flows are independent stochastic variables with estimable
distributions (58). They then proposed solving for the maximum expected
return by mathematical programming methods using chance constraints on
the solution as well as the constraints of the deterministic model —
e.g. a constraint that the probability of bankruptcy be less than some
value. Unfortunately, no analytical solution of the general problem
could be found, although many special cases were solvable. Naslund and
Whinston (51) and Naslund (52) described models with solution by linear
programming, assuming normally-distributed cash flows and fractional
acceptance of proposals. Cord described a model for solution by dynamic
programming, assuming independent, normally-distributed proposals with a
single budget constraint (16). Hillier (35) developed an integer linear
programming model with two budget constraints and cash flows assumed
distributed as described above for his earlier model. Reardon extended
Hillier's model to allow multiple budget constraints (63). Byrne,
Charnes, Cooper, and Kortanek formulated a chance-constrained linear
programming model that also used linear programming under uncertainty

(LPUU) concepts (10). Their model selects proposals based on paybacks so
as to maximize expected profits by a chance constrained programming
algorithm, then determines expected borrowing necessary to meet liquidity
constraints in a manner similar to Dantzig's LPUU model.
The models described above take into account cash throwoffs from
past investments and from proposals presently known to the decision-maker
in determining future budget limits. But it is reasonable to expect
budget levels more than one decision period hence to be affected by cash
flows from investments, presently unknown to the decision maker, that
will be accepted in the interim. The models discussed above assume
future budget monies not invested in presently-known proposals will be
invested in the business (i.e., in unknown, future proposals) and will
grow at some average rate, but the models do not consider any effects
that the gradual liquidation of the unknown investments will have on
future budget restrictions. Unless budget constraints more then one
period hence are in no way binding on any presently-considered investment
scheme, the flowbacks from future investments should be somehow
considered. Anderson, in his model for capital budgeting under
uncertainty, explicitly deals with this concept by introducing "liquidity
fractions" (1). These are simply factors that express the average amount
of an investment that a firm expects to liquidate one year after
acceptance, two years after acceptance, etc. These factors are assumed
estimated from past investment data. Monies that are to be invested in
the firm (in unknown proposals) in the future are assumed to liquidate
according to this pattern of fractions. Anderson describes a formulation
of the MPV Criterion with these liquidity fractions used to ease future
budget constrictions, and with provision for possible short-term
borrowing. Uncertainty in cash flows is treated in Oakford's manner, as
described above (59). The first stage of Anderson's solution procedure
is to select proposals to maximize the expected prospective present worth
subject to budget restrictions on an expectation basis. The second stage
consists of evaluating the riskiness of the first-stage solution by
simulation. The incremental costs of actions to reduce risk — short
term borrowing vs. selecting less risky proposals — are then compared
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and an "improvement" strategy is decided upon. The procedure is then
iterated by introducing new constraints generated by the improvement
strategy.
Simulation of Future Proposals
Thuesen developed a simulation model that approached the unknown
future from a different point of view (75). He viewed a capital
budgeting situation as a decision maker who is faced, at regular
intervals, with schedules of independent investment proposals that arise
from a proposal generator (the firm). Proposals were seen as random
samples from uncorrelated, probabilistic distributions for growth rate,
cost, life, and shape of the cash flow pattern. The defining
distributions were assumed stationary (invariant over time) except that
expected cost grew regularly at some rate. The cash flow shapes
considered by Thuesen consisted of a single cash outflow followed by cash
flowbacks that were (1) a single payment, (2) uniform, (3) increasing
gradient, (4) decreasing gradient, and (5) a combination of uniform and
gradient in pattern. Proposals of shapes (2) through (5) but with
payments only every other year were also considered. When a schedule of
proposals was generated, selection was made according to a specified
decision rule until the budget for that period was exhausted. Budget
limits were determined by the sum of paybacks from "previous investments"
(specified at the start of the simulation) plus — after the first
decision — flowbacks from investments in generated proposals. Borrowing
was not considered. Proposal cash flows were considered deterministic
once they had been generated.
It is noteworthy that the models previously discussed were designed
to make the optimal selection, using a specific MOW, from among a
schedule of proposals known to the decision maker. Thuesen's model was
designed to measure the average effect of using different decision
procedures over a long period of time. Although he was primarily
interested in MPV, he also considered ROGR and the decision rules of
Fleisher, Hunt, and Solomon.
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Parra developed a similar simulation model (60). In essence, his
model was an extension of Thuesen's, allowing for simulation of more
realistic situations. Where Thuesen generated predetermined numbers of
proposals at integral points in time, Parra generated proposals by a
time-dependent Poisson process —i.e., the number of proposals
generated in a period of time was stochastic and the expectation was
allowed to grow with time. Also, the actual time of generation within
the period was random. This allowed for decision procedures other than
batching as well as stochastic growth in number of proposals. Provisions
were included for generation from probabilistic distributions of mutually
exclusive sets of proposals, contingency relationships between proposals,
and the allowable delay from generation to acceptance of a proposal.
Short-term borrowing at stepped interest rates was allowed. In addition
to Thuesen's cash flow shapes, Parra allowed shapes to be randomly
generated according to a Markov scheme. Multiple decision periods,
batching periods, and budget periods per unit of time were possible,
allowing for simulation of very complicated decision schemes.
Parra's model, slightly modified in its details, was the primary
tool of this research. His model is described in detail in Chapter III.
Behavioral Models
A different aspect of the capital budgeting decision process has
been analyzed in some of the "behavioral" models that have been proposed.
These models — such as Cyert, Feigenbaum, and March's (18), Cohen's
(15), and Forrester's (26) — generally are designed to measure the
effects of such things as forecasting accuracy, delay in information
flow, and organizational hierarchy on operations and profit. Bonini, in
his behavioral model, included concepts such as the aversion to pressure
and reactions to reward of individuals (9). Kibbee described similar
models in the context of gaming simulators for management training (45).
Many such models, from simple to elaborate, have been designed.
Behavioral models such as those mentioned above have contributed much
knowledge and insight and they must need be mentioned for completeness'
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sake. However, these concepts have little or no bearing on the proposed
research; they shall not be considered further.
A general discussion of computer simulation models is given by
Naylor, et al. (53). These concepts are further developed by Naylor in
(5*0, with particular emphasis on application to models of economic
systems. Both these references discuss techniques for analyzing the
results of simulation models. Some of these analysis techniques are





This chapter contains a general description of the simulation model
used in the research, with emphasis on its capabilities and its
underlying assumptions. This description is included in order to define
the environment that produced the experimental results of this research.
This description is also intended to be useful to a prospective user of
the model, especially when read, together with Appendix A, as a
supplement to the description given by Parra in his dissertation.
Included in this chapter are discussions of two very important points
that should concern both the users of Parra's model and the interpreters
of this research: the choice of a measure of effectiveness and the
notion of equilibrium. Closely related to the concept of equilibrium is
the notion of "tuning" the model. A description of the tuning process
and of the experiments conducted to test the efficacy of such tuning are
also described in this chapter. A summary of the additional terminology
utilized in this chapter is given in Table II.
Description of the Model
This research is based upon analyses of the results obtained from
simulating a large number of different capital budgeting situations. All
the simulations were produced by using an elaborate model written as a
computer program by Sabino Parra. The model was described in great
detail, including a complete listing of the FORTRAN statements and
flow-charts of the more important subroutines, by Parra in his
dissertation (60). Because the research described here was so dependent
upon this model, and because the conclusions reached by the research are
therefore dependent upon the assumptions underlying the model, it is
worthwhile to describe the model in some detail here. For details beyond





Definition of Terms Used in Chapter III
T: Year being simulated T = 0, 1, ..., H-l.
gp
:
Growth rate of the generation process.
a: Fraction of growth of generation process that is
growth in numbers
.







CJ„ : Cost of a proposal generated in year T.
NP : Number of sets of proposals generated in year T.
CE Q : Expected cost of a proposal during the first year.
NE : Number of sets of proposals expected to be generated
during the first year.
NREPS : Number of times the simulation is to be replicated.
m: Estimated marginal growth rate as used by a decision
rule.
in: Theoretically correct marginal growth rate, determined
from F(g) and EBC.
EBC: Expected value of the ratio of budget to TCP™.
i o Interest rate earned by liquid investments.
MT(t) : The t-th element in the budget vector apparent to
the firm at year T. MT(1) is the money available
for investment at time T; MT(t) , t>l, is the money
that will be available at time T+t-1 from past
investments; normally the total amount available at
T+t-1 will be greater than MT(t) because of returns
from present and future investments.
MH' : The budget vector MH scaled so that MH'(l) = M0(1).
gc
:
The cutoff rate for rhe ROGR criterion. Proposals
with g. < gc are not accepted. The term m will also
be used to denote the ROGR cutoff rate.
g: The average rate of growth of the firm; the prospec-
tive growth rate of the cash flow series with MO as
inputs and MH as outputs.
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The program, as used in this research, was much altered from the
program listed in Parra's dissertation. The vast majority of the
changes, however, were concerned only with improving the execution
efficiency or the storage capacity of the program, or included provisions
to "automatically" perform such tasks as the tuning process described in
this chapter, tasks that heretofore had to be done manually. Although
such changes favorably affected the cost of running the experiments, they
had no effect on the actual output data — in the jargon, they are
"transparent to the user" — and so will not be described.
Timing Conventions
The model uses standard Monte-Carlo simulation techniques to
simulate evenly-spaced, discrete points in time. The basic unit of time
would most commonly be considered as a year, and will be so referred to
here, although with suitable adjustments to input growth rates this basic
time unit could represent any other period desired by the user. There
are one or more batching periods in a year, as desired by the user, which
determines the frequency with which decisions are made over accumulated
batches of proposals. There are also one or more budget periods in a
year, which serve only to denote the period of time that each flow in the
input budget vector covers. Finally, the smallest unit of time
considered by the model, and the unit in which the simulation actually
operates, is the decision period. There are one or more decision periods
in a year, as desired; the only restriction is that there must be an
integral number of decision periods in a batching period and in a budget
period. At the beginning of the simulation, the input budget period cash
flows are converted into decision period cash flows by assuming the cash
flows are uniform and continuous during the budget period. During the
simulation, cash flows for proposals are initially generated as annual
cash flows. These are converted into decision period cash flows (if
necessary) by again assuming a uniform, continuous flow of cash. The
simulation is carried out for an integral number, H, of years. At the
conclusion of the simulation, cash flows for each post-H decision period
are converted into budget cash flows by simply summing the cash flows for
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It is assumed that the basic characteristics of each proposal
generated by the firm — that is, life, prospective growth rate, and cost
of the proposal — are each independent samples drawn from their
respective probability distributions. The numbers of mutually exclusive
proposals in a set and the allowable delay between generation of a
proposal set and its "expiration" date (the time after which the set, if
not previously accepted, will be dropped from further consideration) are
also drawn from input probability distributions. The model also has the
provision for generating contingent proposals. However, since a proposal
with and without a proposal contingent upon it may be viewed as a set of
mutually exclusive alternatives, there is no need to consider this option
further. All these distributions are assumed to be completely
independent and stationary over time, except that the mean of the
distribution of cost of a proposal is assumed to grow regularly from year
to year as described in the following section.
Once the basic characteristics of a proposal have been drawn from
the appropriate probability distributions, the actual values of the cash
flows that make up the proposal are generated. The user may select one
of eight general cash flow patterns for a simulation; all proposals
generated during the simulation will have cash flow patterns that
correspond to the shape selected. In all cases the first cash flow will
be negative (a cash outflow) and the final cash flow will be positive (a
cash flowback). The eight patterns that may be selected are:
(1) A single flowback at the end of the proposal's life
(2) Uniform flowback pattern
(3) Increasing arithmetic flowback pattern
(H) Decreasing arithmetic flowback pattern
(5) Increasing geometric flowback pattern
(6) Decreasing geometric flowback pattern
30

(7) Stochastic cash flowback pattern
(8) Uniform flowback pattern over an infinite life.
In the last case, the distribution of lives is ignored and all proposals
are assumed to have infinite lives.
In the case of geometric flowback patterns, (5) or (6), the
exponential rate of growth or decay is randomly generated. In the case
of stochastic cash flow pattern, a Markov process is used to determine
the signs (+ or -) of the cash flows, except that the first cash flow
always has a negative sign and the last cash flow always has a positive
sign. Specifically, the cash flow signs are determined by the random
number generator and an input, seven-element transition probability
vector that expresses the probability of a cash flowback (positive sign)
for each of the seven states in which the cash flow generation process
may be. Parra gives a detailed description of these seven states and the
entire stochastic pattern generation process in Appendix B of his
dissertation (60, pp. 130-133). Once the complete sign pattern has been
generated, the relative magnitudes of all the cash flows in the
stochastic pattern are randomly generated. Finally, from the prospective
growth rate and cost of the proposal, and the relative magnitudes of the
cash flows, the absolute values of each of the cash flows for the
proposal are determined. In the case of multiple disbursements, which
can occur only if stochastic pattern generation is selected, cost is
interpreted as the discounted sura of all outflows using prospective
growth rate as the discount rate. Once generated, all cash flows
associated with a decision proposal are assumed to be certain; if
accepted, present and future budget flows will be changed by exactly
these amounts.
The cash flows thus generated are interpreted as beginning-of-year
cash flows. In the case of a single decision period each year, this
actually corresponds to the normal end-of-year convention. That is, the
first flow represents cash flow at relative time zero (the decision
time), the second flow represents cash flow at relative time one (one
year after the decision), etc. In the case of multiple decision periods

in a year, each annual cash flow is converted into the appropriate number
of equal cash flows at each decision period within that year. For
example, if there were four decision periods in a year the first cash
flow (the initial outflow) would be converted into four equal outflows to
occur at the decision time and at one, two, and three decision periods
hence, etc.
The time of generation of a set of proposals is determined by a
time-dependent Poisson process. The number of sets of proposals expected
to be generated in a year grows at a regular rate from year to year as
described in the next section. From the expected number of sets for the
current year, a Poisson process subroutine, together with a random number
generator, determines how many sets of proposals will actually be
generated within each decision period of the year. Parra describes this
timing mechanism in detail in Appendix C of his dissertation (60, pp.
135-138).
Growth of the Generation Process
In order that a firm experiencing a growth in its wealth may sustain
that growth over a long period, its opportunities for investment must
grow along with the wealth. If its opportunities do not grow, the firm
will soon find itself with much more money available for investment than
it has desirable investment opportunities, and its growth in wealth will
decline. The model assumes that the overall growth in the generation
process is actually comprised of growths in two factors: growth in the
number of sets of proposals expected to be generated per year and growth
in the expected cost of a proposal generated during a year. The rates of
growth of both factors are assumed constant over time. Furthermore, the
growth in expected cost is assumed to otherwise leave the distribution of
costs of proposals unchanged. In other words, if the cost distribution
were normalized so that the mean cost were one, a sample cost during the
first year would be obtained by taking a sample from the normalized
distribution and multiplying it by the value of the expected cost. For
costs in future years, this normalized distribution of costs would remain
entirely unchanged but the multiplicative factor, mean value of cost,
would grow at the specified rate.

The growth rates of the two factors thus determine the growth rate
of the opportunity generation process, that is, the growth rate of the
expected total cost of proposals generated per year. Parra found it more
convenient to express these quantities as the overall growth rate of the
generation process, gp, and a factor, a , that determines what fraction
of this growth will be growth in expected number of proposals. The
expected value of the total cost of proposals generated in year T, TCPj
,
is
E(TCPT ) = E(CJT ) E(NPT ) = E(TCPn) (1 + gp) T
where E(.) is the expectation operator of probability theory. The growth
in each factor is thus
E(NPT ) = E(NP ) (1 + gp) Tot
E(CJT ) = E(CJ ) (1 + gp) T(1
"a)
where NP-p is the number of sets of proposals generated in year T and CJ^
is the cost of a proposal J in year T. Letting F(CJ) denote the
normalized cumulative distribution of costs discussed above, and CEq =
E(CJq ) denote the expected cost of a proposal during the first year, we
have
F(CJ ) = F(CJ) CE
F(CJT ) = F(CJ) CE (1 + gp) 1 * 1
- ^
Similarly, it will be convenient to introduce the term NEq to denote the
expected number of sets of proposals to be generated during the first
year, NE = E(NP ).
Intuitively, one would expect the rate gp to equal the rate of
growth of wealth of the firm for a firm in equilibrium. This will be




The simplest situation for which the model provides is that of
annual batching of proposals. This situation requires less computation
time to simulate than any other and it is the situation most often
discussed by the theorists; because of these reasons, the majority of the
research is based upon simulation of annual batches.
The model also provides for simulation of more complicated decision
timing schemes. The schemes, other than annual batching, that can be
simulated without program modification are:
(1) Batching all proposals over periods less than annually.
(2) Deciding on each set of proposals sequentially (i.e. at
generation time)
.
(3) Screening proposals so that sets of one class are decided upon
sequentially while sets of the other class are batched. Batched
proposals are decided upon at the end of each batching period, i.e. the
sequential decisions have prior claim on the budget. The batching period
may be less than or equal to a year.
(4) Similar to (3), except that batched proposals are considered at
the beginning of the next batching period instead of the end of the
current period, i.e. the batched proposals have prior claim on the
budget.
(5) Similar to (3), except that sequentially-decided-upon
proposals which are acceptable in themselves but which are not
immediately accepted due to lack of funds fall into a special
"high-priority" batch which is then considered at the beginning of the
next decision period. In other words, in each decision period the
special batch of proposals has first claim on the budget; monies
remaining are available for sequential investment throughout the decision
period; finally, monies remaining at the end of the batching period are
available for investment in the regular batch. (Once a proposal set is
put in the special batch it remains there either until it is accepted or
until its maximum allowable delay has expired).
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Accepted proposals have their cash flows added to the current and
future budget flows as they are accepted. Proposals that are
unacceptable from the viewpoint of the MOW being used in the simulation
— for example, proposals with negative present values — are dropped
from future consideration. Proposals that are acceptable from the
viewpoint of the MOW but are too expensive to be selected are considered
marginally acceptable (note that this has no connotation as to the
relative size of their MOW) . Marginally acceptable proposals
sequentially decided upon are dropped, except for timing rule (5) above,
in which case they are sent to a special batch. Marginally acceptable
proposals that have been batched, either in the regular or the special
batch, remain in that batch for future consideration until their
allowable delay between generation and final consideration has expired.
Money not invested in proposals at the end of a decision period
grows for one decision period at an interest rate equivalent to the true
annual rate i^ and is thus available for investment in the next decision
period. Short-term borrowing —i.e. loans that must be repaid after
one decision period — at stepped interest rates may be allowed by the
user. The borrowing limits are expressed as percentages of the firm's
total worth, where the firm's worth is the sum of the current budget
monies, before any investment, plus the unliquidated value of all future
cash flows, computed at an interest rate equal to the decision rate m.
This process is continued until the specified number (H) of years
has been simulated. Then all quantities except the random number seeds
are reset to their original values and the H-year simulation is
replicated the desired number (NREPS) of tirae3.
For the simulations described in Chapter V, an additional feature
was added to Parra's model: the option of removing some of the budget
monies from availability for investment in generated proposals at the
beginning of each year. The amounts thus removed could be considered
either as dividends paid out (i.e., the amount are considered as cash
flowbacks from the firm) or as money paid into a "sink" (i.e., there is
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no return from the amounts). The amount removed is determined by a
linear function, specified by the user, of the total budget monies
available for the year. Both the constant and the linear factors are
allowed to grow (or decline) from year to year, each at their own rate,
and both factors can have a uniformly-distributed, symmetric, stochastic
variation imposed if desired. For convenience, this process — whether
the amounts shall be considered as returns or not — will be referred to
as the "disinvestment process."
Decision Rules
Parra's model, without any modifications, allows simulation of many
different decision rules. Only three decision rules were considered in
this research, and only these three rules will be described here. These
rules are ROGR and two "approximate MPV" rules using two MOW's.
Specifically, the rules are:
(1) ROGR. All proposals being considered at the decision time are
ranked in descending order of prospective growth rate. Proposals are
accepted in this order, accounting for mutually-exclusive proposals,
until either no more proposals can be afforded or until the proposal
being considered has a prospective growth rate below a specified cut-off
rate, gc.
(2) MPV (Approximate). The MPV criterion, as described in Chapter
II, required solution of an integer programming (IP) problem. Current
algorithms for solution of IP problems are expensive in terms of
computation time. Parra experimented with an IP algorithm which was an
extension of a scheme proposed by Geoffrion. He found the necessary
solution time grew very large with only moderate numbers of proposals.
He also found the exact solution offered only little improvement over the
approximate solution: in three different simulations of ten replications
each, the overall average growth rate of the firm for the approximate
solution was 99.551 as large as that for the exact solution (60, pp.
81-86). For these reasons, the exact MPV solutions was never considered
in this research. The approximate MPV algorithm is as follows: (a) rank
the proposals according to three different indices (specified below);
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(b) determine the set of accepted proposals for each index-ordering in a
manner analogous to that described for ROGR above; (c) select that set of
the three accepted sets that gives the maximum total MOW. The three
indices are: (i) the ratio of MOW to first cost (called by Thuesen and
Parra the Lorie-Savage ratio, because they proposed this index in (M7));
(ii) the ratio of MOW to total cost (which would differ from (i) only in
the case of proposals requiring multiple disbursements); and (iii) the
MOW, itself. Two different MOW's were used with the decision rule in
research: net present value, Pj(m), and prospective present worth,
Pj(m,i<j). Since the exact MPV solution was never considered in this
research, the prefix "approximate" shall henceforth be dropped; it
should be understood that "MPV" means the approximate MPV algorithm.
Furthermore, "MPV" by itself shall be used to denote the algorithm with
prospective present worth as a MOW; "MNPV" shall denote the algorithm
with net present value as MOW.
In addition, throughout this research the MPV criterion was used
with prospective present worth exactly as defined in Chapter II as the
MOW. In certain situations that arose in Tests VII, IX, and XV this
criterion was applied to situations in which decisions were made at
intervals other than annual. In these cases the MOW used was not the
most theoretically correct form; a more correct MOW would have been a
reformulation of the prospective present worth with the factor
( ( 1+i^ )/( 1+ra) ) in the first term raised to a power equal to the expected
interval (in years) between decisions. Presumably, if the more correct
MOW were used the MPV criterion would have made better decisions and
would have given somewhat higher results. Nevertheless, the basic form
of prospective present worth was used in all experiments of this research
in the interests of simplicity and compatibility among observations.
The research often deals with comparisons of the results obtainable
from ROGR, MPV, and MNPV when the three rules use equal values for the
decision parameters gc or m (cutoff rate or discounting rate). It is
convenient to use the symbol m to represent these decision parameters for
all three rules: either gc (for ROGR) or m (for MPV or MNPV).
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Inputs to the Model
The model is sophisticated and complex; consequently a large number
of input data are needed to specify a simulation. Parra briefly
describes the inputs to his model in Appendix A of his dissertation (60,
pp. 120-126). Further descriptions of some of these inputs, and a
description of additional inputs accepted by the revised model are given
in Appendix A to this dissertation. It should be pointed out that the
revised model will accept the identical input set of Parra's original
model and gives identical results; all additional inputs are entirely
optional.
It is convenient to separate the large number of inputs into four
classes. The first such class are the Control variables. Control
variables control the overall operation of the model: input, output,
number of years simulated (H), number of replications (NREPS), and the
set of initial random number seeds (IRNS). It is presumed that any
intelligent selection of values for the Control variables will not affect
the overall results of the simulation. (A test was made of this
presumption for Control variable H; see Chapter IV).
The second class of inputs are the Decision variables. These
variables determine the decision process being simulated: timing of
decisions, MOW used, etc. It is presumed that in a real situation a firm
would have complete control over these variables; it is further presumed
that the choice of these variables has a significant effect on the output
results.
The final two classes of inputs are called Situational parameters
and Tuning parameters, respectively. Inputs from these two classes
determine the situation faced by the firm being simulated. That is, they
determine all the characteristics of the investment proposals to be
(randomly) generated, and they determine the cash throwoffs from previous
investments available for investment (the input budget vector). It is
presumed that in a real situation a firm would have fairly little control
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over these variables; although a gcod businessman would probably try to
modify his situation by improving the quality of the proposals generated.
It is further presumed that at least some of these variables
significantly affect the final results of the simulation (this latter
presumption is extensively examined in Chapter IV). The Tuning
parameters have been put in a separate class from the other Situational
parameters because, for the case of simulating a hypothetical firm in
financial equilibrium, their values must be experimentally determined by
a "tuning" process. The variables that comprise the Situational and
Tuning classes for Parra's original model are listed in Table III. The
variables that determine the (optional) disinvestment process (described
above in "Simulation Process") would be considered as additional
Situational parameters.
Outputs from the Model
The simulation program prints a large quantity of data describing
various characteristics measured during the simulation. The output is
described in Appendix A of Parra's dissertation (60, pp. 126-128). The
output data that is of primary importance in measuring the effectiveness
of the combination of parameters used for the simulation is the vector of
post-horizon budget flows, i.e., the vector of post-horizon cash returns
that would be realized from the accepted subset of generated proposals.
In the usual case of several replications of a simulation, it is actually
the average cash flow vector that is printed. Since this primary output
is a vector, the user of this simulation model who wants to compare
results of various simulation runs is in a situation similar to that of
the businessman trying to choose among alternatives: in order to compare
cash flow vectors, some norm-like function must be applied to reduce each
vector to a scalar.
Measure of Effectiveness
The simulated firm may itself be viewed as a raeta-proposal: invest




Parameters for the Simulation Model
Situational Parameters
F(ME)* Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the
number of mutually exclusive alternatives in a
set.
F(D)* CDF of the allowable delay in years for a pro-
posal between generation and being dropped from
further consideration.
F(L)* CDF of the life (n.) of a proposal in years.
F(g)* CDF of the prospective growth rate of a proposal.
F(CJ)* CDF of the cost of a proposal, normalized:
E(CJ) = 1.0.
EBC* Expected ratio of budget to cost of a proposal.
In equilibrium: EBC = MO ( 1) / (CE x NE ) .
a* Exponential factor determining what portion of
gp is to be growth in expected number of proposals.
CE. Expected cost of a proposal generated during the
first year.
NE Expected number of sets of proposals to be
generated in the first year.
NE . Minimum number of sets of proposals to bemm
, , .generated in any year.
Th Pattern of cash flows of a proposal.
"5 Interest rate earned by highly liquid investments.
iw
.
Interest rate paid on the j-th increment of
•^ borrowing.
fw . Maximum amount that can be borrowed in the j-th
•* increment of borrowing expressed as a fraction
of the firm's worth.
* Considered the most important parameters.
Tuning Parameters
MO Input vector of budget cash flows for investment,




budget vector and the benefits are the vector of post-horizon cash
outflows. (Normally, it would be assumed that the post-horizon cash
flows would be reinvested in the firm). The problem of choosing a
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) for the model is therefore completely
analogous to the problem of choosing a MOW to use in selecting
alternatives. The MOE selected by Parra, and the MOE used throughout
this research, was the average growth rate of the wealth of the firm, g,
defined as the prospective growth rate of the cash flows series with
inputs represented by the input budget vector and outputs represented by
the post-H cash flowbacks.
Drawbacks of g
The drawbacks of using prospective growth rate as a MOW were
discussed in Chapter II: necessity for making an explicit incremental
analysis; the possibility that it is multiply-defined, or undefined, for
irregular cash flow patterns; and the need for a criterion rate to which
the incremental rate can be compared. As an example of these
difficulties and how they affect the use of g as a MOE, consider the
following situation that was observed while running one of the tests
described in Chapter V.
This test will be called Test I. The set of input parameters used
in the simulation and the observed results are listed in detail in
Appendices B and C, respectively. (Inputs and outputs of all tests
discussed in this dissertation will be found in these appendices,
identified by the test number referred to in the text). This test
consisted of a single replication run under each of two decision rules:
ROGR and MPV. Both decision rules had identical input budget vectors and
both faced identical proposal streams. The only difference between the
two treatments was the decision rule used. Table IV displays the
outputs: post-H cash flows and corresponding g for both decision rules
and for the increment (ROGR - MPV). Since the input budget vectors were
identical for both decision rules, the cash flews shown in Table IV are





































Test I Data: Money Invested by Growth Classes










Total 563.9 150.1 118.9
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values of g indicates that ROGR yielded a slightly higher average growth
rate than MPV. However, the incremental analysis shows that accepting
the ROGR series over the MPV series is equivalent to accepting a pure
borrowing at an interest rate slightly greater than 0.13. The proposals
accepted under the ROGR criterion, plus the cash invested at i§ ,
returned more money in the immediate post-horizon years, but from time
(H + 4) onwards the proposals accepted under MPV returned more money.
Clearly, if g is to be used as a MOE, it must be used with caution.
Drawbacks of P(m)
The most common objection to using net present value or prospective
present worth as a MOW was also given in Chapter II, namely the
difficulty of choosing the interest rate, m, upon which the value of this
MOW depends. Some theorists have approached the proper choice of ra from
the viewpoint of various theoretical models of the economic market in
which the firm operates. Oakford argues that the proper choice for m is
the growth rate at which the cost series would be invested if the
proposal under consideration were rejected, and also the growth rate at
which the benefit series would be invested if the proposal were accepted
(59, p. 3D. He calls this growth rate the marginal growth rate: "The
average growth rate at which the marginal incremental cash flow series
would be invested is defined to be the marginal growth rate for a
decision" (59, p. 95). He further points out that while one should use
the average growth rate of the firm in calculations to estimate best the
actual present worth of a proposal, one should use the marginal growth
rate to estimate the incremental present worth of cepting the proposal
(59, p. 92).
These ideas concerning consideration of a proposal by a firm may be
extended to apply to the raeta-proposal: the firm itself (as simulated).
First, consider the case of comparing two simulations which each
represent the same firm but using different decision rules —
specifically, ROGR and MPV. Many tests in this research correspond to
this case; Test I, cited above, for example. This case would also
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correspond to most practical applications of the model, since it seems
reasonable to assume that a firm would have complete control over which
decision rule is used but little or no control over the underlying
processes of generation represented in the model by the situational
parameters. Let rfi be the theoretically correct value of m for the firm,
as discussed below under the Equilibrium and Tuning section. It seems
reasonable to assume further that a large majority of the better
proposals — those with a prospective growth rate greater than ffl — that
are accepted will be accepted under both decision rules. The incremental
series representing the difference between the ROGR and the MPV
meta-proposals will thus be for the most part identifiable with the money
that is left in liquid form under ROGR that, under MPV, is invested in
proposals with rates of return between i and m. Finally, there will
o
remain the presumably small set of proposals with rates of return greater
than f3 that were accepted under one decision rule but not the other for
either of two reasons: (1) due to the difference in amount of money
available for investment under the two rules in the later years of the
simulation, or (2) due to differences in the value ordering of proposals
determined by the two rules.
An illustration of the situation outlined above is given in Table V.
This table lists the total money invested, in thousands of dollars, by
prospective growth rate of the proposal (grouped into classes of growth
rates) for the Test I simulation described above. The data are given for
common investments, investments under ROGR but not MPV, and investments
under MPV but not ROGR. It can be seen that, of all money invested, 79%
under ROGR and 33% under MPV was invested in common by both rules. For
proposals with a rate of return greater than .08, 93% under ROGR and 95%
under MPV was accepted in common by both rules.
The assumption made above was that the incremental series
representing the difference between the ROGR and MPV meta-proposals
consists mostly of money which is left in liquid form (invested at it for
one period) under ROGR but which is invested in proposals with rates of
and ffi under MPV. The relevant data from Test I
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illustrates that this assumption does not appear to be unreasonable, at
least in some cases. From this assumption as to the nature of the
incremental series, and from Oakford's rules for choosing the corapounding
rate, ra, summarized above, one can make a convincing argument that the
proper choice of m for computing Pj(m) for the incremental series would
be the interest earned by liquid investments, i^ .
However, consider the case of comparing the results of two
simulations which represent two different firms, i.e. simulations based
upon two different sets of situational parameters. Although this case
might not be of any particular interest from a practical viewpoint, it is
of considerable theoretical interest. Virtually all the tests described
in Chapter IV are of this nature. The proper choice of rate m is even
more difficult in this case than in the first case. Arguments may be
made for several different rates, depending upon the viewpoint chosen.
Because the simulations represent two entirely different situations, the
incremental cash flow series is not so easily characterized as in the
previous case. No unique choice of a proper value for m suggests itself;
any rate chosen would probably be controversial.
Viewpoint of This Research
For a firm choosing among alternatives, the arguments in favor of
choosing prospective value or present worth as a MOW over prospective
rate of return seem compelling. For comparing simulated firms, the
choice between prospective value and rate of return as a MOE of the
meta-proposal is not so clear. Drawbacks inherent in each choice have
been pointed out.
The measure of effectiveness used throughout this research is the
prospective growth rate of the meta-proposal: the average growth rate
of the wealth of the firm, g. This MOE was selected because the research
was concerned with investigation of simulations of firms in a dynamic
state of financial equilibrium, or near such a state. Assuming that the
horizon, H, of the simulation is chosen strictly for convenience, that
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all post-horizon cash flov/s would actually be reinvested in the firm, and
that the firm is in equilibrium, then g is felt to be an appropriate MOE.
For if two firms fit the assumptions above and g-| is greater than g2,
then for a study horizon chosen sufficiently long, the output cash
flows of firm one will sufficiently dominate the output cash flows of
firm two as to be unequivocally superior. In the case of comparing
proposals this reasoning could not be used because the proposals were
assumed to have fixed, finite lives. In the case of comparing two firms
in equilibrium, it is assumed the choice of horizon is arbitrary and that
the respective growths in wealth could be maintained indefinitely.
The results and conclusions of this research must, therefore, be
approached with some caution. The choice of g as the proper measure of
effectiveness is based upon the assumptions of all firms being in
equilibrium for indefinite periods with all cash returns being reinvested
in the firm. If the model is to be used to simulate — or if some of the
results of this research are to be interpreted as — situations which do
not meet these assumptions, then g may well not be the proper choice for
the measure of effectiveness. As illustrated earlier with the Test I
data shown in Table IV, comparing g for two simulations may not be
indicative of the comparative short-term results. In such cases,
prospective value would probably be a preferable MOE.
Equilibrium and Tuning
In broad terms, a firm is defined to be in financial equilibrium for
purposes of this study when its growth in wealth, or budget, is matched
by its growth in investment opportunities. A firm experiencing faster
growth in money than in opportunities would find itself investing more
and more money in marginal proposals and, eventually, leaving more and
more money in liquid funds to grow at rate i». Eventually this unhappy
situation would slow the growth in wealth until this matched the growth
in opportunities. The obvious converse would be true for a firm with a
slower growth in wealth than in opportunities. In terms of the
parameters of the model, the growth rate of the generation process, gp,
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would be expected to approximately equal the average growth rate of the
wealth of the firm, g, in equilibrium.
Expected Ratio: Budget to Cost
As Parra noted, for a firm in equilibrium the expected value of the
ratio of budget to first cost (EBC) will be constant, except for random
fluctuations (60, p. 63). Specifically, EBC is the expected value of the
ratio of the money available for investment at a decision time (the
budget) to the sum of first costs of all proposals generated since the
last decision. Since at most one proposal can be selected from each set
of alternatives, and since proposal cost is assumed an independent random
variable, EBC is thus the expected value of budget divided by the product
of expected number of sets of proposals and expected cost of proposals.
Thuesen reported that the budget of a firm grows proportionally to the
firm's wealth, with random fluctuations (75). The budget available at
decision time T has been denoted MT(1), and since g is the growth rate of
wealth of the firm the relation
M[T + t](1) = MT(1)x(1 + g)t
will hold, except for stochastic variation. Furthermore since gp
approximately equals g in equilibrium, EBC can be expressed entirely in
terms of input quantities for a firm in equilibrium
EBC = M0(1)/ ( NE xCE )
In an idealized situation, EBC and F(g), the distribution of
prospective growth rates, together determine the theoretically correct
marginal growth rate, ft, of the firm as well as g. That is, assuming
what Oakford calls "unit investment" proposals — proposals with unit
cost and one-year lives — distributed according to F(g) , a good decision
rule would select the most desirable EBC fraction of the proposals
available,
EBC = 1 - F(g = ffi)
and the average growth rate of the money invested in this idealized
schedule of proposals could be simply determined from
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Fig, 1, Relationship of m and EBC to F(g)
Smax
E(g) = / g f(g) dg
a
EBC
The situation is illustrated in Figure 1, which is drawn according to the
usual convention for cumulative distribution functions. It is common in
the literature of capital budgeting to see this situation drawn as a
reflection/inversion of Figure 1; that is, drawn with growth rates as the
ordinate and (1 - F(g)) the abscissa. The curve would then slope
downward to the right. Drawn in such a manner, the curve of (1 - F(g))
vs. g is often called the "investment function."
M8

Of course, variations in the proposals generated from the idealized
"unit investment proposals" will alter the idealized relationships shown
in Figure 1. More realistic proposal characteristics will probably
result in a realized g that is not equal to the theoretical E(g) as
calculated above. This in turn will affect EBC to some extent and hence
perturb the theoretical value of ra. Such perturbations are often very
complex: in general, it is only the idealized situation discussed, or
minor variations of it, that are susceptible to analytical solution. In
this research, the idealized situation will be assumed as a first
estimate for tuning. Throughout this dissertation, a will be used to
denote theoretical value of marginal growth rate as determined above from
F(g) and EBC.
The Tuning Process
Parra described a heuristic tuning procedure (60, pp. 66-69).
Briefly, starting with a value of gp equal to E(g) as described above and
arbitrary MO, run the simulation for a few replications. If the output
average values of post-horizon cash flows, MH' (scaled so that MH'(1) =
M0(D), and g are close to the input values of MO and gp, consider the
model tuned. Otherwise, reset the inputs to the values output by the
simulation and iterate: gpi+1 = g L and MOi+1 - MH £ > where the
subscripts denote the iteration of the tuning process.
Since it was clear at the outset that the research would entail
simulations of a large number of situation/decision rule combinations,
each of which must be tuned, it was early decided this tuning procedure
ought to be investigated further. One objective was merely to gain more
insight into the tuning process itself. The other was to seek answers to
certain questions that had arisen: Was there, in fact, a tuning
phenomenon observable in gp and MO or merely random fluctuation? Was
tuning uniquely convergent, or were there multiple stable values for a
set of parameters? Did the initial values have a significant effect on
the final, tuned values? What was a reasonable choice for a criterion of
"closeness" for stopping the procedure? How many iterations might tuning












Fig, 2, Example of Divergent Behavior Noted while Tuning
convergence? Did both MO and gp require tuning? If so, should the
tuning be simultaneous, should it alternate, or should one be fully
tuned, then the other?
Parra's heuristic tuning procedure is based on the method of
"successive approximation" for finding the roots of a function (62, pp.
320-336). The stochastic nature of the model introduces considerable
random variation in the outputs g and MH, so the tuning process cannot be
expected to converge in the way successive approximation applied to an
analytic function would. In fact, in a few early trial runs the
algorithm was initially convergent but then produced relatively large
oscillations in the tuning parameters. Such behavior is illustrated in
Figure 2. Because of this a simple modification was made to the tuning
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algorithm. To allow for some smoothing in the tuning sequence, values
were reset by
SPi+1 = Xg Si + (1 - Xg ) gpi
M0 i+1 = Am MH{ + (1 - A ra ) MOi
Values of Ag = Am = 1.0 correspond to Parra's original algorithm. Since
there is no particular reason to consider Ag i Am , all tuning tests were
run with Ag = A ffl (except for Test IV, described below), and only the
single parameter A will be referenced. The tests were run with A set
either at 0.5 ("tuning") or zero ("no tuning").
Parameters for the Tuning Tests
A set of arbitrary values for the situational parameters was chosen
to describe the simulated firm. Values for the more important parameters
(those marked with an asterisk in Table III) were randomly generated;
values that seemed "reasonable" were selected for the other parameters.
Table VI lists these values. The randomly-generated distribution F(g)
resulted in an average growth rate of about 0.70. Although this would
not be a realistic value for many businesses, it does not detract from
the validity of the results. All tests were run with the approximate MPV
decision criteria using the theoretically correct value for marginal
growth rate, ffi, over annual batches of proposals.
Runs with Repeated Random Number Seeds
Several runs were made to examine the behavior of the tuning
algorithm when applied to a "constant" stream of proposals — at least,
as constant as is consistent with the assumptions used to construct the
model. Specifically, seeds for the random number generators are reset to
their starting values at the beginning of each tuning iteration. Both gp
and MO were tuned (A = .5) after a single 8-year simulation run.
Resultant values of g for each of the first 25 iterations are shown
graphically in Figure 3 for four of these runs. Test II-A was run with
one set of intial random number seeds (IRNS); Test II-D with a different
set. Both these subtests were run twice, with two different starting
values for the tuned parameters; these values are shown in Table VII.

Table VI
Values of Situational Parameters for Test II
F(ME) = (.345, .757, .815, .947, 1.0)
No del ay all owed
g F(g) CJ F(CJ) L Fl:d
0,,022 0.000 0.560 0.000 1 0.,231
0,.104 0.579 0.655 0.308 2 0,,658
1,.037 0.672 1.105 0.410 3 0.,999
1,.144 0.933 1.215 0.586 4 1,,0
1 .149 0.995 1.220 0.953
1,.167 0.999 1.234 0.955
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Uniform pattern of cash flowbacks
Borrowing: up to 5% of the firm's worth at iw = .03
Table VI I
Starting Conditions for Tuning Parameters for Test II
Test: ll-A(l) II-AC2) ll-D(2)
I l-D(l)
0.469 0.642 0.740
M0 (t) t = l 50,000 50,,000 50,,000
2 34,612 35,.707 32,,200





Fig, 3. Convergence of Sample Tuning Tests II and III
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Initially, five tests — Tests II-A, II-B, ... , II-E — were made.
The starting conditions, IRNS, MOq, and gpQ varied from test to test, but
the IRNS were repeated for each tuning iteration. Test II-A was the only
such test exhibiting convergent behavior; the other four tests cycled
like Test II-D. Output values for Tests II-B, II-C, and II-E are listed
in Appendix C. It is noteworthy that both Test II-A runs converged to
the same value. For this test, the final value was independent of the
starting conditions, although the rate of convergence was affected. It
is even more noteworthy that the cyclical behavior of Test II-D was
noticeably affected by starting conditions: the cycles of Tests II-D(1)
and II-D(2) differed not only in the mean value of g for the cycle (a
significant difference) but also in the period and shape of the cycle.
Also shown in Figure 3 are the results of Test III, which used a
more intuitive tuning procedure. This procedure was identical to the
procedure described by Parra (ten replications were made using the same
set of values for gp and MO, then tuning was done with the average
outputs and the process was iterated; random number seeds were not reset
between simulations) except that Parra's procedure had A = i
f
and Te3t
III was run with X = .5. Test III is shown for comparison with the Test
II runs. Test III appears to be converging to an average g of about 0.70
— just about the same value as that of Test II-D( 1 ) , but quite different
from the values of Tests II-A and II-D(2). It is also apparent that the
repeated IRNS runs of Test II were close to their final values in eight
to ten simulations, but tuning by average (Test III) took 60 simulations.
Analysis of Variance Tests
Three different factorial experiments were run to test the effects




The runs of this test, Test IV, were performed similarly to Test II
described above — viz., tuning was done after each 8-year simulation and
IRNS were reset for each iteration. The test was designed to discover
the significant effects that four factors might have on the final value
of g. The four factors were (A) initial value of gp, (B) initial value
of MO, (C) whether gp is tuned or held constant, and (D) whether or not
MO is tuned. The values of the factors tested are shown in Table VIII.
Note that both levels of MO have identical net present worths at g =
.725, Pmo(«725) = 83,741, where .725 is the mean of the two values used
for gp.
Thirteen of the 16 treatments led eventually to stable values of g
and MH. Three of the four runs made with A = 0, X = .5 resulted in
m g
cycling; the mean value of g for the final cycle was used as the observed
value in these cases. Table IX displays the observed values. Table X
gives the analysis of variance (ANOVA) of this test. The conclusions are
that for the case of tuning every iteration and repeated IRNS the
following factors have a significant effect on observed final values of g:
(1) initial value of gp,
(2) Whether or not MO is tuned, and
(3) The interaction between the initial gp and whether or not gp is
tuned.
Observations without Tuning
This test was performed to see whether the input values of gp and MO
actually have a significant effect on the observed values of g from a
simulation. No tuning was done to produce the observations. Ten
simulations for each combination were run. The levels of factors A (gp)
and B (MO) used for this test were identical to those for Test IV — see
Table VIII. (Again, both values of factor B had equal net present values
computed for g = .725, the mean of the two values for factor A).
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Table VI I I




















Mean Observations for Test IV


















* Combination resulted in cycling; value shown
is average g for the last cycle.
Factor
Table X
ANOVA of Test IV
MSS d.f
.
A 0.0324 ]L 58.65*
B 0.0000 ]L <1.
C 0.0031 ]L <1.
D 0.0079 3 14.38*
AB 0.0005 ]L <1.
AC 0.0291 ]L 52.72*
AD 0.0005 1L <1.
BC 0.0002 ]L <1.
BD 0.0003 ]L <1.
CD o.oooi :L <1.
Error 0.0006





Comb i nat i on
(1) a b ab
5 72 4 .8079 .5156 .7405
5304 .7211+ .5531 .7462
5297 .8173 .5282 .7194
5573 .7487 .5604 .7722
5355 .7047 .5569 .7791
U721 .7561 .5297 .7957
5442 .8283 .5871 .7953
5062 .7450 .5693 .7350
5889 .7937 .5357 .7341













ANOVA of Test V
Factor MSS d.f. F
A 0.4508 1 324.76*
B 0.0003 1 <1.
AB 0.0043 1 3.09
Error 0.0014 36
* Significant at .05 level.
The ten observed values for each of the four treatment combinations
of Test V are listed in Table XI. Table XII displays the ANOVA of this
test. The ANOVA supports the conclusion that only the value of gp has a
significant effect on the observed values of g for a simulation — not MO
nor the interaction.
Tuning on the Average
Test VI was conducted to examine the effects of the initial values
of gp and MO on the final, "tuned" value of g under conditions as
described earlier for Test III: tuning on the average results of ten
replications, X - .5, random number seeds not reset during a test. Again
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the levels of factor A (gp) and factor B (MO) from Test IV were repeated
for this test. Ten tuning iterations (ten replications each) were run
for each test.
The mean observed values of g for the final iteration of each of the
four treatment combinations are shown in Table XIII. Table XIV lists the
ANOVA of this test, supporting the conclusions that starting values of
neither gp nor MO appreciably affect the final values of g under "normal"
tuning conditions.
Comparison of Samples
Finally, the samples of observations from Tests IV, V, and VI may be
compared
:
(1) Test IV ~ n = 16, u = .7041, S = .0717
(2) Test V — n = 40, u = .6488, S = .1149
(3) Test VI — n = 40, y = .7136, S = .0466
where n indicates the sample size of each test. Examination of the
observations of Tests IV and V suggests that these each be divided into
observations for factor A, initial value of gp, at high level (A = + 1)
and observations for low A (A = - 1)
(1a) Test IV (A = + 1) — n = 8, u = .7492, S = .0402
(1b) Test IV (A = - 1) — n = 8, y = .6590, S = .0688
(2a) Test V (A = + 1 ) — n = 20, y = .7559, S = .0461
(2b) Test V (A = - 1) — n = 20, y = .5418, S = .0289
There seems no reason to believe all 40 points of Test VI are not samples
from the same distribution.
To test whether the five samples (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3) could be
samples drawn from (assumed normal) distributions with equal variances
the "M Test" can be applied (17). The calculated value for the five
samples is M = 9.329 which is less than the tabulated value for M. The
hypothesis that all variances are equal cannot be rejected. As a check
upon the subdivisions of samples (1) and (2), the M test applied to the




Observations of the Final Iteration, Test VI
Comb i na t i on
(1) a b ab
Mean .7128 .7212 .7101 .7105
Std. Dev. .0U70 .0509 .01+90 .01*62
Table XIV
A NOVA of Tesit VI
Factor MSS d.f. F
A 0.0002 1 <1.
B 0.0005 1 <1.
AB 0.0002 1 <1.
Error 0.0023 36
Table XV









* Significant at .05 level,
Table XVI
ANOVA of the Six Tuned Samples
Source MSS d.f. F
Total 0.0030 55 —
Among




than the tabulated value for M: the hypothesis of equal variances is
rejected.
Mere visual inspection of the five samples suggests the means of the
distribution from which they were drawn are not equal. This conclusion
can be formalized by an analysis of variance of the five samples,
assuming equal variances based on the results above. The ANOVA is
summarized in Table XV. The hypothesis that the five samples are drawn
from distributions with equal means is rejected at the .05 level.
One final comparison of interest is a comparison of the means of
just the "tuned" samples - i.e., omitting samples 2a and 2b (Test V).
For this test, sample 3 will be divided into the four treatment
combinations under which it was observed. Test IV will again be treated
as two samples: 1a and 1b. The ANOVA of these six "tuned" samples is
given in Table XVI. The hypothesis that these six samples are drawn from
distributions with equal means is accepted at the .05 level.
Summary and Conclusions: Tuning
These tests served to reaffirm confidence in Parra's notion of
tuning. The input values for the tuning parameters do have an effect on
the observed output values of g in the simulation model (without tuning)
,
although variations in budget vector MO that preserve the net present
value of the budget do not affect g appreciably. When tuning on the
average (over ten replications) starting values for gp and MO have no
effect on the final "tuned" values. In the case of tuning with a
repeated set of IRNS, as in tests II and IV, "convergence" was achieved
more rapidly than in the case of tuning on the average, but the result
was dependent both upon starting value for gp and the set of IRNS.
Finally, a comparison of the observed samples indicated that tuning
affects the mean of the distribution of observed g, but not the variance:
all observed samples of g appeared to be drawn from distributions
(assumed normal) with equal variances; all "tuned" observations appeared
to be drawn from distributions with equal means.
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Tests run in the earlier stages of this research, i.e. most of
those tests described in Chapter IV, were tuned using a procedure
identical to that described for Tests III and VI. Specifically, tuning
was done on the average results of ten replications; the tuning
parameter, A, was set at 0.5. Convergence was tested by using the
standard "t-test" at .05 confidence level to test whether gp and P^o^gP)
could be considered the means of the realized distributions of g and
P^(g), respectively. When both tests indicated convergence, the tuning
process was stopped and the final iteration was taken as the observation.
In the later tests, this procedure was modified: tuning was done on the
average results of five replications with tuning parameter X set at 0.8.
When both tests indicated convergence, five additional replications were
run without resetting any parameters. These final ten replications were
taken as the observation. This second version of the tuning algorithm
produced tuned results more economically than the first version with no
apparent loss in effectiveness.
Cautionary Notes
Two aspects of the tuning process which should be considered
carefully by the prospective user of Parra's model deserve to be pointed
out here. The first concerns the assumption of approximate equality
between gp and g in equilibrium. When simulating a hypothetical firm,
the equilibrium gp must be determined experimentally through some tuning
process similar to that described above. This means that the growth rate
of the generation process is tied to — in fact, is determined by — the
growth rate of wealth of the firm. Although this is what is meant by
equilibrium, and it seems reasonable as a long-term result, it may not be
a reasonable state of affairs for an individual situation. Practically
speaking, the dynamic nature of the business/economic world probably
precludes actually achieving equilbrium for all but a few firms.
The second aspect is closely related to the first. When comparing
the results of two fully-tuned simulations, one must keep in mind that,
in general, the two simulated firms received different budget amounts and

that they "saw" proposal streams with different characteristics. Because
of the influence of gp, the firm with the higher gp generated costlier
proposals, on the average, but consequently received higher cash
flowbacks; more importantly, this firm also generated more proposals per
year.
Based on the results of the tuning tests described above, we would
generally expect full tuning of each simulation to emphasize the
differences among the simulations. Again, these would reflect the
long-term differences to be expected assuming growth in proposal
generation is affected by growth in wealth. Such a situation may often
be appropriate; it seemed appropriate for the sensitivity tests described
in Chapter IV, for example. All the tests described in that chapter are
"fully tuned": each treatment observed was individually tuned using the
process described above.
In other cases, full tuning may not be appropriate. For example if
one wished to compare the results obtained by applying two different
decision rules to the same situation, the short-term (or "somewhat
untuned") results may be more appropriate. Because of the influences
exerted by MO and gp, one might feel that the tuning process would
introduce a bias in favor of the better decision rule. In such a case it
might be be better to determine gp and MO from some average or general
tuning process, say by setting them to the average of the two fully-tuned
values. The observations taken from this generally-tuned situation would
then introduce no bias in favor of one or the other simulation, yet
neither simulation would be too far from a fully tuned state. The tests
on optimum decision rule described in Chapter V all make use of this
concept of general tuning.
Finally, the tuning process described above is inappropriate if
one is simulating a firm that is known or assumed not to be in





The major goal of the research described in this dissertation is
represented by the tests analyzed in Chapter V: an examination of
techniques for optimizing two selected decision procedures and comparing
their relative effectiveness under a broad range of conditions. Before
this part of the research could be conducted, a considerable body of
preliminary testing had to be carried out to define the problem space
properly. These preliminary tests are concerned mostly with an
investigation of the sensitivity of the measure of effectiveness, g, to
changes in the Situational parameters. These tests are described and
discussed in this chapter. All tests described in this chapter were
fully-tuned with decision parameter m equal to the theoretically correct
value, ffi. Detailed listing of input values and observed outputs are
contained in Appendices B and C, respectively, for all tests described.
Primary Tests
In Chapter III it was pointed out that the set of input variables
for the simulation model could conveniently be divided into four
categories. Variables that serve to exert some overall control over the
simulation with no relation to the firm being simulated were called
Control variables. It is assumed that the MOE observed from a simulation
is invariant with respect to Control variables. (This assumption was
tested in the cases of control parameters H, or Horizon, and scaling;
results of these tests are described below under "Secondary Tests").
Variables that serve to describe the complete set of decision rules used
in the capital budgeting process were called Decision parameters. Tests
exploring the problem of maximizing the MOE through the choice of
decision rule are described in Chapter V. Remaining variables were
classified as either Situational parameters or Tuning parameters.
Together, variables of these two classes serve to describe the situation
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within which the decision rules roust operate: the distributions
governing the (random) generation of investment proposals by the firm,
and the parameters describing the short-term borrowing and disinvestment
situations faced by the firm. Values for the Situational parameters may
be almost arbitrarily chosen. Values for the Tuning parameters are
usually determined from the Situational parameters by the tuning process
described in the last chapter.
It was pointed out that the major goal of this research was an
investigation of selected decision policies under a broad range of
conditions. As stated above, it was assumed that the Control parameters
would not affect the MOE and were considered irrelevant for the purposes
of this research. To attempt to determine a full response surface of g
to all the Decision and Situational parameters would be a task of far too
broad a scope under present conditions. What may be — and was —
attempted is an investigation of the optimum g attainable from the MPV
and ROGR decision rules under a few common decision timing conventions,
over a broad range of values for some of the Situational parameters. In
order that even this reduced problem could be explored within a limited
research budget, it was necessary to conduct some preliminary tests to
determine the sensitivity of the MOE, g, to changes in the Situational
parameters.
The First Test
In order to reduce the parameter space to be investigated to a
workable level, an initial screening of the situational parameters was
done to eliminate those thought unlikely to be important. Although some
of this screening was based on tests run by Parra — e.g., he found that
varying cash flow pattern between uniform and Markov patterns had no
effect — some of the parameters were eliminated on the basis of
intuition. The other parameters, namely those defining the short-term
borrowing and disinvestment processes, were eliminated, not because it
was thought their influence on g was unimportant but in order to reduce
the scope of the problem to a practicable level. The seven parameters
considered in Test VII were indicated with an asterisk in Table III.
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An eighth factor was included in the preliminary sensitivity test:
the scaling factor. Just as EBC is represented, not by an actual input
variable, but by a relationship among three input variables (M0(1), CEg,
and NEq), so also is scaling represented by a relationship between two
input quantities (CEq and NEq). Following the classification scheme of
the last chapter, scaling will be considered a Control parameter,
although it could be considered a Situational parameter instead. It
would be financially impractical to use Parra's model to simulate
directly a firm that generated, say, 2000 proposals per year. Besides
the prohibitive expense of generating so many proposals, there would be a
problem of storage space required by the model. Instead of simulating
such a situation directly, one could "scale" the problem by generating,
say, only 100 proposals per year, each 20 times as expensive as in the
original case. Parra had conducted some tests of scaling effects, but
they were not considered conclusive so scaling was added to the factors
to be tested for sensitivity.
Obviously, another idea of "scaling" may be used: all proposal
costs and input budget cash flows may be multiplied by a common factor,
which clearly would not affect the EBC. Because of the proposal
generation process, outlined in the previous chapter, multiplying
proposal cost by some factor will result in all generated cash flows of
the proposal being multiplied by the same factor. Thus, multiplying the
Situational parameter CEq by some factor will result in all simulated
cash flows except the input budget vector M0 being multiplied by that
factor. It is assumed that scaling in this second sense may be performed
at will with absolutely no effect on the output g, so it will not be
considered further. "Scaling" will refer strictly to simultaneous
adjustment of CEq and NEq such that their product, E(TCPg), and hence
EBC, remains constant.
Description
The sensitivity test, then, consisted of an experiment to test which
of a set of eight factors, and which of their interactions, have a
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significant effect on the output g. For the scalar factors, a and EBC,
it might suffice to pick two or so interesting values and test at these
levels. However, for the five parameters that are distributions, it
would be hard to limit the values of interest to just a few levels. At
just two levels each, a full factorial experiment would require 256
observations. Including the requisite tuning, such an experiment would
be prohibitively expensive. This reality led to consideration of
fractional replication as a method of achieving the desired results at
acceptable cost. This, in turn, meant that the factors were all limited,
practically, to two levels each. Rather than attempt to delineate two
"most interesting" sets of values for the parameters that were
distributions, most of the values for these parameters were randomly
generated. Values for the two levels of the eight factors are shown in
Table XVII. Values set for the other situational parameters for this
test are shown in Appendix B (interpretation of the Markov transition
probability vector for cash flows can be found in Parra: 60, pp.
131-133).
A special relationship exists between the two levels of F(g). In
order to meet the requirements of the factorial experiment, it was
necessary that both levels of F(g) have equal values of ffi at both values
of the EBC levels. There appeared little doubt that a difference in E(g)
as determined from F(g) would result in a significant difference in
realized g, so it was decided that both levels of F(g) should have the
same mean value and thus measure the effect of a difference in shape
only. First an arbitrary, but reasonable, F(g) was constructed from a
random number generator. The mean of this randomly-generated
distribution turned out to be about 0.242. The distribution was then
modified for g > .1 in order to yield E(g) = .14. The distribution was
kept fixed for g < . 1 so that both derived distributions would yield
equal values of ffi for both levels of EBC. For the low level of the
distribution, the values of F were left constant but the corresponding
values of g were reduced to yield E(g) = .14. For the high level of this
factor, values of g were left at their original values and the
corresponding values of F increased to yield the desired E(g). Figure 4




Levels of the Parameters for Test VII
Fa ctor Low Level Hi gh Level
A. F(ME) (Exactly one proposal (.,723, .871, .949,
per set) .957, 1.0)
E(ME) 1,.0 1. 5
B. F(D) (Mo delay a 1 lowed ) (.,468, .667, .893,
.972, 1.0)
E(D) 0,.0 2.,0
C. F(g) g F(g) g F(g)
0.04 0.000 0.04 0.000
0.06 0.100 0.06 0.100
0.100 0.300 0.100 0.300
0.106 0.520 0.125 0.771
0.123 0.585 0.157 0.868
0.141 0.590 0.331 0.875
0.200 0.739 0.468 0.994





D. F(L) L F(L) L F(L) L F(L) L F(L)
1 .4383 7 .9955 1 .0900 7 .6862
2 .5085 8 .9959 2 .2700 8 .8333
3 .6228 9 .9964 3 .3510 9 .8974
4 .9000 10 .9993 4 .4163 10 .9000
5 .9881 11 .9999 5 .4794 11 .9692
6 .9900 12 1.0 6 .6098 12 1.0
E(L) 2 .6 5 .5
E. F(CJ) CJ F(CJ) CJ F(CJ)
0.364 0.000 0.286 0.000
0.572 0.157 0.714 0.300
0.927 0.571 1.070 0.639
1.064 0.590 1.594 0.912
1.311 0.736 2.040 0.960
1.525 0.759 2.795 1.000
1.725 1.000
E(CJ) 1 .000 1 .000
S CJ .425 .489

























Fig, 4, Derivation of the Two Distributions of g
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It was felt that having the two levels of F(g) thus related had
practical importance. One of Viafore's findings was that the capital
investment curve (for those firms with sufficient data to attempt
estimating the curve) based on past proposals for capital investment
often was optimistic in the sense that the average growth rate of past
proposal estimates was noticeably greater than the historical rate of
growth of the firm over the same period (78). One possible cause of this
condition might have been excessive optimism in calculating the
prospective returns from proposed investments, although other factors,
such as investment in "mandatory" proposals, discussed in Chapter V,
probably also had an influence.
Such a situation corresponds to the simulated situation above: the
generated distribution of F(g) had a mean value of .242, and it was
desired to alter the curve so that the final mean value was .14. The two
curves derived from the generated curve follow two logical methods of
reduction (of course a third method could be a combination of the first
two). The factorial experiment, then, would indicate whether a firm
which felt its estimated capital investment curve was "inflated" because
of overestimation of prospective growth rates for past proposals might
reduce the curve in an arbitrary manner so that the mean growth equals
the historical growth of the firm.
The experiment was run as a quarter-replicate of a 2& factorial
experiment. The defining contrast for the quarter-replicate was
I = - ABODE = - ABFGH = + CDEFGH
using the notation of John and Kerapthorne (41, ch. 8; 44, ch. 20). This
resulted in what is sometimes called a resolution V design: an
experimental design in which all main effects and two-factor interactions
are estimable without bias. A resolution III design is one in which some
of the main effects are aliased with two-factor interactions. A
resolution IV design is one in which all main effects are estimable
independently of the two-factor interactions, but some of the two-factor
interactions are aliased with each other. Designs of resolution lower
than III or higher than V are not pertinent to this research.
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The decision criterion for all tests was approximate MPV using ffi,
the theoretically correct value of m, over annual batches of proposals.
All treatment combinations were fully-tuned. Ten replications of each
combination were observed. Table XVIII lists means of g for the final
ten simulations of each of the 64 treatment combinations. Observations
are identified by the usual notation for factorial experiments: the
presence of a letter indicates that the observation was taken with that
factor at its high level, the absence of a letter indicates low level.
The symbol (1) indicates the observation with all factors at their low
levels. Thus, for example, observation "adg" was taken with factors A,
D, and G at high levels and factors B, C, E, F, and H at low levels.
Table XIX lists the analysis of variance of the experiment (interactions
of three or more factors were assumed not significant a priori). Table
XX lists selected values of the marginal means.
Analysis
The following factors are indicated as being significant at the .05
level:
(1) Factor A — F(ME)
(2) Factor C — F(g)
(3) Interaction AC
(4) Factor H — EBC.
It would have been very surprizing had factors A or H not been
significant. That factor C (and interaction AC) is significant is not
wholly unexpected, it just means that the precise shape of the
distribution of g is important. Two more factors were also indicated as
significant:
(5) Factor D — F(L)
(6) Interaction DG, where factor G is Scaling.
Note (a), that these latter two factors, while indicated as significant
at the .05 level, have much lower F-ratios then any of the first four,
and (b), from the marginal means it appears that factor D (life) is
significant due to an effect at low G (scaling); at high G, factor D has
no effect at all. Because of these reasons, based on the results of Test
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Table XVI I I
Mean Observations for Test VII
Combi nat ion Mean g Comb i na t i on Mean g
ab .1864 bef .1814
abfg .1908 beg .1733
abfh .1621 bch .1528
abgh .1612 befgh .1603
abed .2005 bedef .1799




abedgh .1730 bedefgh .1560
abce .1939 bdf .1774
abcefg .2004 bdg .1731
abcefh .1755 bdh .1584
abcegh .1750 bdfgh .1508
abde .1849 bef .1709
abdefg .1894 beg .1710
abdefh .1655 beh .1498
abdegh .1654 befgh .1548
acdef .2045 cd .1776
acdeg .1981 cdfg .1786
acdeh .1759 cdfh .1576
acdefgh .1741 edgh .1539
acf .1945 ce .1702
acg .1944 cefg .1807
ach .1789 cefh .1513
acfgh .1761 cegh .1557
adf .1885 de .1749
adg .1833 defg .1700
adh .1641 defh .1573
adfgh .1668 degh .1535
aef .1843 (1) .1647
aeg .1851 fg .1741
aeh .1690 fh .1499




AI1GVA of Test VII
Factor MSS (xlOO) d. f. F
A It. 0922 ] 216.98*
B G.0055 ] <1.
C 0.987U ] 52.35*
D 0.0740 ] 3.92*
E 0.0000 ] <1.
F 0.0195 ] 1.03
G 0.0031 ] <1.
H 6.9645 ] 369.27*
AB 0.0074 ]L <1.
AC 0.1854 ] 9.83*
AD 0.0163 ]L <1.
AE 0.0041 ]L <1.
AF 0.0023 ]L <1.
AG 0.0093 ]L <1.
AH 0.0316 ]L 1.67
BC 0.0023 ]L <1.
BD 0.0065 ]L <1.
BE 0.0 00 ]L <1.
BF 0.0054 :L <1.
BG 0.0016 :L <1.
BH 0.0086 :L <1.
CD 0.0009 :L <1.
CE 0,0001 :L <1.
CF 0.0013 :L <1.
CG 0.0001 L <1.
CH 0.0015 L <1.
DE 0.0045 L <1.
DF 0.0112 L <1.
DG 0.0779 L 4.13*
DH 0.0001 L <1.
EF 0.0027 L <1.
EG 0.0001 L <1.
EH 0.0003 L <1.
FG 0.0020 L <1.
FH 0.0702 L 3.72
GH 0.0020 1 <1.
Residual 0.0119 27
Error 0.0189 576




Marginal Mean Observations -- Selected Values (Test VII)
Factor Marginal Mean g
A (Single) 1 (Multiple)
.1649 .1809
C (Low s ) 1 (High s )
.1690 g .1769 8
D (Short) 1 (Long)
.1719 .1740
H (Low E3C) 1 (High EBC)
.1834 .1625
C (Low s ) 1 (High s )
g ~ g
A .1627 .1672 (Single)
1 .1753 .1866 (Multiple)
D .1710 .1728 (Short)
1 .1753 .1727 (Long)
VII alone, the two factors D and G tentatively were not considered as
significant parameters for the tests to follow. This decision was
reversed by the results of Tests VIII and X.
The Second Test
The results of the first test indicate that parameters A, C, and H
— the distributions of the number of alternatives and of the prospective
growth rates and the expected ratio of budget to total cost — definitely
have a significant effect on output g. The tests of optimized decision
rule must, therefore, be conducted over ranges of values of these three
variables. The first test further indicates that three of the other five
factors do not have a significant effect on g: factors B, E, and F, the
distributions of allowable delays and of normalized costs and that
fraction of gp that is growth in numbers of proposals. These factors
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could thus be held fixed over the optimum tests without loss of
generality. The first test yielded somewhat ambiguous results with
respect to the final two factors, D and G — distribution of lives and
scaling — but the tentative conclusion reached was that these two
factors were not significant and could be disregarded.
It is noteworthy that the first test was conducted using a single
decision rule, MPV over annual batches of proposals, throughout.
Therefore, the possibility remained that one or more of the factors shown
to be not significant could have a significant interaction effect on g if
the decision rule were changed. It was to explore this possibility that
the second sensitivity test was designed; Test VIII should be considered
an extension of Test VII.
Description
It was shown that the "previous factors" A, C, and H from Test VII
~ F(ME), F(g), and EBC — did have a significant effect on g. It was
further shown that none of the other factors interacted significantly
with any of these three (disregarding any interactions of three or more
factors). Therefore these three previous factors could be eliminated
from consideration in Test VIII. A fourth previous factor was also
removed from the second test — previous factor G, scaling.
Scaling would always be present to some degree; as was pointed out
earlier, direct simulation of large firms is not practicable. Since
scaling could not be eliminated for practical purposes, it remained to
discover what levels of scaling were acceptable and what levels, if any,
were not. This scaling factor was dropped from Test VIII because it was
felt unlikely that further testing of scaling at only two levels would be
conclusive. A separate test was designed to test and compare several
levels of scaling. This test is described below under the section on
Secondary Tests. Four of the eight factors from Test VII were thus
eliminated from consideration in Test VIII.
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The four remaining factors from the previous test, factors B, D, E,
and F, were retained for Test VIII, with designations and levels tested
unchanged. Two other factors were added: Decision Criterion — new
factor A: MPV (low level) and ROGR (high level) — and Decision Timing
Rule — new factor C: annual batches (low) and strictly sequential
(high). The factors for this experiment are summarized in Table XXI.
All observations were taken with previous factors F(ME), F(g) , scaling,
and EBC held fixed: F(g), Scaling, and EBC at their previous "high"
levels, and F(ME) at a value not used in the previous test (see Appendix
B).
In the sequential decision cases, the measure of worth used for the
MPV criterion was identical to that used in the annual batching cases and
identical to the definition of prospective present worth given in Chapter
II. This formulation is based on the assumption that present monies not
invested will remain in liquid form (earning interest at rate ij for a
period of one year. In the sequential-decision cases it would be more
realistic to assume these funds would remain in liquid form for a much
shorter period: the expected interval until generation of the next
proposal. For a large firm this interval could be so short as to reduce
the formulation for prospective present worth to the formulation for net
present value. It is not suggested that the MOW used in this experiment
should be the MOW used by sequential decision-makers; rather, as noted in
Chapter III, the basic form of prospective present worth was used for
simplicity and for the sake of compatibility with other tests.
The significance of the main effects and two-factor interactions of
the six parameters for Test VIII could be tested with resolution V in the
32 observations of a half-replicate of the full 2^ design. The positive
principal half-replicate defined by the contrast I = + ABCDEF was chosen
for the design. Each of the 32 treatment combinations was fully-tuned
and ten replications observed. The average values of g for the ten
replications of each combination are listed in Table XXII. All
interactions of degree three or higher were assumed zero a priori and an




Levels of the Parameters for Test VIII
Factor Low Level High Level
Non- i ncremental ROGR
C.
F(D) (No delay a 1 1 owed ) (.,468, .667, .893,
.972, :L.0)
E(D) 0,.0 2,.0
Timl ng Annual Batches SI:rictly !Sequential
F(L) L F(L) L F(L) L F(L) L F(L)
1 .4383 7 .9955 1 .0900 7 .6862
2 .5085 8 .9959 2 .2700 8 .8333
3 .6228 9 .9964 3 .3510 9 .8974
4 .9000 10 .9993 4 .4163 10 .9000
5 .9881 11 .9999 5 .4794 11 .9692
6 .9900 12 1.0 6 .6098 12 1.0
E(L) 2,.6 5 .5
F(CJ) CJ F(CJ) CJ F(CJ)
0.354 0.000 0.286 0.000
0.572 0.157 0.714 0.300
0.927 0.571 1.070 0.639
1.064 0.590 1.594 0.912
1.311 0.736 2.040 0.960
1.525 0.759 2.795 1.000
1.725 1.000




F. a 0.35 0.65
Note: A High level of factor B (delay) is meaningless when






Mean Observations for Test VIM































ef .1880 abedef .1711
carried out as shown in Table XXIII. Selected values of the marginal
mean values of g are shown in Table XXIV.
Analysis
The analysis of variance supports the conclusion that the following
factors must be considered significant at the .05 level:
(1) Factor A — Decision Criterion
(2) Factor C — Decision Timing
(3) Factor D ~ F(L)
(4) Interaction AC
(5) Interaction CD
As in the previous test, the observed F-ratio for the distribution
of proposal lives is greater than the critical value but is still the
smallest observed value to be considered significant. In this test,
however, an interaction involving the distribution of lives, namely the
interaction of F(L) with decision timing, was observed to have quite a
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Table XXI 1 1
ANOVA of Test VIII
Factor MSS (xlOO) d.f. F
A 0.8326 1 34.68*
B 0.0010 1 <1.
C 4.4230 1 184.21*
D 0.1158 1 4.82*
E 0.0074 1 <1.
F 0.0643 1 2.6 8
AB 0.0006 1 <1.
AC 0.2598 1 10.82*
AD 0.0286 1 1.19
AE 0.0000 1 <1.
AF 0. 0044 1 <1.
BC 0.0001 1 <1.
BD 0.0010 1 <1.
BE 0.001+7 1 <1.
BF 0.0061 1 <1.
CD 0.661+9 1 27.69*
CE 0.0003 1 <1.
CF 0.0U12 1 1.72
DE 0.0010 1 <1.
DF 0.07H+ 1 2.97
EF 0.0001+ 1 <1.
Res i dual 0.0096 10
Error . 0240 288
Significant at .05 level.
Table XXIV






































high value for its F-ratio. On the basis of the results of both
sensitivity tests it must be concluded that the distribution of proposal
lives does significantly affect g. The only other factors indicated as
significant in Test VIII were the two factors that were decision
parameters, and their interaction. As in the previous test, F(D), F(CJ),
and ot are indicated as having no significant effect on the output.
Secondary Tests
The two tests described above accomplished the primary objective of
the sensitivity testing, namely, determining which situational parameters
must be varied and which may be left fixed for the tests to be described
in Chapter V. Some further sensitivity experimentation was carried out,
however, in a series of five smaller, individual tests. These secondary
sensitivity tests are described below.
The first test examined the influence of a Decision parameter,
batching period, on output g. It is an extension of a test that Parra
conducted. The results of this test did not influence the design of any
subsequent tests in this research since further simulation with any
batching period other than one year was never contemplated. The second
test was a considerably more detailed examination of the effects of
scaling than was Test VII. The results of this scaling test had a very
definite effect on the planning of subsequent tests. The third
experiment tested the validity of the assumption that the choice of value
for the Control parameter H, the horizon of the simulation, does not
appreciably affect the average growth rate of the simulated firm. The
fourth test further examined the influence of F(L) upon g. Finally, the
fifth and last test described in this section was a simple factorial
experiment to test whether the variables examined in the third and fourth
tests, H and F(L), have a significant interaction.
Batching Period
One of the Decision parameters that serves to define the complete
decision process for a firm is the length of time over which proposals
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are accumulated into a batch to be decided upon the batching period.
If a firm had an extremely short batching period, its decision rule
would, in effect, be very similar to the case of strictly sequential
decisions. Assuming the available annual budget was significantly less
than the total cost of proposals expected to be generated during the
year, this nearly-sequential case might be expected to yield returns
inferior to, say, annual batching. The marginal results from Test VIII
shown in Table XXIV tend to reinforce this supposition. On the other
hand, an extremely long batching period would entail leaving budget
monies in liquid funds, to grow at rate ig , while the proposals were
accumulating over these long periods. This would serve to draw down the
overall returns. In the extreme, an infinitely long batching period
would result in the firm's g being exactly equal to ig . Intuitively,
then, one might expect there exists some optimal batching period for each
firm — some batching period that would return results that were, on the
average, better than the results attainable from either shorter or longer
batching periods. This optimal period might be expected to be dependent
upon the combination of Situational parameters that the firm faces, and
it may further be dependent upon the decision rule used by the firm.
One of the tests run by Parra and described in his dissertation
compared the results obtained by batching over intervals of one-eighth of
a year to the results from annual batching in an identical situation (60
pp. 95-104). From this experiment, called by him "Test 8", he concluded
that significantly better results could be obtained from batching over an
annual, rather than an eighth-annual period. He also concluded that
sequential decision-making is inferior to annual batching. The objective
of Test IX was to extend Parra's results in order to examine more closely
the effect of batching period on g. Only periods which are an integral
divisor or an integral multiplier of a year will be considered in this
test.
Description
This test was performed twice, on two distinct sets of Situational
parameters. The MPV criterion was used for all observations. Test IX-A
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was run with Situational Parameters identical to those used by Parra
(Parra called this set of parameters "Situation 21"). Parra's
observations were used for batching periods of one-eighth and one year.
Additional observations were made for batching periods of one-fourth,
one-half, two, and three years. A simulation horizon of eight years was
used for all observations of batching periods less than, or equal to, one
year. Horizons of 16 years and 18 years were used for the observations
of batching periods of two and three years, respectively. In other
words, taking into account the ten replications made in each case, the
average results reported for batching periods of two years or less are
based on from 80 to 640 simulated decisions. The average g reported for
the batching period of three years is based on 60 decisions. For the
Test IX-A parameters, ig = .02 and ffi = .07.
The second set of Situational parameters, that for Test IX-B, were
based on those used for combination "de" in Test VIII. The same batching
periods observed in Test IX-A were again observed, except that
observations for one-eighth year were omitted. A simulation horizon of
eight years was again used for batching periods of one year or less. An
horizon of 14 years (as opposed to 16 years in Test IX-A) was used for
the two year, and 18 years for the three year, period observations. Some
problems were encountered in conducting Test IX-B because certain
treatment combinations resulted in accumulations of proposals that
exhausted the storage capacity of the program. For this reason,
observations were made at two different levels of scaling: observations
for batching periods less than a year were run with NEq = 20;
observations for periods of two and three years were run with NEq = 12;
observations for the one year period were made with both levels of
scaling. For the same reason, parameter a , which governs the growth in
numbers of proposals, was set at .35 for batching periods of a year or
less, but was reduced to .25 for the longer periods. Based on the
results of Tests VII and VIII, this change in parameter is not expected
to affect the results. Finally, because of excessive proposal
accumulations, only seven replications were observed for the three year
batching period of Test IX-B; ten replications were observed for all
other periods. For this test, ic- = .04 and ffi = .06.

Table XXV
•ved (lean Value of g for the Catching Pe;riod Tests
S i tua t i on
Per i od Hor i zon 21 de^ dn$
1/8 yr 8 yrs .1460*
1/4 8 .1347 .1729 —
1/2 8 .14 4 7 .1771 —







* Results reported by Parra.
** Subscript on de indicates value of NE
n
used;
the two versions of Situation de were
identical in all other respects.
The observations for one-eighth year, Test IX-A, taken by Parra,
used a different MOW than any of the other non-annual observations of
this test. All other observations used as a MOW the prospective present
worth exactly as defined in Chapter II, i.e. assuming a one-year period
between decisions even though decisions were being made at other than






) = sJ0 ((1+i (S
)/(1+m))- 1 25 + £ sjt (Um)-t
t=1
As noted previously, the formulation used in this research was used, not
because it was held to be the best form to use, but rather for the sake
of simplicity and compatibility with other observations.
The ten-replication average results for both situations are listed
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Fig. 6, Test IX, Situation "de": g ys, Batching Period
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subtest A and in Figure 6 for subtest B. The lines in both figures
represent linear functions least-squares-fit to the observations.
Analysis
Inspection of Table XXV clearly shows that, in both cases, optimal
results were obtained with a batching period of one year. More formally,
the statistical t-test for independent samples may be used to test the
hypothesis of equal means and may be applied to compare the sample for
the annual period to samples for other periods, for both subtests. For
Test IX-A, the computed t-statistic for paired observations of one year
vs. one-half year is 3.232; for paired observations of one year vs. two
years it is 7.515 (assuming unequal variances for the samples). For Test
IX-B these t-statistics are 10.832 and 3.037, respectively. The critical
value of t at the .05 confidence level appropriate for this test is
2.262; in all four comparisons the hypothesis of equality is rejected.
This formal test supports the conclusion that annual batching is
preferable to batching over any of the other periods tested. With the
single exception of the results reported by Parra for the one-eighth year
batching period, results declined monotonically as the batching period
was varied from one year.
Pending further investigation, these results must be regarded as
being dependent on the set of Situational parameters. Although two
distinct situations were modeled, and all the parameters of both
situations seemed "reasonable" — seemed to represent conditions faced by
many actual businesses — it must still be regarded as quite possible
that some "reasonable" combination of i. and F(g) could result in a
o
biennial batching period being optimal, for example. It should also be
noted that while the annual batching period results were optimal among
the periods tested, this does not preclude the absolute optimum results
from actually being obtained at some odd period — say, 1.34 or 0.77




Scaling was defined as a simultaneous adjustment of the values of
the expected number and expected cost of proposals such that the product
of these values remains constant. The purpose of scaling is to reduce
the number of proposals to be generated so as to reduce the cost of
simulation. Naturally, it is desirable to scale such that the costs of
simulation are minimized while keeping the effects of the scaling on the
output measure of effectiveness negligible. A preliminary test of
whether or not scaling does affect g was included as part of the first
sensitivity experiment, Test VII. The two levels of scaling examined in
this test were initial expected proposal inputs of eight and 12 sets per
year. The results of this test with regard to scaling were inconclusive.
Parra also did some preliminary investigation of the tuning problem
in his "Test 4" (60, pp. 78-81). He compared results from initial
expected proposal inputs of two, four, and eight sets per year. His
conclusion was that scaling may not affect the average g observed but
that smaller numbers of proposals result in increased variance in the
output
.
Test X was planned as a more extensive examination of the effects of
scaling. The firms reported in detail by Viafore generated many hundreds
of proposals each year, although these firms were admittedly among the
larger corporations in America (78). Neither of the previous scaling
tests mentioned above considered an initial expected level of proposals
greater than 12. Simulation of a firm the size of those studied by
Viafore with a model generating only ten or so sets of proposals per year
must be considered a rather severe case of scaling, indeed — at least,
until information is available that indicates scaling down the number of
proposals to this extent has no serious effect on the output of the
simulation. Test X was specifically designed to explore the
relationships between simulations run, as previously, with a small (ten





Five simulations were run for this test, with values for NEq of 5,
10, 20, 40, and 80 proposals per year. Except for the scaling, the basic
set of input parameters for this test was identical to the set used for
observation "de" of Test VIII. This latter simulation provided an
additional observation at an initial input of 12 proposals per year.
Finally, except for a different distribution of the number of
alternatives in a set, the parameters for Test X matched these for
observation "acdeh" of Test VII; this provided a seventh observation at 8
proposals per year. The MPV criterion over annual batches of proposals
was used for all simulations, and all simulations were fully-tuned. Ten
replications were observed for each level of NEq except for NEq = 80.
For this case, three replications failed due to excessive proposal
accumulation so only seven observations were recorded. The simulations
of 80 proposals per year also differed from the others in that factor a
was set at .07 for this case, but was set at .35 for all others.
The means and variances for the observations of g of this test are
listed in Table XXVI. Figure 7 displays the variation of the mean with
respect to scaling; Figure 8 displays the change in variance. In both
Table XXVI
Observed Means and Variances for the Scaling Test
KE
o








30 based on 7 replications, a = .07;
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Fig. 3, Test X: Variance of g ys., NEq
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figures, the solid lines represent power curves least-squares-fit to the
observations.
Analysis
Clearly, the variance of observed g decreases raonotonically with
increasing NEq over the range of this test. The M-test can be applied
to test formally whether the observed differences in variance are
significant. For example, testing the three samples with the highest
values of NEq the computed M-statistic is 38.43. This is greater than
the tabulated critical value at the .05 confidence level of 6.34, so the
null hypothesis of equality is rejected. This same test applied to other
sets of three or more samples leads to the same conclusion.
The change in sample means also seems regular: a decrease in NEq
results in a decreased mean value of g. In this instance, however, the
differences cannot be considered statistically significant. Using the
t-test for independent samples with unequal means for pairwise
comparisons of the sample for NEq = 80 to the other samples leads to the
conclusion that the means are (pairwise) equal at the .05 confidence
level. The maximum t-statistic thus computed is that for the samples for
80 and 10 proposals per year, which has the value 1.740 compared to the
critical value of 2.447. A comparison of the samples for 40 and 5
proposals per year — samples which yielded the maximum and minimum mean
values of g — gave a t-statistic of 1.751, again indicating acceptance
of the hypothesis of equality of means.
If the least-squares power curve fit to the variance, as shown in
Figure 8, is accepted as being indicative of the change in variance to be
expected from a change in scaling, then it must be concluded that
doubling the number of sets of proposals to be generated will result in
approximately a 60J reduction in variance of g. This increase in numbers
of proposals will apparently also result in a slight increase in the mean
of g, but the difference will not be statistically significant. Based on
the results observed in Test X, there would appear to be little advantage
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in running simulations with the initial rate of proposal generation
greater than about HO sets per year. It also appears that research on a
limited budget, such as the research described in this dissertation, may
be carried out using generation rates of around 20 sets per year with few
adverse effects. Because simulation costs are approximately linearly
proportional to NEq so long as the exact MPV solution is not considered,
this latter scaling level of 20 sets per year was utilized for the
remainder of the research.
It was stated in Chapter III that one of the underlying assumptions
of this research was that the choice of values for the Control parameters
of Parra's simulation model had no significant effect on the observed
measure of effectiveness. It was decided that this assumption should be
investigated in the case of one of the Control parameters: H,
representing the horizon time for the simulation. The general effect of
H was felt to be similar to that for NREPS, the number of replications
observed. The product of H and NREPS is the total number of years
simulated. It was thought that it would make no difference to the
expected value of output g whether one observed, say, ten replications of
eight years each or twenty replications of four years each; that changing
either H or NREPS would affect only the variance of observed g. Test XI
was a simple experiment to measure the effect of H on the output.
Description
The set of Situational parameters for this test was based upon
Parra's "Situation 21", which was also used in the batching test (Test
IX-A), as well as a few other tests yet to be described. There were
three differences between the parameters of the original "Situation 21"
and the parameters for this test. For Test XI no short-term borrowing
was allowed, scaling was reset to an initial rate of 2M proposals per
year, and F(L) was changed to allow longer proposal lives. Observations
were made using both MPV and ROGR decision rules. Horizons of 4, 8, 12,




Observed Data for Horizon Test
Me an g s
g
xlOO
H ROGR l-IPV ROGR MPV
4 .1605 .1548 1.5222 1.5388
8 .1631 .1543 .8977 .8825
12 .1626 .1547 .6685 .6370
16 .1632 .1544 .4877 .4210
and ten replications were observed for each combination. The means and
standard deviations of each observed sample are listed in Table XXVII.
Analysis
From the data shown in Table XXVII it appears evident that the
standard deviation of g is inversely proportional to H. This is
consistent with the assumption that a variation in H is equivalent to a
variation in NREPS. Since the sample variances are dependent on the
treatment, an analysis of variance test is not appropriate to test for
equality of means among the samples. Mere inspection suggests that all
the samples have equal means, and this may be somewhat formalized by
conducting pairwise t-tests for equality of means for each pair of
samples within the two decision rules. All the t-statistics are less
than unity, leading to the conclusion that there is no pairwise
difference between sample means. In general, it would appear that a
choice of H in the region of eight to twelve would yield good results at
reasonable cost.
Distribution of Lives
Both of the primary sensitivity experiments, Tests VII and VIII,
indicated that parameter F(L), the distribution of proposal lives, has a
significant effect on output g, although in both tests F(L) was just
significant. Test XII was a small experiment run to examine the




This experiment was run using the same set of Situational parameters
as the previous test, the "modified Situation 21" parameters discussed
for Test XI. Observations were made for proposal lifetimes
deterrninistically generated as 1, 2, 4, and 8 years. The stochastic cash
flowback pattern used in all the previous tests was again used. Another
observation was made for proposals with (deterrninistically) infinite
lives and a uniform flowback pattern. Finally, two more observations
were made using two stochastic distributions of lifetimes and stochastic
cash flow patterns. The two distributions of lives were those used for
Test XIV, discussed in the next chapter. Observations were made for both
ROGR and MPV decision rules for all treatments; all observations were
fully-tuned and consisted of ten replications. The observations are
listed in Table XXVIII and displayed graphically in Figures 9 and 10.
Table XXVI I I










* Life stochastically determined;
E(L) = 2.92 yrs., max L = 5 yrs.
** Life stochastically determined;
F.(L) = 5.50 yrs., max L = 12 yrs.
*** Observed for uniform flowback
pattern, infinite lives; all other
observations used stochastic
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Fig, 9, Test XII: g vs., Proposal Lifetime (ROGR)
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It appears that, for lives deterministically generated over the
range one to eight years, observed g Increases with increased life, but
that this increase is relatively slight. It also appears that, for lives
determined by a probability distribution, comparing the mean of that
distribution — or either the upper or lower limits of the distribution
— to the data for deterministic life gives only a poor estimate of the g
to be obtained. Finally, for both decision rules, the maximum results
were obtained in the case of deterministically infinite lives with a
uniform flowback pattern.
Apparently the increase of g with life can be explained in large
part by the rapidity with which short-lived proposals liquidate the
funds invested in them. Ignoring the relatively minor differences caused
by tuning for the moment, the various trials of Test XII faced nearly
identical situations each year: for any given year of the simulation the
expected number of proposals, the expected cost of each proposal, and the
expected internal rate of return of each proposal were each identical for
all the trials. Each trial started with identical values of M0(1), the
budget to be invested in the first year, and all trials should have
selected nearly-identical sets of proposals. Because of more-rapid
liquidation, the trials with shorter-lived proposals would be expected to
have more money available for liquidation in the second year than would
trials with longer-lived proposals. All trials were presented with
nearly-identical sets of proposals during the second year. The best of
these proposals would presumably be selected in common by both "short"
and "long" trials; the additional money available for investment by the
"short" trials would thus necessarily have to be invested in less-
desirable proposals or left in liquid form to grow at rate i~ . Thus the
"short" trials would have a lower average rate of growth than the "long"
trials. Tuning would exaggerate this condition somewhat: the difference
in gp would result in the "long" trials having slightly more proposals to




Interaction of F(L) with H
The final test to be described in this chapter is Test XIII, a very
simple 2x2 factorial experiment designed to discover whether any
significant interactive effects exist between the distribution of lives
and the simulation horizon.
The two levels of horizon, factor A, treated were 8 and 16 years.
The two levels of factor B, F(L), were a distribution giving only short
lives (1 to 5 years) and a distribution giving only long lines (9 to 14
years). The MPV criterion was used for all observations, and all
observations were fully-tuned, of ten replications each. The four
observed mean values of g for the treatment combinations are listed in
Table XXIX, the analysis of variance of the 40 samples is given in Table
XXX. The analysis of variance shows that the observations indicate no
significant interactive effects on g between horizon and distribution of
lives. The analysis also reinforces the earlier conclusion that the
distribution of lives does affect the output significantly.
Table XXIX
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It deserves reemphasis that what was measured in all the tests
discussed in this chapter was the sensitivity of g, the average rate of
growth of the wealth of the firm, to changes in various parameters input
to the simulation model. In every case, observations were made from a
fully-tuned condition with the Decision parameter m set at tfi, the
theoretically correct value. Both the concepts of being fully-tuned and
of fB were defined and discussed in Chapter III.
The two primary sensitivity tests served to define the problem space
for further experimentation. These tests showed that changes in the
distributions of the number of alternatives, of prospective growth rate
for proposals, and of proposal lives, and changes in the expected ratio
of budget to cost — F(ME), F(g), F(L), and EBC - all significantly
affect the output. Even changes in F(g) that conserve the value of E(g)
significantly affect the output. Consequently, any experiment intended
to define results that are to be considered general results must be
conducted over various values of these parameters.
On the other hand, changes in the distributions of normalized cost
and allowable delay, and changes in that fraction of proposal generation
growth that is growth in numbers of proposals — F(CJ), F(D), and a —
do not significantly affect the output. To these must be added the
parameter Th which determines the shape of all the cash flow patterns,
and which was indicated by one of Parra's tests also to be not
significant. Experiments may be run with these values held fixed without
loss of generality of the results.
It was also noted that although the normalized distribution of costs
F(CJ), did not have a significant effect on the output, the expected cost
of a proposal, CEq, may be significant, depending upon how it is changed
in relation to the expected number of sets of proposals, NEq, and the
input budget vector, MO. Specifically, changes in CEq and NEq such that
their product is constant change the scaling and changes in scaling
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affect the variance of the observations although such changes do not
significantly affect the mean of the output. Further, changes in CEq
such that the expected total cost of all proposals for a year is changed
will alter EBC, unless MO is also changed in compensation, and EBC does
have a significant influence on expected output.
The primary sensitivity tests also served to confirm the assumption
that the decision process can have a significant effect on the output.
Two aspects of the decision process, decision rule (MPV vs. ROGR) and
timing rule (annual batch vs. sequential), were tested and found
significant.
One of the more surprizing results of this series of tests was the
magnitude of the influence that the distribution of lives can have. The
results of Tests VII and VIII tended to indicate that F(L) had only a
small, though significant, effect on the output. For both these tests,
the two levels of F(L) tested allowed equal ranges of lives, from one to
12 years, although their expected values differed by more than a factor
of two. The Test XII observations of deterrainistically-generated lives
from one to eight years indicated a small, but regular, increase in
output with increased proposal life. However, for the observations of
Test XII of probabilistically-generated lives, and even more so for the
observations of Test XIII, values of g observed for longer-lived
proposals were considerably higher than the values obtained from shorter-
lived proposals. The magnitude of the difference appeared to be
influenced more by differences in the ranges of lives generated than by
differences in expected life. The difference apparently was largely due
to the faster liquidation of investment by the shorter-lived proposals.
Since both "short" and "long" trials faced essentially identical sets of
proposals, the more rapid liquidation in the "short" trials resulted in
more investment in less-desirable proposals for those trials, thereby
reducing their average rate of growth. The difference observed may also
be at least partially a consequence of the selection of g as the MOE.
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Test IX examined the influence of the Decision parameter batching
period on the performance of the firm. Two distinct situations were
simulated; in both cases annual batching proved superior to batching over
the shorter and longer periods tested. This result must be considered
dependent upon the situation simulated. The possibility of a different
combination of Situational parameters resulting in a different optimal
batching period cannot be ruled out solely on the basis of Test IX. The
test also does not eliminate the possibility that some odd batching
period between one-half and two years is actually superior to the annual
period, although the near-linearity of the results, shown clearly in
Figures 5 and 6, tends to argue against this possibility.
Finally, some of the results discussed in this chapter serve as
guides for achieving observations with relatively small variance at
reasonable computation cost. Test X indicated that further testing
should be carried out with scaling such that the initial rate of proposal
generation is on the order of about 20 to 40 sets of proposals per year.
The insensitivity of the results to factor a allows the experimenter to
keep the number of sets near this level throughout the simulation. Test
XI indicated that a reasonable value of horizon for simulation would be
on the order of 8 to 10. Based on these results, subsequent tests were




TESTS OF OPTIMIZED DECISION POLICIES
Throughout this dissertation it has been assumed that a firm has
little or no control over the situation it faces, as determined by the
Situational parameters, but that a firm has complete control over the
decision process it uses, i.e., over the values of all Decision
parameters. It seems natural, then, to consider the problem of finding
the optimum decision policy for a firm. That this problem is neither
trivial nor uninteresting may be inferred from the large body of
literature that exists on the subject, some of which was reviewed in
Chapter II. More specifically, an interesting problem posed by the model
of the firm defined in Chapter III is that of selecting the set of
Decision parameters so as to maximize the expected value of g for a
situation. Parra's computer model would be of obvious value in the
exploration of such a problem through simulation; indeed, it was for just
such purposes as this that Parra constructed his model.
From the viewpoint of a practical application of the model, the
problem of finding the optimum decision process appears tractable. The
single set of Situational parameters representing the situation faced by
a specific firm could be held fixed while the full set of Decision
parameters is explored in depth to find the optimum decision rule for the
firm. Such an exploration would not be excessively expensive. Probably
the greatest hindrance to such a pragmatic approach would be the
difficulty of estimating the Situational parameters for an actual firm.
Viafore's research indicates that relatively few businesses have the
necessary data to estimate the full set of Situational parameters: out
of 45 firms studied by him, only four kept sufficiently detailed records




Research such as this is genera.lly limited to the study of
hypothetical situations. Parameters are set more or less randomly to
values that the researcher thinks are "typical" or "reasonable." The
results obtained from the simulation of such a hypothetical situation may
be interesting, but the conclusions, in the strict sense, must be limited
to that particular case. Any attempt to draw general conclusions from a
small set of such individual situations most likely will be viewed with
skepticism.
Of course the ultimate goal of research into the best choice of
Decision parameters would be the specification of an optimum decision
rule for the general capital budgeting problem. If no decision rule is
universally optimal, then rules which are locally optimal, and their
regions of optiraality, should be explored. Any attempt to find a "best"
decision rule must involve some sort of regular search over the many
variables that define a capital budgeting situation. The size of this
overall problem, the number of variables defining the situation, make
this problem a formidable one.
The experiments discussed in the last chapter have served to limit
the problem of examining the optimized decision rules for the general
case to some extent. These experiments showed that the "shape" of
proposal cash flows, the distribution of delays, the normalized
distribution of costs, and the fraction of generation growth that is
growth in numbers do not affect the average rate of growth of wealth of
the firm. These parameters may be kept fixed without loss of generality
for the results. On the other hand, the distribution of proposal lives,
the distribution of prospective growth rates, the distribution of the
number of alternatives in a set of proposals, and the expected value of
the ratio of budget to total cost of proposals generated do affect the
measure of effectiveness, g. These parameters must be varied in some
regular fashion in the search for general results.
The tests described in the preceding chapter ignored certain of the
Situational parameters, such as those defining the short-term borrowing
situation faced by the firm. These parameters have largely been
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disregarded throughout this research, not because they were felt to be
unimportant but because they added too many dimensions to an already
complicated problem. The Situational parameters whose sensitivity was
measured in this research relate to the generation of investment
proposals by the firm; they are, in a sense, endogenous qualities of the
firm. The parameters not considered, specifically the interest rate
earned by liquid investments and the short-terra borrowing situation, do
not affect proposal generation and can be considered, in the same sense,
as exogenous qualities.
The decision process, itself, considered by this research was
somewhat arbitrarily limited. There were simply too many dimensions to
the decision process to allow full exploration over all the Decision
parameters. Certain tests conducted by Parra and some run in the earlier
stages of the research indicated that results attained by annual batching
are superior to results attained either by batching over any other period
or by sequential decision-making. These tests were described in the
previous chapter. The experiments to be described in this chapter
consider optimization over only two Decision parameters: decision rule
(ROGR, MPV, and sometimes MNPV) and estimated marginal growth rate. No
optimization over any of the other Decision parameters was considered.
The problem described above as the "ultimate goal" was the aim of
the experiments described below. This research cannot lay claim to
having fully determined the optimum decision rule for the general case.
However, the results described below do represent a first approach to
such a solution.
A Specific Situation
The last two tests described in Parra's dissertation must be
considered among the most interesting tests that he ran. These tests
were quite similar: each was based on a single set of Situational
parameters, different for each test, and in both tests results were
observed for the three decision rules ROGR, MPV, and MNPV, over various
estimates of the marginal growth rate. Parra called these experiments
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Tests 9 and 10. The results of both tests were quite similar; Figure 11
displays the Test 9 results observed by Parra. From Tests 9 and 10 Parra
concluded the following:
• All three decision rules perform comparably for ra = ffi.
• For ROGR and MNPV, it is preferable to underestimate ffi rather than
overestimate it.
• For MPV, overestiraation of m is preferable to underestimation.
• ROGR with ra = 0.0, i.e., without a cutoff rate, compares quite
favorably with the best results of MPV or MNPV (60, pp. 104-109).
One thing these two tests had in common was that both were based
upon situations that included distributions of proposal lives that
generated only very-short-lived proposals. The maximum life generated by
the situation for Test 9 was five years; for Test 10 the maximum was only
four years. So, although the results of these tests were very
interesting, the short lives of all the generated proposals caused the
conclusions to be viewed with some suspicion. It was decided to rerun
one of these two tests, substituting a distribution of lives that allowed
longer lives, to examine the comparative behavior of the three decision
rules under the condition of longer lives. Test 9 was arbitrarily
selected as the test to be rerun. This experiment — the rerun Test 9 of
Parra — was called Test XIV.
Description
An experiment described in the previous chapter indicated a change
should be made to the conditions of the original Test 9. Parra ran this
test with the expected number of sets of proposals for the first year
equal to 12. Test X indicated this value is too low for good results.
Accordingly, Test XIV was run with 24 sets of proposals expected during
the first year. To ensure comparable data, a simulation was made using
input data identical to the data used by Parra but with the revised
scaling. This "rerun Test 9" was called Test XIV-A.

Fig, 11, Observed g ys, m from Parra's "Test 9"
Adapted from Parra, Fig, 4,8, p. 107,

Parra's set of Situational parameters for the original test included
a provision for short-tern borrowing. The borrowing situation simulated
was, in fact, quite a favorable one. Up to five percent of the worth of
the firm could be borrowed for one year at an annual interest rate of
.03; for comparison, liquid investments earned .02 interest and fli was
.07. It was felt that the inclusion of permissable short-term borrowing
added needless complication to the situation. So, the original set of
parameters — i.e., still with the "short" value of F(L) — was run
again, this time without any borrowing allowed. This simulation was
called Test XIV-C. These two conditions, including the original
borrowing and with no borrowing, were then run using a value for F(L)
that permitted considerably longer (up to 12 years) proposal lives; these
were called Tests XIV-B and XIV-D, respectively.
Another factor that had to be considered was the tuning procedure to
be used. All the experiments described in the preceding chapter were
fully-tuned: each combination of factors was individually tuned before
the ten replications were observed. As attractive as the idea of fully-
tuned observations is in some respects, it has certain disadvantages in a
comparison such as this experiment entailed. Specifically, ignoring
replications for the moment, since each observation is individually
tuned, each observed g will be based on a value of gp that in general is
not equal to the value of gp for any other observation. This means that
each observation is based on a different proposal stream, and that the
proposal streams for observations with high values of g are generally
better in a sense than the proposal streams with low g. It was decided
that the comparison of this experiment, and those of Test XV, described
below, would be more meaningful if all results were based on common
streams of proposals. Thus the tests described in this chapter used what
was earlier called "general tuning." For Tests XIV-A through -D, the
three decision rules (ROGR, MPV, and MNPV) were each tuned using rc a m.
The values of gp and MO for each subtest were then set to the average of
the three values tuned at ra = 2f. This set of Tuning parameters was then
used for all the observations of the subtest.
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The four subtests XIV-A through -D, then, were generally-tuned and
covered the four combinations of borrowing/no borrowing and long/short
lives. Two other subtests were run, Tests XIV-E and XIV-F. These
subtests were fully-tuned and both were run with the borrowing provision
allowed. They covered the two levels of F(L), short- and long-lived
proposals, respectively. These subtests were run to get an idea of the
differences that might be expected between fully-tuned and generally-
tuned results.
Observations were made for five different values of ra for each
decision rule in all the subtests except Test XIV-D, in which only four
values were observed. In each case, one observation was taken at the
value of ra that was guessed as maximizing g. Subtests XIV-A through -C
all used identical proposals streams for each of the observations within
the subtest. Of course, proposal streams differed between subtests due
to differences in gp and F(L). For subtest XIV-D, proposal streams for
different values of m differed, but all observations at a particular
value of ra were derived from identical proposal streams.
Table XXXI lists the observations for the two generally-tuned
subtests with borrowing, Tests XIV-A and -B. Table XXXII lists this data
for the two subtests without borrowing, subtests -C and -D; and Table
XXXIII lists the data for the fully-tuned subtests, -E and -F. This data
is displayed graphically in Figures 12 through 17.
Analysis
The curves shown in Figures 12 through 17 represent parabolas
least-squares-fit through the observations. These curves appear to give
a good indication of the behavior of g with varying m in the region of
most interest, that part of each curve near where g reaches its maximum.
The parabolas are less good indicators of performance away from the
neighborhood of the maximum. The validity of the curves for ROGR with
m < i~ must particularly be viewed with suspicion as no observations were




Average Observed Data for Tests XIV-A/B
(General Tune, with Borrowing)
(XIV-A) (XIV-B)
Short Lives L.ong Lives
m ROGR MNPV MPV ROGR MNPV MPV
05 .1640 .1630 .1625 .1707 .1689 .1588
06 .1642 .1637
07(m) .1629 .1635 .1637 .1714 .1710 .1709
08 .1714 .1710
10 .1636 .1724
11 .1559 .1543 .1642 .1669 .1562 .1723
14 .1427 .1441 .1630 .1545 .1564 .1698
Table XXXI I
Average Observed Data for Tests XIV-C/D
(General Tune, no Borrowing)
(XIV-C) (XIV-D)
Short Lives 1_ong Lives
m ROGR MNPV MPV ROGR M.NPV MPV
04 .1696 .1663
05 .1622 .1611 .1608
06 .1624 .1621




11 .1554 .1540 .1627 .1693
14 .1427 .1440 .1617 .1501 .1519 .1654
Table XXXI I I
Average Observed Data for Tests XIV-E/F
(Full Tune, with Borrowing)
(XIV-E) (XIV-F)
Short Lives L.ong Lives
m ROGR MNPV MPV ROGR MNPV MPV
00 .1599 .1573
04 .1609 .1570 .1524 .1675 .1600 .1597
07(m) .1653 .1658 .1595 .1746 .1721 .1677
10 .1560 .1545 .1555 .1778 .1782 .1755
13 .1410 .1425 .1555 .1758 .1765 .1795
16 .1279 .1302 .1630 .1703 .1690 .1798
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Fig, 12, Test XIV-A: g vs., m (Short Lives, with Borrowing,
General Tune)




























Fig, 15, Test XIV: g ys, m (Short Lives, No Borrowing, Full


















Fig, 17. Test XIV: g y£. m (Long Lives, No Borrowing, Full
Tune and General Tune)
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Observed values of g are uniformly greater for the observations made
with longer-lived proposals. In fact g in the region of its maximum is
raised nearly one percent for the generally-tuned cases, from about .16
to about .17. This effect of the increased lives appears to be
independent of the other factors varied: m, decision rule, and borrowing
situation.
The presence of the highly desirable borrowing option acted as
expected. Observed g with borrowing was slightly greater than the
corresponding value without borrowing, although the additional increment
was generally only on the order of one-tenth of a percent. This effect
was more pronounced in the cases of ROGR and MNPV used with the lower
values of m. The observed differences tended to be slighly greater for
the longer-lived observations.
The conclusions reached by Parra in the case of short-lived
proposals generally appear to remain valid when proposal lives are
increased:
• All three decision rules give nearly equal returns for m = fli.
• ROGR and MNPV give very similar results throughout the range of
values of m tested.
• ROGR and MNPV are much more sensitive to over-estimated ffi than is
MPV.
• For MPV, overestimation of ffi is preferable to underestimation.
In fact the highest g observed were with MPV using m approximately equal
to 1.5 ft.
• However, the results of ROGR and MNPV appear to be more sensitive
to underestimated ffi for longer-lived proposals than was the case for
shorter-lived proposals. In other words, that value of m that yields
maximum g appears to increase somewhat with proposal lives for ROGR and
MNPV, although this does not appear to be true for MPV.
Finally, from Figures 16 and 17 it appears that the effect of
full-tuning compared to general-tuning is to cause a shift in the curves
of g versus m that is generally describable as upward and to the right.
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In addition, the fully-tuned cases appear to be generally more sensitive
to misestimated ra* than the generally-tuned cases.
The General Case
It is generally conceded that a rational businessman should act in a
manner that will maximize the wealth of his firm, assuming all other
factors (social, legal, ecological, etc.) will not be affected by the
decision. If it is assumed, as Parra assumed, that the investment
opportunities the businessman will face are randomly generated from a
multinomial distribution of characteristics, and if it is further assumed
that this underlying distribution is not easily amenable to change by the
businessman, then the hypothetical businessman must attempt his profit
maximization within the constraints of the "situation" he faces — the
stochastic stream of investment proposals that is immutable to him. His
means of maximization of wealth is thus restricted almost entirely to the
choice of rules by which he selects from the proposals presented to him
those in which he will invest his money. This set of selection rules has
been viewed as being composed of three parts: a timing rule (when shall
decisions be made?); a decision rule (a measure of worth and an algorithm
for applying it to a choice among alternatives); and a "discount" or
"cutoff" interest rate to be used with the decision rule (the growth rate
at which capital released by the decision is expected to be reinvested).
Considerable debate about the correct choice of the last two factors
has appeared in the literature over the years. This debate has generally
been on either theoretical grounds — e.g., assuming a classical
free-market economy, one might argue that the appropriate discount rate
should be equal to the current lending rate — or on the basis of a
comparison of results when applied to a specific set of proposals. Parra
used his simulation model to produce curves of g vs. ra (observed rate of
growth in wealth of a firm vs. estimated marginal growth rate, i.e., the
selected discount rate) for three decision rules. He did this for two
disparate "situations" in his Tests 9 and 10. The experiment to be
described here was aimed at producing similar curves of g vs. ra over a

number of situations, with the factors that make one situation
significantly different from another varied singly over ranges of values
that would seem to encompass the set of reasonable values for the
respective factors. From the resulting sets of curves, some interesting
general conclusions will be drawn.
Parra said of his Tests 9 and 10, "The basic idea behind these tests
is the study of the performance of the decision criteria under errors in
the estimation of m," (60, p. 105). However, the results of his tests,
and of Test XIV, above, indicate that the theoretically correct value of
m may not be the value that maximizes g. In all four generally-tuned
cases of Test XIV, the MPV criterion achieved its best results for a
value of m approximately 50 percent higher tham ffl: at about .10 or .11,
as opposed to the theoretical value of .07. Furthermore, for the
short-lived cases depicted in Figures 11 and 13 the R0GR and MNPV
criteria achieved their maxima for m noticibly less than ffi.
It appears that the theoretical value ffi, as derived from EBC and
F(g), may not always be a good indicator of the value of m to be used to
attain maximum g. Call the maximum value of g attainable g* and let ra*
denote the value of m that is used to obtain g*. Test XIV indicates that
m* is not necessarily equal to ffi. Apparently ra* depends upon the
decision criterion used as well as EBC and F(g) . It probably also is
affected by some of the other Situational parameters. A decision-maker
seeking to maximize his g should therefore treat m as another parameter
to be varied so as to maximize g, rather than merely setting it to its
theoretical value, albeit the difference between the g realized at ffi and
g* at m* appears small.
Obviously, a decision-maker may vary his decision parameter ra with
ease. Probably he can select his decision criterion with nearly equal
facility. The culmination of this research is the experiment to be
described below. It is an investigation into the choice of decision
criterion and m to maximize the rate of growth in wealth of the firm.
The experiment examines the g* achieved for two different decision timing
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rules, over various values of the Situational parameters previously found
to be important. The intention was to find the optimum decision rules
under conditions that were as general as limited resources permitted.
Description
Test XV was run as a full factorial experiment over the various
Decision and Situational parameters tested. For each combination of
these parameters, a curve of g versus ra was estimated from observations
at five sample values of m. The resulting estimates of g* and m* were
then analyzed. As usual, detailed values of the input parameters and
output values of g are contained in Appendices B and C. However, since
this test is considered so important, it is worthwhile to here delineate
the conditions under which Test XV was run in somewhat greater detail
than was done for previously described experiments.
Decision Parameters
Two decision criteria were compared in this test: MPV and ROGR. The
results of Test XIV indicated that the criteria ROGR and MNPV behave
similarly. Of course, since this proposition has not been tested beyond
the indications of Test XIV, this must be regarded as an assumption, not
a conclusion. However, the previous test and the results reported by
Parra do indicate that this assumption is plausible. Since testing two
criteria instead of three reduced the cost of the experiment by
one-third, this assumption was an attractive one. For these reasons,
MNPV was not considered in Test XV.
Two different decision timing rules were examined in this
experiment. The first rule was, predictably, annual batching of
proposals. The second rule was suggested by Viafore's research as
representing a decision timing rule that was generally typical of the
rules used by the firms he studied (78, pp. 130-131). Because it was
derived from observed practices, this second timing rule will be referred
to as the "realistic" timing rule for brevity. With the realistic timing

rule, proposals ara divided into two classes on the basis of their cost.
Sets of proposals containing an alternative with a cost above some
certain value are put into an annual batch to be first considered for
adoption at the beginning of the following year. Money available for
investment in proposals during a year is first used to purchase proposals
from the batch of "large" proposals. Money remaining after the "large"
proposals are selected is used to purchase "small" proposals, decided
upon sequentially, as they are generated throughout the year. The
delineation of "large" proposals was arbitrarily selected as being
proposals with costs in the top ten percent for this experiment.
As was the case for Test VIII, described in Chapter IV, in Test XV
when the MPV criterion was sequentially applied to proposals the MOW used
was prospective present worth as defined in Chapter II. It was again
recognized that this formulation of prospective present worth was not the
most theoretically appealing form for decisions made at other than
regular annual intervals, but this form was used throughout the research
for simplicity and compatibility. The comments made on this subject in
Chapters III and IV apply also to the observations of Test XV with
sequential decision-making.
The two different decision timing rules were treated in this
experiment, not with a view toward a firm optimizing over the two rules,
but rather to examine the behavior of g*, m*, and the optimum decision
criterion under each rule. Given the assumptions underlying the
simulation model and the results of the preliminary tests described in
Chapter IV, it was not felt likely that the realistic timing rule would
prove superior to strict annual batching. It was felt that the realistic
rule more closely approximated what was actually practiced in industry
than the theoretically more appealing annual batching. Furthermore, it
was not thought likely that strict annual batching would abruptly become
more widely accepted by industry in the near future, even if this test
did indicate a substantial improvement in results could be gained by so
doing. Instead the two timing rules were considered so that the results
of Test XV would be meaningful both to theorists, who ordinarily consider
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annual batching, and to practitioners, who probably utilize a rule
similar to the realistic rule.
The final Decision parameter varied for this experiment was the
discount, or cutoff, rate, m. For every combination of the other
Decision parameters and the Situational parameters, observations were
made at five values of m. The first four values were chosen regularly in
every case: the values were .7 Si, ffi, 1.5 ffi, and 2 m. After these four
simulations were run, a second-order polynomial was least-squares-fit
through the four observations and the value of ra* estimated from this
polynomial. The fifth point to be observed was this estimated m*, which
of course varied from one combination to another. In every case, only
whole percent values for m were observed. If the estimated value of m*
for the fifth point coincided with one of the first four values observed,
a value one percent greater was taken as the fifth value of m to be
observed.
Situational Parameters
Four of the Situational parameters considered in the sensitivity
tests of Chapter IV were found to have a significant influence on the
average growth of wealth of the firm. These four factors were the
expected ratio of budget to total cost of proposals and the probability
distributions for the generation of the number of alternitives in a set,
the prospective growth rate of a proposal, and the life of a proposal.
For the results to have any pretension toward being considered as general
results, observations would have to be made over regularly-varied values
of these four parameters. The other three Situational parameters tested
in the sensitivity experiments were found not to influence g significantly.
These three parameters could be left fixed throughout the experiment
without affecting the generality of the results. The financial realities
of the situation when considered along with the two Decision parameters
to be examined at two levels each, meant that at most Text XV could treat
three of the four important Situational parameters at only two levels
each, and the fourth at three levels.
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The distribution of proposal lives was selected as the parameter to
be tested at three levels. Given tne limited scope financially imposed
upon the experiment, it was felt that EBC could be examined adequately
with only two levels: a high value (0.9 was used) and a low value (0.7).
Two levels were also deemed adequate for the distribution of the number
of alternatives in a set. Viafore reported that, in practice, the
identification and economic analysis of alternatives is the exception
rather than the rule (78, pp. 117-118, 132-13*0. In other words, his
research indicates that a very good approximation to the general practice
in industry would be represented by an F(ME) that deterministically
generated a single proposal for each set. It was decided that it would
be adequate to test at this level, and at a level that did allow
alternatives to be generated. The second level used for F(ME) generated
sets of from one to five proposals, with 2.0 being the expected size.
Thus the choice of which parameter to test at three, rather than two,
levels was reduced to a choice between F(g) and F(L).
It was decided to test F(g) at only two levels, but for a very
different reason than was used in the cases of EBC and F(ME). Given the
bounds of this test, it was thought that two levels each fairly
adequately spanned the space of interest for EBC and F(ME). However F(g)
seemed a parameter with such complicated ramifications that no small
number of samples could be considered as adequately spanning its space of
interest. Instead, a small set of values must be regarded as a random
sampling of values from a very large, or even infinite, sample space.
This was the concept used in the design of Tests VII and VIII, the
primary sensitivity tests. In the language of the statistician, at two
levels each the parameters EBC and F(ME) were to be considered
"fixed-effects" factors and parameter F(g) was to be considered a
"random-effects" factor. Little information would be gained by testing
F(g) at three levels over testing it at two levels, whereas the benefits
from going from two to three levels were felt to be substantial for F(L).
For these reasons, F(g) was the third parameter examined at two levels in
Test XV. The two levels tested were the same two values as were used in
Tests VII and VIII. Both were derived from a randomly-generated
115

distribution, both had equal values of Si at the two levels of EBC
considered, and both had equal expected values, 0.14, but different
standard deviations (0.07 and 0.11).
Parameter F(L) was tested at three levels in Test XV. In Tests VII
and VIII, F(L) was considered at two levels which had equal ranges (one
to twelve years) but different expected values (2.6 and 5.5 years). In
these tests the effect of a difference in F(L) was small. However, in
Tests XIII and XIV, which compared two values of F(L) with unequal
ranges, the difference in effects attributable to the change in F(L) was
considerably more pronounced. Although these results do not definitely
prove it, they at least indicate that a difference in range of F(L) is
more important than a difference in expected life. It was therefore
thought that three levels of F(L) could adequately span the space of
interest. The three levels chosen were a "short" F(L) (lives from one to
five years), a "broad" F(L) (lives from one to fourteen years), and a
"long" F(L) (lives from nine to fourteen years). Thus F(L) was also
considered a "fixed-effects" factor for Test XV.
It should be mentioned that designation of EBC, F(ME), and F(L) as
"fixed-effects" factors is a somewhat relative choice. There are a few
things in life that have an unarguably limited sample space — e.g.,
human gender as determined by chromosome test -- and would be considered
as "fixed-effects" factors in almost any experiment involving them. Most
things, however, can take on a very large, or even infinite, number of
values. These things do not always have to be considered "random-
effects" factors; indeed, often they are not. Classification as a "fixed-
effects" factor does not require that all possible values of the factor
be sampled and tested, just that all values of interest regarding the
experiment be sampled. Classification of EBC as a "fixed-effects" factor
to be tested at the values 0.7 and 0.9 in no way implies that values of
0.95, 0.75, or 0.5 for EBC were thought to be inconceivable. It meant
that, considering the limitations posed on the allowable sample size of
the experiment and in the absence of indications to the contrary, the
effects of varying this parameter could be considered reducible to
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results at a "high" level and results at at a "low" level. It would
certainly have been preferable to test a broader range of values at
closely-spaced points for this parameter and for the others. Such a
luxury could not be afforded.
A set of Situational parameters was used in this test that were not
used in any of the previous tests, namely the parameters governing the
disinvestment process. Viafore reported that a large fraction of the
budgets of the four firms he studied in detail was spent on "mandatory"
proposals. The fractions thus invested ranged from a low of 20$ to a
high of 88$ (78, pp. 141-150). It was decided that inclusion of such
investments would serve to increase the realism and applicability of the
simulations. The larger portion of the observations for this experiment,
those observations of Test XV-A, all used a 15$ rate of investment in
mandatory proposals. On this 15$ rate was imposed a uniformly-
distributed variation of plus or minus 2.5$ so that the money actually
"invested" in mandatory proposals ranged between 12.5$ and 17.5$ of the
annual budget. Observations for Test XV-B were made, half with no money
absorbed by such proposals and half with 30$ (plus or minus 2.5$)
"invested" in such proposals.
Mandatory proposals were modeled by the disinvestment process
without returns, as described in Chapter III. These proposals were
considered a money "sink": money "invested" in them was removed from the
budget, with no return gained from this "investment." It would appear
that this viewpoint would correspond with that of the management of
actual firms for a large portion of these proposals, since Viafore
reported that many of the mandatory proposals were viewed as "profit-
maintaining" proposals with no return. However, a proper incremental
analysis could show these proposals as promising very high returns. A
common example would be that of replacing a burnt-out fuze at a plant:
the incremental cost of this proposal is merely the nominal cost of a new
fuze, while the incremental returns are the continued profitability of
the plant for the forseeable future. The alternative is not to replace
the fuze and shut down the plant. From this it might appear that the
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proposal to replace the fuze has an almost infinite rate of return. The
logical consequence of this view would be for the management to encourage
practices that were destructive of fuzes so that a higher percentage of
the budget could be invested in fuze-replacement at an enormous rate of
return. The point is that the future stream of profits from the plant
are attributable to the past investments that constructed the plant. It
was pointed out in Chapter III that the model assumes that once a
proposal is accepted, its future cash flows are to be received
deterministically. Thus the replacement of a fuze — or the installation
of a smoke-stack precipitator or the refurbishing of an employee washroom
to comply with revised government regulations — should actually be
viewed as an expense that is attributable to a past investment. Thus
mandatory investments were viewed as costs due to discretionary
investments accepted in the past; costs that were not taken into account
when the discretionary proposal was considred and accepted, due to faulty
forecasting of the future.
Mandatory investments were modeled as having the highest priority on
the budget. They were included in the strict annual batch timing rule as
well as the realistic timing rule so that the results would be comparable.
It should be reeraphasized that the different treatments were each
required to "invest" equal percentages of their budget, not equal sums of
money. Thus a treatment that tended to produce higher budget levels
—as, for instance, did short-lived proposals compared to long-lived
proposal — would "invest" larger suras of money in mandatory proposals,
even though the fraction of budget was constant.
The level of investment in mandatory proposals also affected the
expected ratio of budget to cost. As it has been considered thus far,
EBC is the ratio of budget available for investment in proposals
generated from the input distributions to the total cost of such
proposals. It is the budget after mandatory proposals have been financed
that thus determines the effective EBC. However, the ratio of budget
before buying mandatory proposals to the total cost of discretionary and




Comparison of Values of Overall
to Effective EBC for Test XV
Effective Overall EBC
EBC Fraction of Budget to
Mandatory Proposals
0.00 0.15 0.30
0.70 0.70 0.73 0.77
0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93
Table XXXV
Designation of Observations for Test XV
Factor Parameter Mnemonic Designation
A Criterion R or M, for ROGR or MPV
B Timing R or B, for Realistic or Batching
C F(ME) S or M, for Single or Multiple
D EBC H or L, for High (.9) or Low (.7)
E F(g) None — use GO or Gl (GO has the
smal 1 er variance)
F F(L) S, B, or L, for Short / Broad / or Long
G Mandatory N, M / or H, for None / Medium (15%),
or High (30%)
close to the value of the effective EBC in any case. Table XXXIV
compares the effective and overall EBC values for the three levels of
investment in Mandatory proposals.
Tuning Parameters
Test XV was run under conditions that were described earlier as
"general-tuning". The reasons for running this experiment generally-
tuned are the same as for Test XIV, described earlier in this chapter.
The values of gp and M0 were determined from the average fully-tuned
values for both MPV and ROGR observed for four treatment combinations
that formed a quarter-replicate of the full 16-point factorial over
timing rule, F(ME), EBC, and F(g). All points were observed using the
"broad" distribution of lives, with 15% of the budget going to mandatory
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proposals. Considering only the four factors varied over the tuning
points, the design was determined by the alias set
I = + BCD = - CDE - - BE
Designation of Observations
There were seven factors varied for Test XV: two Decision
parameters and five Situational parameters (including the fraction of
budget absorbed by mandatory investments). Two of the Situational
parameters were observed at three levels each; the remaining five factors
were treated at two levels each. The observations could thus be denoted
by the system commonly used for factorial experiments. For the factors
treated at two levels, the absence or presence of the appropriate letter
indicates whether that factor was observed at "low" or "high" level (0 or
1 level), respectively. For factors treated at three levels, the terms
xO, x1, or x2 identify the level observed, where "x" is the appropriate
letter. This method of classification is entirely adequate, but the
identifications cannot be interpreted without repeated references to a
table of factors. To ameliorate this burden somewhat, a second
identification scheme was devised for this experiment. This second
scheme does require the reader to remember the order in which the seven
factors are designated, but uses a mnemonic scheme to identify the
levels. It may prove somewhat easier to interpret for some readers.
Table XXXV lists the seven factors and the mnemonic code for their
levels. Observations will be identified by both methods in this
dissertation. Thus the eight observations used to arrive at the
general-tune values of gp and MO were: RBMLGOBM (aeflgD, MBMLGOBM
(eflgD, R- and M-BSHGOBM (acdeflgl and cdeflgD, R- and M-RMHG1BM
(abdflgl and bdflgD, and R- and M-RSLG13M (abcflgl and bcflgD.
Analysis
Test XV-A consisted of the 96 points representing all treatment
combinations of the full factorial design with the portion absorbed by
mandatory proposals held constant at 15% (i.e., all possible combinations

that include factor G at level 1, g1). At each of these 96 points,
observations (10 replications each) were taken at five separate values of
m. The details of all these observed values may be found in Appendix C.
Table XXXVI presents the most interesting portion of the observed data,
the estimated optimum point m* and the resultant g*. For each
combination there are two estimates of the optimum point: the observed
maximum value of g, and the extreme point calculated for the second-order
curve fit through the observations. Both estimates are shown in Table
XXXVI. The identifying designations of Table XXXVI are compressed to
five terms for brevity. The first term, that for Factor A, decision
criterion, is omitted because the data for the two criteria are shown
differentiated by column. The last term, representing Factor G, the
fraction of the budget absorbed by mandatory proposals, is omitted
because all the observations were taken at level g1 , 15£ of the budget.
Marginal Analysis
The detailed observations for Test XV-A may also be combined into
average marginal observations of g for the four values of ra observed in
each case: .7 fli, m, 1.5 fii, and 2.0 fl. These marginal values must be
kept separated by the two levels of EBC because the value for Si changed
with the level of EBC. Table XXXVII lists these various marginal values,
along with an estimated maximum point for each set, calculated from the
maximum point of a parabola fit through the four average values. The
data from Table XXXVII is displayed in Figures 18 through 22. From these
data the following may be concluded:
• ROGR is more sensitive to overestimated ffi than is MPV.
• In many cases, especially for the high level of EBC, the ra* for
MPV is greater than ffi.




• In general, g* for ROGR is less than g* for MPV, but the
difference is slight.
• Behavior in the region i < m < m is inconclusive, since only a
o
single observation of each marginal curve lies in this region. However,

Table XXXVI
Estimated Maxima for Test XV-A Observations
Treatment RO GR MPV
Observed Cal cul ated Observed Calc ulated
m* g* m* s* n* s* n* Z*
RSHGOS(fO) 0,,05 0,,0317 0..061 0,,0315 0,,05 0.,0317 0.,052 0.0315
RSHGOB(fl) 0.,07 0,.0935 0.,073 0,,0903 0,,08 0.,0979 0.,077 0.0983
RSHG0L(f2) 0,.09 0,,1150 0.,077 0,,1157 0,,09 0,,1144 0.,080 0.1145
RSIIGlS(efO) 0,,05 0.,0342 0,,062 0,,0342 0,,05 0,,0342 0,,051 0.0341
RSHGlS(efl) 0,,07 0,.103U 0,,071 0,,1045 0,,08 0.,1031 0.,077 0.1027
RSHGlL(ef2) 0,,09 0.,1175 0.,075 0,,1135 0,,09 0,,1173 0,,083 0.1172
RSLGOS(dfO) 0,,05 0. . 0U63 0.,046 0,,0472 0.,08 0.,0460 0.,086 0.0463
RSLGOB(dfl) 0,,10 0.,1104 0.,091 0.,1036 0.,10 0.,1035 0.,099 0.1085
RSLGQL(df2) 0.,10 0..121*8 0. , 1 5 0,,1233 0.,11 0,,1263 0,,113 0.1230
RSLGlS(defO) 0,,08 0,,0479 0,,0 76 0,,0430 0,,09 0,,0432 0,,09 5 0.0481
RSLGlB(defl) 0.,10 0.,1169 0.,092 0,,1178 0,,10 0.,1161 0,,099 0.1158
RSLGlL(def2) 0,,10 0.,1288 0.,095 0.,1231 0. , 10 0,,1282 0,,103 0.1275
RMHGOS(cfO) 0,,07 0,,0495 0.,065 0,,0501 0.,07 0.,0580 0,,068 0.0579
RMHGOB(cfl) 0.,08 0.,1190 0.,076 0,,1197 0.,10 0,,1221 0,,091 0.1218
RMHGOLCcf 2) 0.,10 0.,1386 0.,089 0.,1383 0,,13 0.,1402 0,,122 0.1401
RMIIGlS(cefO) 0,,07 0.,0564 0.,066 0,,0571 0.,07 0.,0646 0,,06 2 0.0643
RMHGlB(cefl) 0.,09 0.,1314 0.,075 0.,1320 0.,10 0.,1325 0,,098 0.1324
RMIIGU(cef2) 0. 09 0.,1514 0.,033 0.,1515 0,,12 0.,1515 0.,10 8 0.1513
RMLGOS(cdfO) 0.,08 0.,0685 0.,079 0.,0630 0,,09 0,,0739 0,,086 0.0730
RMLGOB(cdfl) 0, 11 0,,1335 0.,114 0.,1332 0.,14 0.,1363 0.,143 0.1354
RNLGOUcdf 2) 0.,13 0,,1533 0,,126 0.,1531 0, , 16 0.,1568 0.,161 0.1561
RMLGlS(cdefO) 0,,08 0.,0761 0.,075 0.,0762 0,.11 0,,0806 0,,100 0.0803
RMLGlB(cdefl) 0.,10 0.,14 4 7 0.,096 0.,1439 0, , 12 0,,1456 0,,120 0.1435
RMLGlL(cdef2) 0.,10 0.,1622 0.,090 0.,1585 0,,13 0,,1702 0,,128 0.1647
BSHGOS(bfO) 0.,05 0.,0353 0.,059 0,,0343 0,,05 0,.0355 0,,051 0.0353
BSIIGOB(bfl) 0,,05 0.,1045 0.,066 0,,1057 0,,05 0,,1051 0,.053 0.1054
BS!!G0L(bf2) 0,,07 0.,1208 0.,06S 0,,1222 0,,07 0,,1209 0,.068 0.1220
BSHGlS(befO) 0.,05 0,,0380 0.,060 0,,0372 0,.05 0,,0382 0,,050 0.0381
BSHGlB(befl) 0.,05 0.,1095 0.,066 0,,1108 0,,05 0,.1101 0,.061 0.1102
BSHGlL(bef2) 0.,07 0.,1241 0.,063 0,,1256 0,,07 0.,1242 0,,069 0.1247
BSLGOS(bdfO) 0,,05 0.,0537 0,,040 0,,0559 0,.05 0,.0555 0,,040 0.0557
BSLGOB(bdfl) 0,,05 0,,1201 0.,055 0.,1206 0,.05 0,.1208 0,,040 0.1233
BSLG0L(bdf2) 0,,08 9,,1354 0.,0 76 0,,1355 0,.05 0,.1354 0,,040 0.1369
BSLGlS(bdefO) 0,,07 0,,0547 0.,063 0,,0550 0,.03 0,.0558 0,.077 0.0565
BSLGlB(bdefl) 0,,07 0.,1253 0,,082 0,.1274 0,.05 0,.1273 0,,040 0.1302
BSLGlL(bdef2) 0.,08 0.,1389 0.,076 0,,1391 0,.05 0,.1392 0,.040 0.1437
BMHGOS(bcfO) 0,,05 0.,0538 0.,064 0,.0540 0,.07 0,.0626 0,.065 0.0625
BMHGOB(bcfl) 0,,07 0.,1256 0..068 0,.1262 0,.00 0,.1288 0,.033 0.1286
BMHG0L(bcf2) 0,,07 0,,1437 0.,0 69 0,.1490 0,.10 0,.1482 0,.098 0.1476
BMHGlS(bcefO) 0,,05 0,,0611 0..065 0,,0616 0,.07 0,.0691 0,,059 0.0692
BMHGlB(bcefl) 0,,07 c.,1336 0,,068 0,.1394 0,.10 0,.1400 0,,089 0.1400
BMMGlL(bcef2) 0,,07 0.,1541 0.,070 0,,1637 0,.10 0,.1611 0,,101 0.1608
BMLGOS(bcdfO) 0,,05 0,,0771 0,,046 0,.0767 0,.06 0,,0807 0,,054 0.0803
BMLGOB(bcdfl) 0.,09 0,,1424 0,,093 0,.1427 0,.12 0,.1435 0,.122 0.1425
BMLG0L(bcdf2) 0,,10 0,,1637 0.,097 0,.1645 0,.14 0,.1640 0,,144 0.1635
BMLGlS(bcdefO) 0,,07 0,,0829 0,.068 0..0829 0,.09 0,.0878 0,.086 0.0875
BMLGlB(bcdefl) 0,,03 0,.1579 0,,084 0,.1579 0,.09 0,.1547 0,.094 0.1533




Average Marginal Values of i for Test XV-A
Curve 7 m m 1. 5 m 2 m Ce 1 cul ated Max
EBC=H m = 0.05 C .06 C .09 C .12
g*
ROGR Curves
. .H. . 0. 0063 0. 0973 0. 0961 0. 0753 0. 069 0. 0994
R . H . . 0, 0920 0. 0938 0. 0934 0. 0736 0. 072 0. 0961
B.H.
. 0. 1017 0. 1007 0. 0987 0. 0771 0. 43 0. 1019
.SH.. 0. 0842 0. 0S45 0. 0822 0. 0555 0. 072 0. 0865
MM.
. 0, 1005 0. 1101 0. 1099 0. 0952 0. 071 0. 1119
.HGO. 0, 0930 0. 0936 0. 0923 0, 0730 0. 069 0. 0955
.MG1. 0. 1006 0. 1010 0. 0998 0. 0777 0. 069 0. 1033
.H.LO 0449 0. 0429 0. 0391 0. 0119 0. 040 0. 0460
.M.LI 0. 1143 0. 1155 0. 114 9 0. 0950 0. 071 0. 1177




0073 0. 0983 0. 0990 0. 0925 0. 076 0. 0995
R.H.. 0. 0927 0943 0950 0. 0905 0. 081 0. 0962
B.I!. . 0. 1020 0, 1023 0. 1020 0946 070 0. 1031
.SH.. 84 4 0850 0842 0, 0745 0, 070 0, 0858
MM
. .
1103 1116 1137 0. 1105 086 1136
.HGO. 0940 0949 0, 0957 0881 075 0. 0963
.HG1. 1007 1016 1023 0. 0970 077 1027
.H.LO 0490 0487 0465 0394 057 0. 0490
.H.LI 1137 1154 1155 1101 079 1169
.H.L2 1293 1308 1339 1231 084 1338
EBC=L m = 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.20
ROGR Curves
..L.. 1116 1122 0839 0644 086 1136
R.L.. 1043 1077 0820 0627 092 1082
B.L.. 1190 1166 0358 0662 079 1195
.SL.. 0976 0976 0609 0395 035 0997
.ML.. 1256 1268 1068 0894 089 1275
..LGO. 1073 1078 0929 0635 083 1031
..LG1. ,1160 1166 0749 0653 087 1172
..L.LO 0625 0585 0195 - 0020 077 0629
..L.LI ,1282 1303 1041 0852 090 1311
..L.L2 ,1441 1477 1281 1101 .094 1479
MPV Curves
. .L. . .1104 1131 .1019 0369 .096 1132
R.L.. .1034 1081 0997 0838 104 1082
B.L.. .1174 .1180 .1041 0900 .088 1186
.SL.. .0977 .0992 .0794 0629 .089 0998
.ML.. .1231 .1269 .1243 1109 .113 .1273
.
.LGO. .1068 .1092 .1028 .0949 .089 .1079
..LG1. .1141 .1169 .1010 .0789 .080 ,1155
..L.LO .0645 .0642 .0544 ,0336 .082 0649
..L.LI .1260 .1295 .1167 .1014 .098 .1295
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Fig, 22. Test XV-A: Average Marginal Curves by F(L)
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it appears that g for ROGR is less than g for MPV at high levels of EBC
in this region, and the reverse for low levels of EBC. Differences in g
between the two criteria are very small, less than one-quarter of a
percent, with a single exception.
• In the region ra less than or equal to m, g for ROGR grew more
superior to g for MPV as lifetimes increased.
• The sensitivity of ROGR to overestimated f5 was more severe for the
high level of EBC.
• The sensitivity of both criteria to overestimated fli was more
severe in the case of sets of single proposals than in the case of
multiple alternatives.
• The sensitivity of both criteria to overestimated a was apparently
unaffected to any great extent by changes in timing rule, F(g) , or F(L).
• In any case, g* was not markedly greater than the g attained at
m = ffi.
• In general, MPV is insensitive to a misestimate of m* over a wide
range of m, but ROGR is sensitive to the value of m used.
ANOVA of the Optimum
A second approach to analyzing the data of Test XV-A is an analysis
of variance of the data displayed in Table XXXVI. There are two
estimates for each of the quantities m* and g* , the observed maximum and
the calculated maximum point of the least-squares-fit parabola. Table
XXXVIII lists the analyses of variance of the two estimates of g* and
Table XXXIX the analyses of ra* . For all analyses, interactions of three
or more terms were assumed zero and their suras of squares combined to
form the error term. Tables XL and XLI list the marginal mean values of
g* and m*, respectively, for all main effects. There is very close
agreement between the two estimates of g* and between the two estimates
of m* . From these data the following points are indicated:
• All six factors tested, and many of their interactions,
significantly affect g*.




Table XXXVI I I
ANOVA of g* for Test XV-A
Observed S* Calculated g*
Factor d.f. liSS xio 6 F MSS xlO 6 F
A Cri ter ion 1 54.6 19.15 25.2 6.43
B Timing 1, 515.3 531.31 1, 794.0 4 5 7.30
C F(ME) 19/ 147.3 6, 713.99 18, 073.0 4 606.98
D EBC 5, 797.0 2, 032.66 5, 475.2 1* 395.69
E F(g) 1, 227.0 430.22 1, 201.3 306.23
F F(L) 65, 035.9 23 154.86 65, 962.5 16, 814.48











A' 1.8 <1.* 3.8 <1.*
AF 23.0 8.38 27.6 7.04
B( 2.7 <1.* 0.2 <1.*
B[) 56.7 19.87 114.4 29.17
Bf 4.1 1.43* 5.5 1.41*
B! 26.4 9.26 50.0 12.76
Ct) 28.3 9.94 7.6 1.95*
CA 290.5 101.85 233.1 59.43
CF 2 116.0 40.66 92.2 23.51
Dl 1 0.2 <1.* 0.0 <1.*
Df 2 27.5 9.66 44.8 11.42
Ef 2 44.8 15.72 44.3 11.43
£ -ror** 68 2.9 — 3.9 —
Not signi f i cant at .05 leve . All Dther Factors are
sign i f i cant
.
** All interactions of three or more factors were considered





ANOVA of m* for Test XV-A
Observed m* Calcul ated m*
Factor MSS *10 F MSS xlO 6 F
A Cr i ter ion 2 926.0 29.27 1,399.3 14.77
B Timing 10, 626.0 106.31 7,758.0 60.32
C F(ME) 11 484.4 114.90 9,262.9 72.02
D EBC 5 551.0 55.54 4,802.5 37.34
E F(g) 1.0 <1.* 17.5 <1.*
F F(L) 7 ,007.3 70.11 5,798.7 45.09
A 5 84.3 <1.* 698.7 5.43
A( 2 ,926.0 29.27 2,893.0 22.49
A[) 1.0 <1.* 110.5 <1.*
A 26.0 <1.* 33.8 <1.*
A 13.5 <1.* 132.2 1.03*
B( 126.0 1.26* 341.3 2.65*
B r) 875.9 8.76 2,350.3 18.27
3 84.3 <1.* 270.0 2.10*
Bl 576.0 5.76 271.9 2.11*
CI) 176.0 1.76* 1,033.6 8.04
c 459.4 4.60 645.8 5.02
c 2 528.1 5.28 770.5 5.99
D 1 1.0 <1.* 0.9 <1.*
D 2 44.7 <1.* 112.6 <1.*
E 2 719.8 7.20 745.5 5.80
E r ror** 63 100.0 128.6 -_-
Not significant at .05 level. All other factors are
s igni f icant
.
All interactions of three or more factors were considered



































































































































































































































































































• The distribution of lifetimes, and interactions involving it, have
a surprisingly strong effect on g*. This is probably at least partially
due to the effect of maintaining the fraction of budget absorbed by
mandatory proposals constant.
• The choice of criterion has a relatively small, but significant,
effect on g*; it has a somewhat larger relative effect on ra*.
Considering the marginal mean values shown in Tables XL and XLI, the
general effects of all six factors were in the general direction
indicated by the earlier results of Tests VII, VIII, and XIV. The
magnitudes of the effects that both Decision parameters, criterion and
timing rule, had were relatively small — perhaps surprisingly so. The
distribution of lives, on the other hand, had a surprizingly large
effect on both g* and ra* . Decision timing rule also had a large effect
on m* (although, as noted above, not on g*). Finally, the lack of any
significant effect of a change in the variance of F(g) on ra* is
noteworthy, and interesting from a practical viewpoint.
Effect of Mandatory Investment Level
Test XV-B was an extension of Test XV-A, designed to examine the
behavior of the optimal point (ra*, g*) under two different fractions of
the budget absorbed by mandatory proposals. All Test XV-A observations
were based on 15$ of the budget being spent on mandatory proposals; Test
XV-B observations were taken, half with no money spent on such proposals
and half with 30$ (27. 5% to 32.5%, accounting for permitted variation)
spent on them. The "broad" level of F(L), f 1 , was omitted for this
subtest as of course was the "middle" level of mandatory investment
level, gl , leaving a 2? factorial design as the basis of the experiment.
Both levels of factor A, decision criterion, were observed for each
combination. Of the remaining six factors, a one-eighth replicate of the
full factorial was observed, giving a total of 16 combinations to be
observed. This was a design of resolution III; the two-factor
interactions were aliased with some of the main effects and with one
another and so could not be estimated. The defining contrast for the
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design was I = + BCD = + DFG = + BEF, plus the generalized interactions.
Five values of m were observed for each of the 16 combinations, the
values of ra determined as in Test XV-A, and ten replications run for each
value.
When the 16 treatments of Test XV-B were combined with the
appropriate 16 treatments of subtest -A, three pairwise comparisons could
be analyzed: no money in mandatory proposals compared to 15$, no money
compared to 30* , and 15 % compared to 30£. A more sophisticated analysis
would have been based on a fractional replication of a 3 x 2& design,
with fraction of budget absorbed by mandatory proposals being the factor
observed at three levels. Fractional replications of a full 2N factorial
experiment are not difficult to design; all the fractional replication
experiments described in this dissertation have been of this type.
Fractional replications of a 3^ factorial design are more difficult to
design, but they are a standard concept discussed in statistical
literature. Fractional replications of a mixed 3M x 2N experiment, while
theoretically feasible, would be enormously more complicated to design in
practice. It was not felt the potential worth of Test XV-B warrented
such efforts, so the simple but less appealing pairwise design was used.
Table XLII lists the observed and calculated estimates of the optimum
points for the Test XV-B observations, along with the pertinent subtest
-A data (observations at level gl). Because of the necessity to separate
the observations by level of EBC, and because of the the low resolution
of the design, the average marginal data for subtest -B (i.e., data
similar to that presented in Table XXXVII and Figures 17-21 for subtest-A)
would be severely confounded and so will not be shown.
The analyses of variance of the estimates for g* and ra* for Test
XV-B are shown in Tables XLIII and XLIV, respectively. Six analyses are
shown in each table, one for each of the three pairwise comparisons (P0
vs. P1, P0 vs. P2, and P1 vs. P2) for both the observed and calculated
estimates of the maximum point. From Table XLIII it can be seen that
factor A, decision criterion, was not indicated as having a significant
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ANOVA of g* for Test XV-
Observed g* Calcu la ted g*
Factor d.f. MSS *10 6 F MSS xlO 6 F
(1) PO vs. PI
A Cr i ter i on 1 9.0 <1.* 1.3 <1.*
B T imi ng 1 260.8 9.63 270.6 8.44
C F(ME) 1 3 , 9 8 7 . 9 147.22 4,083.2 127.35
D EBC 1 6,241.0 2 3 0.40 5,990.8 186.85
E F(g) 1 260.8 9.63 303.0 9.61
F F(L) 1 17,004.1 627.75 16,628.1 518.62
G Mandatory 1 12,432.3 453.96 12,927.6 403.20
Residual 8 27.1 32.1
(2) PI vs. P2
A 1 3.1 <1.* 25.3 <1.*
B 1 689.1 32.89 922.6 20.54
C 1 3,788.4 130.83 3,229.1 71.90
D 1 5,662.6 270.29 4,306.0 107.01
E 1 238.7 11.39 151.9 3.33*
F 1 44,880.4 2,142.26 42,900.3 955.21
G 1 12,645.0 603.58 11,864.6 264.17
Residual 8 21.0 49.9
(3) PO vs. P2
A 1 4.0 <1.* 20.2 <1.*
B 1 402.0 9.38 566.4 7.58
C 1 3,844.0 89.73 3,335.1 44.63
D 1 13,888.6 324.22 12,545.0 169.22
E 1 225.0 5.25* 130.0 1.74*
F 1 28,645.5 688. 70 26,895.9 359.93
G 1 52,578.4 1,227.39 51,008.1 682.61
Residual 8 42.8 74.7
Not significant at .05 level; all other factors are




ANOVA of m* for Test XV-B
Observed m* Calculated m*
Factor d ,f. MSS xlO 6 F MSS xlO 6 F
(1) PO vs. PI
A Criterion 506.3 7.36 540.6 4.28*
B Timing 1,056.3 15.36 1,620.1 12.82
C F(ME) 156.3 2.27* 162.6 1.29*
D EBC 306.3 4.45* 390.1 3.09*
E F(g) 6.2 <1.* 280.6 2.22*
F F(L) 3,906.3 56.81 4,522.6 35.78
G Mandatory 506.2 7.36 351.6 2.78*
Pves idual 3 68.8 126.4
(2) PI vs P2
A 625.0 4.25* 256.0 1.49*
B 3,025.0 20.59 2,352.3 13.67
C 25.0 <1.* 25.0 <1.*
D 400.0 2.72* 420.2 2.44*
E 100.0 <1.* 42.2 <1.*
F 4,225.0 28.76 3,481.0 20.22
G 25.0 <1.* 156.3 <1.*
Residual 8 146.9 172.1
(3) PO vs. P2
A 625.0 5.45 400.0 2.85*
B 1,225.0 12.64 1,722.3 12.28
C 25.0 <1.* 81.0 <1.*
D 400.0 4.13* 256.0 1.82*
E 100.0 1.03* 420.2 3.00*
F 4,225.0 43.60 4,032.3 28.74
G 625.0 6.45 196.0 1.40*
Residual 8 96.9 140.3
* IJot significant at .05 level; al 1 other factors are




maximum § for MPV exceeded that for ROGR in 13 of the 16 cases. Factor
E, F(g), was indicated as having a significant effect on g* in only half
the analyses. The remaining five factors definitely had a significant
effect on g*, with factors F and G, F(L) and fraction of budget absorbed
by mandatory proposals, indicated as having the strongest effect.
The analyses of Table XLIV should be most interesting from a
practical viewpoint, as these indicate the optimum value of a Decision
parameter that should be used in order to attain best results. From this
table it can be seen that factors C, D, and E — F(ME), EBC, and F(g) —
are indicated as having no significant effect on m* in all six analyses.
Factors A and G, decision criterion and fraction of budget absorbed by
mandatory proposals, are indicated as having a significant effect in only
two of the six analyses. Factors B and F, timing rule and F(L), are
indicated as definitely having an effect on the best choice of m.
The corresponding analyses of Test XV-A indicated that all six of
the factors A through F significantly affected g*, and that all but
factor E significantly affected m* . The analyses above for Test XV-B
indicated in contradiction that factors A and probably E did not affect
g*, and that factors C and D and probably A and G did not affect ra*
significantly. These contradictions between conclusions are probably the
result of the extensive confounding of the main effects with
interactions, especially with two factor interactions, many of which were
indicated as significant in the subtest -A analyses. These confoundings
were a direct result of the small sample size of subtest -B. Test XV-B
was intended to estimate the effect of factor G, portion of the budget
absorbed by mandatory proposals, on the optimum point. The analyses of
variance indicate that this factor has a strong effect on realizable g*,
but that it probably does not influence m*, the best choice of m.
The marginal mean values of g* and m*, for all of the six analyses
of variance performed on each, are shown in Tables XLV and XLVI,
respectively. These tables indicate that the behavior of the marginal




Marginal Mean Values of g* for Test XV-
Observed g* Calcul a ted g*
Factor Level = 1 1
(1) PO vs. PI
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G Mandatory .1561 .1003 .1562 .0993
(2) PI vs. P2
A .0691 .0700 .0718 .0692
B .0630 .0761 .0 629 .0781
C .0541 .0849 .0563 .0847
D .0507 .0883 .0532 .0878
F
.0557 .0734 .0674 .0736
F .0156 .1225 .0187 .1223
G C15% vs. 30% ) .0976 .0414 .0977 .0433
(3) PO vs. P2
A .0982 .0992 .1009 .0986
B .0937 .1037 .0938 .1057
C .0832 .1142 .0853 .1142
D .0693 .1282 .0716 .1278
E .0950 .1025 .0969 .1026
F .0564 .1410 .0587 .1407




Marginal Mean Values of m* for Test XV-
E
Observed m* Calcu lated r
Factor Level = 1 1
(1) PO vs. PI
ROGR MPV






























G Mandatory .091 .080 .091 .081
(2) PI vs. P2
A .071; .086 .077 .085
B .094 .066 .093 .068
C .079 .081 .082 .079
D .075 .085 .075 .086
E .083 .078 .082 .079
F .064 .096 .066 .095
G (152 vs. 30%: I .081 .079 .077 .084
(3) PO vs. P2
A .079 .091 .082 .092
B .094 .076 .098 .077
C .084 .086 .085 .089
D .080 .090 .083 .091
E .088 .083 .092 .082
F .069 .101 .071 .103
G (0% vs. 30%) .091 .079 .091 .084
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analyses of subtest -A except for the values for factor A involving level
g2, 30$ of budget to mandatory proposals. Referring back to Table XLII
it can be seen that the calculated estimates of g* for ROGR exceed those
for MPV in three of the four cases at level g2, but the observed
estimates of g* for ROGR exceed the observed MPV maxima in only one
instance. This anomaly is probably largely due to the fact that the
calculated estimate of g* is derived from a parabola fit through only
five points. Depending on the variation of the observed g from the
theoretical value at each of the five points, and upon how closely the
theoretical behavior of g with m actually approximates a parabola, these
fit curves may be only a crude approximation of the true behavior. In
two cases, ROGR had a calculated g* greater than that for MPV but an
observed g* less than MPV, although the observed g* was taken at an m
quite close to the calculated ra*. For these two cases, it would appear
that the curves are not particularly good fits; the true value of g* for
MPV probably exceeds that for ROGR in these cases. In the one
observation BMLG1LH (bcdef2g2) the true maximum g for ROGR apparently
does exceed that for MPV.
Tables XLV and XLVI also indicate that:
• The behavior of the marginal values of m* for factors A through F
is consistent with that shown earlier in the analyses of subtest -A
except for the cases of the calculated optima for factor C, g1 vs. g2,
and factor E, gO vs. g2. These variations from the previously-indicated
behavior are not large. The comments made in the preceding paragraph
apply to these deviations as well.
• Predictably, g* declines as the fraction of budget absorbed by
mandatory proposals increases. Based only on the three values observed,
the decline in g* appears to be linear with respect to factor G.
• An increase in factor G generally seems to result in a slight
decrease in ra*, although the data for the calculated estimate of the
optimum in the case of g1 vs. g2 is contradictory to this trend.
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Reexamination of the MOE
Probably the single most interesting thing about the large volume of
data produced in Test XV was the large effect caused by a change in F(L).
It seemed possible that this could be at least partially due to the
choice of g as a measure of effectiveness (see the discussion in Chapter
III). Since all simulations used generally-tuned values of gp and MO —
that is, all simulations used identical input values for these parameters
— the short-lived simulations faced the situation of their input budget
MO having cash inflows for all eight years of the simulation but their
output MH having cash outflows for only five years. To look at this more
closely, a combination was chosen at random — RBSHGO.M (b(F)g1) — and
the average final output cash flows for the short and broad levels of
factor F were compared. The incremental post-horizon cash flows for the
increment (fO-fl) are shown in Table XLVII. The average value of g for
the fO case was 0.0317; for the f1 case it was 0.1038. The incremental
cash flow series shown in Table XLVII obviously represents a borrowing at
an usuriously high rate of interest. If net present value is used to
Table XLVI
I
Sample Incremental Post-Horizon Cash Flows
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compare the two values of MH it would obviously indicate the f1 series as
preferable for any reasonable discount rate. For example, PfO-fl(g = • 1
)
is - $139,000. Clearly, a comparison of the values of g leads to the
same conclusion as the net present value calculations in this case.
It should be noted, also, that the shorter-lived simulations
produced higher budget amounts after the first year of simulation than
did the broad- or long-lived simulations. Since the amounts absorbed by
mandatory proposals was determined by a constant fraction of the budget,
the short-lived simulations invested substantially more money in such
proposals than did the other simulations. For the two simulations
compared in Table XLVII, the short-lived simulation sunk approximately
1.5 times as much money per year as did the broad-lived simulation into
mandatory proposals, for years three through eight of the simulations.
Value of the Results as Predictors
Test XV was a rather large and elaborate experiment designed to
explore the optimum decision policy for the capital budgeting problem
under general conditions. The test was especially concerned with the
optimum choice of decision criterion and "discount" (or "cutoff") rate m
in the general case. A good deal of information was obtained from this
test about the behavior of the optimum point (m*, g*) for two criteria
and two timing rules under a variety of different situations.
A practically-minded capital budgeter would do well to concern
himself with this problem: choosing the optimum decision policy. Since
the problem appears much too complicated to allow a good analytical
solution, the best approach would appear to be one similar to that
proposed by Parra, and represented by the Test XIV of this chapter. This
approach would involve estimation of all the significant Situational
parameters for the firm and proceeding with a detailed simulation of the
firm in the manner of Test XIV. Depending upon how closely the estimated
Situational parameters, and the assumptions upon which the model is
based, fit the actual situation being modeled this should produce
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simulation results that are more or less indicative of the actual results
to be expected for that firm.
One could also attempt to predict a firm's behavior from the results
reported for Test XV. A first, naive approach could be to select the
tested combination that most closely approximated the firm to be modeled
and use these results as an unsophisticated prediction of the expected
actual results. The information contained in this chapter allows the
Test XV results to be used in this manner so that the goodness of their
value as predictors may be judged. Namely, the Test XV results can be
used to predict the Test XIV results (specifically, the results for the
short-lives, no borrowing, generally-tuned case, Test XIV-B)
.
Test XIV cannot be viewed as a particularly severe test of Test XV's
results as predictors. Four of the seven factors of Test XV were tested
at levels that correspond exactly to conditions of Test XIV-B: ROGR and
MPV, annual batching, no money to mandatory proposals, and short-lived
proposals. The levels of the other three factors had to be selected to
correspond as closely as possible to the Test XIV conditions. The
earlier experiment had an EBC of about .62, so the low level of factor D
(0.7) was used. Test XIV had an F(ME) that permitted up to three
alternatives so the high level of factor C, permitting up to five, was
used. Finally, the F(g) for Test XIV had a mean of 0.118 and a standard
deviation of 0.076; the low level of factor E, with a standard deviation
of 0.070 (both levels had equal means of 0.140) came closest to this, and
was selected.
Observation .BMLG0SN ((A)bcd), therefore, most closely approximated
the Test XIV conditions. This estimate permitted more alternatives per
set than did Test XIV and an F(g) with a higher mean, tending to give the
predicted results a somewhat higher g* than would be expected from the
target. On the other hand, the predictor observation had a higher EBC
and an F(g) with a smaller standard deviation, both of which would tend
to give the predicted results a g* that was too low. With respect to m*,
the level of F(ME) of the predictor would tend to predict a value that
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Table XLVI I I
Estimated g*: Realized and Predicted Values







Estimated m* : Realized and Predicted Values
Predicted by Predicted by
Nearest Case Linear Model
Real i ze d Nearest
ROGR
Observed g* .1624 .1540
Calculated g* .1624 .1540
MPV
Observed g* .1627 .1575











.104 = 1.4 3m
.07 = .70m .068
.067 = .67m .069
.08 = .80m .071
.076 = .76m .077
was too high but the level of EBC would produce a prediction that was too
low. The differences in standard deviation of F(g) should have no effect
on ra*; the effect of the difference in means of F(g) was unknown. In
short, the overall effects of the differences in the three variant
factors on either g* or m* were entirely unpredictable from the data at
hand.
Table XLVIII lists the predicted and the actually observed values
for the estimated g* of the Test XIV situation, for both decision
criteria. It is apparent that the predicted values of g* were too low by
differences of one-half to three-quarters of a percent. Additionally,
the difference in g* between the two criteria was exaggerated in the
prediction over what was realized, although the better criterion (MPV)
was correctly predicted. The corresponding values of m*, predicted and
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realized, are shown in Table XLIX. These data are really more important
than the g* data, since it is presumably upon the estimated m* that the
actual decision policy would be based. Since the data from Test XIV and
the data from Test XV are such that two different theoretical values of m
are involved (.07 for the Test XIV data and .10 for the Test XV data),
values of m* are expressed both in absolute terms and as a function of ffl.
It can be seen that the predicted values of m* for MPV are even worse
indicators of the realized results than were the predictions of g*. The
predicted values of m* for ROGR are nearly correct, but the predicted
values for MPV are much too low. Test XV predicted a value of m* < ft
when the realized value of m* was considerably greater than ri; the most
that can be said for predicted ra* is that the value for MPV was correctly
predicted as being greater than the value for ROGR.
Despite the fact that only two values were observed for most of the
independent variables, a second attempt at prediction was made by
constructing a linear regression model for m* and g* from the various
parameters tested. Such a model was fit, for m* and g* for each of the
two decision criteria, to the following quantities (values of the
predictor quantities for the case attempted are shown in parentheses):
expected number of alternatives E(ME) (1.07); EBC (.62); standard
deviation of the distribution of prospective rates of return, Sg (.076);
expected life of a proposal, E(L) (2.92); percent of proposals sent to
batch, b (1.0); and percent of budget absorbed by mandatory investments
with no return, p (0.0). The equations for the average predicted optimum
for ROGR were
m* = .003 E(L) - .018 b - .060 EBC + .008 E(ME) + .106
g* = .011 E(L) - .372 p + .027 E(ME) - .108 EBC + .108
The equations for the average optimum for MPV were
m* = .028 E(ME) + .004 E(L) - .025 b - .079 EBC + .107
g* = .011 E(L) - .387 p + .029 E(ME) - .105 EBC + .111
The equations for the individual predictions based on observed and on
calculated optima differed very little from the average equations shown
above. It can be seen that the two equations for m* are very similar,
except for the coefficients for E(ME) and EBC, and that the two equations
145

for g* are also very similar, except for the coefficients of p. The
values of g* and m* predicted by these linear regression models are shown
in Tables XLVIII and XLIX (values for the predictions based on both
observed and calculated estimates of g* and m* are shown, instead of the
average predictions that would result from the four equations shown
above). Values for m* predicted from the linear regression models agree
very closely with the values of m* predicted by the "nearest case"
approach and are thus rather poor predictions of the realized values, as
were the former predictions. The values of g* predicted by the
regression models turned out to be much worse even than the "nearest
case" predictions. (The linear regression model does not take into
account any difference in the mean values of the two F(g), but any
attempt to do so would further degrade the predictions since E(g) for the
Test XV data on which the models are based was 0.14 but E(g) for the test
case was only 0.118). Clearly, although the linear regression models
accounted for about .7 of the total variance in m* and about .9 of the
total variance in g* for the Test XV data, these models are very poor
predictors of other situations.
Based on these attempts at prediction, it must be concluded that any
attempt to extrapolate from observations of Test XV to a specific
situation will have only poor results, beyond the limits of the general
conclusions that have been discussed at length in this chapter. It may
deserve emphasis that although Test XV was designed to cover as broad a
spectrum of situations as possible, it was never seriously expected that
the coverage would be so broad or finely-spaced that the results could






The research described in this dissertation has consisted of fifteen
separate experiments of varying size and importance. The earlier tests
were concerned with examining the concept of tuning the model so as to
represent a firm in financial equilibrium; these tests were described in
Chapter III. Chapter IV described the series of experiments that
explored the sensitivity of the output MOE, g, to changes in certain of
the input parameters. The culmination of the research was represented by
the two tests described in Chapter V: tests which examined the optimum
decision rule under a range of conditions. The first section of this
chapter is a collection and summary of the more important results of all
these tests. The second section contains a brief outline of some
recommended topics for further research. This chapter concludes the
presentation of the research.
Summary of Conclusions
In Chapter III it was pointed out that the many input quantities
required by the modified version of Parra's simulation model could
conveniently be separated into four distinct classes of parameters.
Inputs classed as Situational parameters serve to define the situation
faced by the simulated firm; in particular, these parameters govern the
proposal generation process. Tuning parameters also define facets of the
firm's situation, but the actual values of these parameters need to be
determined by a tuning process to model a firm in financial equilibrium
facing the situation defined by the Situational parameters. Decision
parameters define the complete decision rule used by the simulated firm.
Finally, the remaining inputs may be aggregated into a class called
Control parameters because they exert various forms of overall control





Tests II through VI were run primarily to see if the differences
observed between outputs from tuned situations were true differences or
if they were caused by the tuning paths taken in tuning the situations.
The tests indicated that the concept of a firm being in financial
equilibrium, described in Chapter III, is valid and that some adjustment
of parameters, or tuning, is necessary in order to produce a model of a
hypothetical firm in such a state. Both Thuesen and Parra reported that
the relative magnitudes of the input and output cash flows tended to form
into a pattern characteristic of the firm being modeled. This same
tendency was noted throughout the research, but the tests of Chapter III
indicated that the pattern of budget flows really does not affect the
output g, at least considering fairly drastic changes in shape that
conserve the present worth of the budget. However these tests showed
that a tuning phenomenon definitely does exist for parameter gp, and that
gp has a strong influence on the output. In this sense the concept of
equilibrium for a firm, equality between gp and expected g, is valid. Of
course, if the short-term results from a model of a specific firm are of
interest, tuning should not be employed.
The two large sensitivity experiments of Chapter IV, Tests VII and
VIII, showed that four of the Situational parameters defining the general
investment situation faced by the firm have a significant effect on g for
a firm in equilibrium: EBC, F(g), F(ME), and F(L). The other Situational
parameters tested were found not to have a significant effect: a, F(D),
and F(CJ). Some Situational parameters were not tested for significance,
namely the interest rate earned by liquid investments and the borrowing
situation faced by the firm. Finally, Test XV, described in Chapter V,
indicated that the Situational parameters governing disinvestment without
return (interpreted as investment in mandatory proposals) also are
significant, and that their effect appears to be linear with respect to
the fraction of budget thus absorbed.
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It was also found that certain Decision parameters do, in fact, have
a significant effect on the output. The parameters found significant
were decision criterion and timing rule. The significance of the other
dimensions of the overall decision rule were not tested. The tests of
Chapter IV, in conjunction with the results reported by Parra, indicated
that batching proposals over an annual period might be expected to be
better than batching over a six-month or shorter period, including
sequential decision-making, or batching over a two-year or longer
period. The marginal mean results of Test VIII indicate that the ROGR
criterion yields a higher value of g at iB than does the approximate MPY
criterion, on the average. However Test XV indicated that MPV generally
gives the superior g* for a situation.
The influences of two Control parameters on g were also tested.
These parameters were the simulation horizon and scaling, where scaling
refers to a simultaneous adjustment of the expected cost and expected
number of sets of proposals such that their product remains constant. It
was found that neither parameter affected the expected value of g
although both affected the variance of observed g. The effect of both
horizon and scaling on the variance is in the direction that would be
expected: an increase in either H or NEq decreases the variance but
increases the cost of the simulation. For both parameters, the resulting
increase in cost is approximately linear, so long as the exact MPV
solution is not attempted . However while the decrease in standard
deviation is approximately linear with an increase in H over the range 4
to 16 years, the decrease in standard deviation with respect to NEq
approximates a power function such that doubling the number of proposals
results in about a H0% reduction in the standard deviation.
Optimum Decision Policy
Parra examined the optimum decision policy in the cases of two
distinct, randomly-chosen situations. He examined the realized value of
g= over various values of the Decision parameter m, for three decision
rules: ROGR, MNPV, and MPV. In both cases, Parra considered only annual
1*»9

batching of proposals. Both situations yielded curves of g vs. m that
were very similar. These curves may be described in general terms as:
• The MPV curve was relatively flat and peaked at a value of m* that
was approximately 1.5 fa.
• The ROGR curve peaked at an ra* that was equal to, or only slightly
less than, fft; the curve was quite flat for m < ra*, but for m > m* fell
off much more sharply than the MPV curve.
• The MNPV and ROGR curves were nearly coincident.
Test XIV reexamined one of these two situations to see what effect
longer proposal lives would have on the results. The conclusions reached
from this examination of a specific situation were (1) all three rules
give nearly equal results for ra = ffl; (2) for MPV, it is preferable to use
m > ffi rather than m < m; and (3) for ROGR and MNPV, it is preferable to
use m < ffi, although these rules become more sensitive to m < m as lives
were increased. (Parra also tested ROGR using m = 0, — i.e., ROGR
without a cutoff rate — and found this gave results only slightly less
than the g* of ROGR or MPV in the case of short-lived proposals; ROGR
with m = was not tested in any of the experiments of this research)
.
Test XV represented the ultimate goal of this research. It was an
examination of g vs. ra for ROGR and MPV similar to that of Test XIV, but
conducted over a wide range of situations. The situations were produced
by regularly varying those parameters found significant in the
sensitivity tests, in a full factorial design. Besides the annual
batching situation used by Parra and generally considered by theorists,
results were also observed for a second timing rule designed to more
closely approximate the actual practice of many firms. The results
described above for the two situations conceived by Parra, and reexamined
in Test XIV, were found to be valid for many of the situations examined
in Test XV, but by no means all.
This examination of the general optimum indicated several things.
The ROGR criterion is generally more sensitive to overestimated m* than
is the approximate MPV criterion, especially at the higher level of EBC
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tested. The sensitivity of both criteria to overestimated ra* was more
severe when each set was composed of a single proposal than when
alternatives were allowed, but it was independent of timing rule and the
distributions of prospective growth rates and lives. The value of m* for
the MPV criterion was greater than that for ROGR in most, but not all
cases. The value of m* for the MPV criterion was greater than the
theoretical value ffi in most cases, especially at the higher level of EBC.
The value of ra* was entirely independent of F(g) , for both criteria.
Similarly, the level of disinvestment had no apparent effect on m3
,
although it had a strong (and apparently linear) effect on g* for both
criteria. At the higher level of EBC, it appeared that realized values
of g for m < f5 were greater for the MPV criterion than for ROGR; but the
reverse was true for the lower level of EBC (which more closely
corresponds to the situation examined by Parra and in Test XIV). The
performance of the ROGR criterion in the region m < m increased relative
to MPV as lives were increased.
From the foregoing, it should be evident that the general situation
was a complex one, and few universal guidelines could be extracted. It
did appear that realized g at the theoretical value m was not markedly
less than the overall optimum g* for both criteria, in general. The
optimum g* for MPV was generally greater than the corresponding g* for
ROGR, but on the whole the difference was relatively slight. In fact the
effect of either of the two Decision parameters, criterion or timing
rule, on g* was quite small. The. "realistic" timing rule, which batched
only 10* of the proposals on the average and decided upon the remaining
905S sequentially, gave results much closer to those of strict annual
batching than were shown in Test VIII, which compared annual batching to
sequential decisions on all proposals; batching the 10? most-expensive
proposals improved the results (relative to annual batching) considerably.
Finally, it was noted that the distribution of lives had a surprisingly




Recommendations for Further Research
A number of areas in which further investigation is desirable
suggested themselves during the course of this research. These are
briefly described belov;. They fall generally into one of two general
subjects: ways in which the model itself may be improved and further
tests that might profitably be carried out with the model.
Improvements to the Model
Computer programming must still be regarded as somewhat of an art,
as well as a science. With a program as large and complex as Parra's
model, the code can never be absolutely optimized; improvements in coding
which will improve efficiency will always be possible. Beyond this,
numerous other fairly obvious but pedestrian changes in coding which will
improve the model's capabilities are possible. In particular, extensions
to the present maximum allowable values for proposal lives (14 years)
would doubtless make the model more appealing to some potential practical
users. Extensions to the current limitations on simulation horizon and
to the maximum number of proposals allowed in the stack (presently 19
years and 210 proposals, respectively) might be attractive to some users
although the results of Tests X and XI would indicate the current limits
are entirely adequate for most purposes.
The experiments described herein all were run using a "load module"
compiled with Stanford University's FORTRAN H compiler, with the
compiled-code-optiraization feature, on the university's IBM 360/67
computer. The final version of the program appeared to be quite
efficient operating thus, and could be run in the "Standard Batch" mode
on the computer. However, for some applications such as entering
extensive program changes or for use by relatively naive users, it is
desirable to run the program using a compiler with more extensive and
comprehensive error-diagnostic messages, such as the WATFIV compiler.
Unfortunately, the large volume of code and the large amount of storage
required do not allow the program to be run under WATFIV in the "Standard
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Batch". To be run under WATFIV, the prograr.i requires the "Large"
partition as it occupies about 238K bytes of core; this adds considerably
to both cost and turn-around time. It would seem desirable, then, to
have a reduced version of the the program available, one which could be
run in WATFIV and fit in the "Standard" partition.
Thuesen noted that no data was available on the "shape" of cash flow
patterns experienced in industry. Viafore also remarked on the general
lack of such information within the firms he studied. Parra conducted a
test which indicated that there was no significant difference in results
between proposals with cash flows of uniform return and proposals with
stochastic cash flow patterns. Nevertheless, a slight change in the
program may enhance the model's realism for some users. At present, a
single integral-valued parameter, Th, specifies the cash flow pattern
(from among eight possible choices) that will be assumed by all proposals
generated by this model. It would be a small and simple change to
instead allow Th to be a random variable, the probability vector
specifying the probability that a generated proposal will be of each
possible shape to be specified as a Situational parameter.
Tests VII and VIII indicated that the distribution of allowable
delay in accepting a proposal has no effect on the results. However,
none of the decision criteria used in this test account in any way for
future acceptance of proposals, they merely rank proposals on some
(presently-seen) MOW and accept according to this ranking within the
constraints of the present budget. The exact MPV or MNPV criteria, which
do attempt to account for possible future acceptance, were not tested;
quite possibly F(D) would be significant under these rules. The model
presently keeps unaccepted-but-acceptable proposals in the stack for
their allowable delay without change. It might be more realistic to
introduce a stochastically-determined rate of decay (or, more generally,
of change) to be applied to proposals that are delayed. Let d be a decay
rate randomly selected from the input distribution of such rates.
Normally, one would expect d. < but this is not necessary; one could
input a distribution that allowed values greater than zero as well — to
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be interpreted as an increase in value with delay. A very simple scheme
would be to multiply all cash flows of a proposal delayed one year by
(1 + d ) : this would yield a new present worth ( 1 + d.) times the original
and leave prospective growth rate and payback period unchanged.
Alternatively, one could multiply just the returns by (1 + d. ) and leave
the costs unchanged, which (for d. < 0) would reduce the desirability of
all measures of worth. One could also use two rates and multiply all
costs by (1 + d.-| ) and all returns by (1 + a^), or one could devise, say,
an arithmetic scheme of decay with delay.
The change to the model that would probably increase its realism the
most would be to include the provision for correlation among the
stochastically-generated characteristics of proposals. Viafore was
unable to verify the applicability of Parra's model to the firms he
analyzed; he speculated that this was likely due to conditionality in the
proposal generation process, although he had no hard evidence to
substantiate this suspicion. Allowing correlation among the presently-
independent characteristics would thus apparently improve the realism of
the model considerably. The drawback to this is, as Hillier once noted,
that probably no one has sufficient information reliably to estimate the
correlation coefficients (33, p. 449).
A final suggested alteration to the model is concerned with
improving the results obtained from the approximate MPV criterion. It
may be recalled that the approximate solution consisted of ranking the
proposals on each of three measures: the ratio of present worth to first
cost (LS), the rate of ?sent worth to total cost (BC), and the present
worth itself (PV). The ilgorithm then compared the three (not
necessarily distinct) sets of accepted proposals produced by the three
rankings and selected the one that maximized total present worth. In the
course of the research, data were collected on about 32,000 decisions
over batches of proposals by the approximate MPV criterion (there is
little value in examining the results of sequential decisions). The
three rankings were identical in 64$ of all those decisions. The LS
ranking indicated the best choice 88% of the time, BC 83? and PV 73$.
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The LS ranking uniquely gave the best ranking in almost 9% of the
decisions, BC in almost 5$, and PV in over 6% of the cases. Parra found
this approximate rule produced a value of g that was 99.5$ as high as the
value produced by the exact MPV algorithm, on the average. He also found
that the solution time required by the exact algorithm exceeded that of
the approximate solution by an exponential function of the number of
proposals.
t = 2.95 (1.35) NE
where t is in seconds (60, p. 83). Using this function, the exact
solution of the level of scaling found acceptable in Test X and used for
all the succeeding tests, NEq = 2H, would require about 1.1 hours of
additional computer time for ten replications, which would appear to be a
totally unacceptable cost for the very small gain in results.
The suggested improvement to the algorithm is as follows. Rank on
the three indices presently used and also on a fourth index: prospective
rate of return. (This would necessitate few modifications to the
selection procedure as such a ranking is already generated and used
whenever ROGR is chosen as the decision rule). From the set of four
rankings (or three, if the additional ranking on gj is not desired)
accept all proposals that are indicated as being selected by all rankings.
Then, considering only the remaining budget money and possible borrowing,
and considering only those proposals that were indicated for acceptance
by at least one, but not all of the rankings, enter the integer
programming solution routine. No data on the subject has been collected
but it seems probable that the large majority of proposals in the truly-
optimal set would also be in the set accepted in common by the four
rankings. If it is assumed that only six proposals remain, on the
average, after all proposals accepted by all four rankings have been
selected then Parra's formula indicates the refinement step would require
only about 20 seconds of computation for ten replications. Since the
large majority of proposals accepted would be so done on the basis of a
ranking algorithm, this would still produce a solution that, in general,
would be non-optimal. However, it is thought that it would effect an




The tests described in Chapter III reaffirmed that Parra's concept
of tuning is a valid one, at least for the parameter gp. The tuning
process used that seemed most efficient was tuning on the average of five
replications with a value of .8 for the tuning parameter A. Since
future testing of hypothetical situations, such as those examined in this
research, will likely involve a considerable amount of tuning in order to
experiment with firms in equilibrium, it might be well be worth some
effort to examine the most efficient choice of NREPS and X more formally.
The sensitivity tests of Chapter IV examined the sensitivity of the
model to most of the likely parameters. These results were then used in
the design of the examination of the optimum point (m*, g*), Test XV.
The sensitivity tests actually measured the sensitivity of output g
measured with parameter m at its theoretically correct value, ffi. It
would obviously have been more desirable to test the actual sensitivity
of the optimum point itself to changes in the various parameters. Test
XV indicated that the value of g at ffi is generally only slightly less
than the maximum value attainable, g* , so the tests conducted in this
research will probably prove valid for g* as well. However, the
sensitivity of the value of ra* to the various parameters is important and
has not been estimated for the parameters held constant in Test XV: a,
F(D), and F(CJ). Cf course the major drawback to testing the sensitivity
of (m*, g*) over testing the sensitivity of g at ffi, and the reason why
such testing was not done in this research, is that the former would be
several times as expensive as the latter due to the necessity of
experimentally finding the optimum point.
The determination of optimum batching period possibly deserves
further attention. Test IX determined that annual batching was optimal
over the set of batching periods tested (1/^, 1/2, 1, 2, and 3 year
periods) for two distinct situations. It was noted that this did not
preclude some odd period, of a length not tested, from being the true
optimum, although the linearity of the results of both situations would
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argue against this. It was also noted that it was entirely conceivable
that other situations could have an optimum batching period of, say,
one-half year or two years, depending on the values of io and F(g) and
possibly other parameters. Finally, the possibility that the results
were somehow dependent upon a subtle flaw in the coding of the program
cannot be eliminated. All tests were run with what was referred to in
Chapter III as the "basic time unit" equal to one year, which may have
influenced the results in some as-yet-unguessable way. The easiest way
to explore this last point would be to rerun one or both of the
situations of Test IX with some other period, say one-quarter year, as
the basic time unit to see if this changes the results. This change of
basic time unit would entail changes in all interest rates, and changes
in parameters NEq, gp, and MO. For strict equivalence, the growth in
generation process must also be modified so as to alter the values of CEt
and NEt every four basic time units (assuming one-quarter year as this
unit). This approach could also be used to explore whether annual
batching is the true optimum. Simulations with a one-quarter year basic
time unit could produce results for "odd" batching periods of three-
quarters and one-and-one-quarter years; simulations with a one-eighth
year unit could produce results for batching periods of seven-eighths and
one-and-one-eighth years, etc. In this way all practical batching
periods between one-half and two years could be quickly explored.
The influence of three of the four factors found significant in the
sensitivity tests — factors EBC, F(ME), and F(g) — were generally
predictable. The influence of the fourth factor, F(L) — and
particularly the strength of its influence — was surprising. Apparently
this stemmed directly from the obvious fact that shorter-lived proposals
more quickly liquidate the funds invested in them than do longer-lived
proposals. Therefore, a firm facing shorter proposals would tend to have
a budget vector, MT, that had relatively large cash flows but relatively
fewer flows compared to the budget vector of a firm facing longer
proposals. Assuming all other aspects of the investment situation were
identical between two firms except the distributions of lives, the firm
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facing shorter proposals would thus tend to invest more money in le33
desirable proposals each period, since the more attractive proposals
would presumably be accepted by both firms. However, because of the
relative importance of this parameter, the mechanism by which FtL)
influences g deserves investigation in considerably greater detail than
was possible in this research.
The examination of the optimum decision policy described as Test XV
was considered the culmination of this research, although the sensitivity
tests described in Chapter IV may be of more practical value. It should
not be surprising then that extensions to the experiments run in Test XV
are thought worthwhile. The most obvious extension would probably be the
most fruitful: an examination of results at more values of the important
parameters — testing these parameters over a wider range, with raore-
closely-spaced points of observations. The analyses of the optimum point
described in Chapter V all suggest that such an extension of Test XV be
carried out using a fractional replication design to hold down simulation
costs. However, it was pointed out earlier that fractional replications
of other than a full 2N or 3M experiment are extremely difficult to
design in practice, although there is no theoretical limitation. One
might also wish to include the Situational parameters governing short-
term borrowing in such an extended test, although inclusion of borrowing
among the factors to be considered would add considerably to the
dimensionality and complexity of the test.
The "realistic" decision timing rule of Test XV produced results
nearly as good as strict annual batching on the average, although the
realistic rule batched only the most-expensive ten percent of proposals
generated and decided upon all other proposals sequentially. Earlier
tests indicated a much larger difference in results would be expected
between annual batching and sequentially-deciding on all proposals.
Since there appears to be considerable reluctance on the part of industry
to adopt the practice of strict annual batching of proposals it would
seem desirable to conduct a small experiment further to test the
influence of the fraction of proposals batched (parameter SIZE determined
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this fraction for the scheme used in the realistic rule, but as described
both in Parra's dissertation and below in Appendix A there are several
other possible criteria for batching).
Finally, one might consider a change in the realistic decision rule
to make it applicable to certain other firms. The effect of this change
may then be examined in a simple experiment. Viafore stated that some
firms that he studied used an accounting convention that does not
correspond to the convention used in the model when multiple-disbursement
proposals are adopted. The model pays for each expense out of budget
monies for the period in which the expense occurs. Some firms, however,
use the convention of allotting money to pay for all expenses incurred by
a proposal from the budget for the period in which the proposal is
selected for adoption. For example, assume a proposal is adopted in year
one that requires a disbursement in year three as well as the initial
disbursement. The model as presently formulated would pay the initial
costs out of budget monies for year one and then subtract the payment
required in year three from the budget monies available for year three.
The modified scheme would pay both costs with year one budget monies.
Since this is a convention that is used in some firms, it would seem
interesting to examine the effects of using this as opposed to paying




NOTES ON THE MODEL
The final version of the simulation program used in this research —
the version used in the tests described in Chapters III, IV, and V —
accepts input data that is entirely compatible with the program "MESS1"
written by Sabino Parra. This program in turn, accepts inputs that are
entirely compatible with the slightly earlier version of the program,
"MESS" which was described in detail in Parra's dissertation, with a
single exception which is noted in the first section of this Appendix.
The second section contains a discussion about certain of the inputs
described in Appendix A to Parras dissertation. In particular, the
second section points out certain details and idiosyncracies about the
"standard input data set" (i.e., that set described in Parra's
dissertation plus the additional element described in the first section).
These comments are intended to aid users of the model who do not have a
detailed familiarity with the actual program coding. The second section
also lists extensions that have been made to the ranges of values that
parameters in the "standard input data set" may assume. The third part
of this appendix describes optional input parameters that are additional
to the "standard input data set" and are accepted by the program. The
fourth section contains a brief description of the revised arrangement of
storage of generated proposals in the proposal stack. The fifth section
is a summary of the preliminary screening of proposals by subroutine
"DDELAY" for simulation of situations other than strict annual batching.
The sixth and final section of this appendix is a very brief discussion
of an aspect of numerical analysis that should be considered when
simulating the ROGR criterion. In all six sections, input variables are
referred to by "card number" as well as by the variable name. The card
number is generally indicative of the position in the input deck of the
card(s) that contains the variable. Card numbers listed below are
compatible with the card numbers used by Parra. Optional inputs are
delineated by angular brackets, as < ... >.
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Additional Input Required by the Program
The input data set for the program "MESS1" contains one parameter in
addition to those described in Appendix A of Parra's dissertation that is
required. This parameter is on card 6 of the input deck.
Card 6 NMAX, MNPRPP, MAXINT,MAXBDG, NBPPY (5110)
NBPPY The number of budget periods in a year. There must be an integral
number of decision periods in a budget period, i.e., NBPPY must be
a divisor of NDPY (card 13). The cash flows of KEEPMT (card 19)
are input by budget period.
Notes on the "Standard Input Data Set"
Card 1 There are three separate random number generators in the program.
MNJ1 and MNJ2 are seeds for the generator that determines the time
of generation of each set of proposals. M2 is the seed for the
generator that determines allowable delays from F(D). M1 is the
seed for the generator that determines all other randomly-
generated quantities of each proposal (life, cost, etc).
Card 14 BDGINF,LPINF,SOLINF,DELINF,COLECT,RNINF<,NT> (6L5,4X,A1)
NT See discussion of Optional Additional Inputs, below.
Card 5
H The maximum allowable value for the horizon is 19, determined by the
bounds on arrays SJJOAC and ACUNLQ in common block "LMSTOL".
Increasing H results in increased computation time. A value
around 8 to 10 is recommended for H: see the results of Test XI
in Chapter IV.
Card 6
NMAX This input is meaningless. The maximum number of proposals that
can reside in the simulation stack at present is 210.
MNPRPP If the simulation uses the subroutine ONE (strict annual
batching) , the user is assured that at least MNPRPP proposals will
be generated each year. However, if the simulation uses the
subroutine SEVRAL (other than strict annual batching), MNPRPP is
not used and the number of proposals generated in a year may be
less than MNPRPP.
MAXINT The maximum allowable value is 200.
MAXBDG The maximum allowable value is 50, determined by arrays F and




LMAX The maximum allowable life is 14 years (with a single exception;
see THUES immediately below).
THUES A value of 5 generates an exponential or geometric (increasing)
pattern of cash flows; a value of 6 generates a geometric
(decreasing) series. The growth/decay rates of such series are
determined by taking random samples from the distribution of
prospective rates of return, F(g) (card 25) and subtracting the
(arbitrary) value of .04. A value of 8 for THUGS generates
proposals with uniform payback patterns and infinite lives. In
this case, rational and compatible values for LMAX and LFPRB
(cards 7 and 23) must be input, but they will be ignored by the
simulation. If budget flows are to be printed (BDGINF = T, card
4) with THUES = 8, the later values shown for the final budget may
not include flows from the earlier accepted proposals but the
computation of g will properly reflect all flows. For correct
operation, the value of 8 for THUES should be used with MAXBDG
exactly equal to the product of H and MBPPY.
Card 9
If the distribution of costs (card 27) is input in normalized form
with a mean cost of unity, as was assumed throughout the text,
then AVCST, entered as a negative floating-point number, is the
negative of the expected disbursement required for adoption of a
proposal, i.e. the expected cost of a proposal during the first
year (CEQ ).
Card 13
The value of MB represents the number of years, including the
decision year, for which the program checks to ensure budget
constraints are not violated. If proposals may be of multiple
disbursement type (THUES = 7) one would usually specify MB > 1,
but increasing MB increases solution time slightly. The limits
are KC < MB < 11, where KC is described under card 21.
CHY Negative values are also allowed. If a negative value of NBTCHY
is input then the absolute value of NBTCHY will be the number of
batches considered each year, but proposals that would have been
sent to the regular, low-priority batch by the screening process
(to be considered at the end of the batching period) will instead
be sent to the "special", high-priority batch, to be considered at
the beginning of the next decision period. Within each decision
period, the high-priority batch is considered first, then monies
remaining are available for investment in sequentially-decided
upon proposals. At the end of each batching period, monies not
spent (on high-priority batched or sequential proposals) are
available to buy low-priority batched proposals.
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Card 15 SIZE, IDELTA,MBAR,APGR,RBM <,BETA> (6F10.0)
SIZE See discussion under Preliminary Screening, below
APGR Low values are recommended for this parameter; see the discussion
in Chapter IV (APGR corresponds to Situational parameter a ).
However, an input value of zero will result in program failure.
RBM This input is meaningless. It is ignored by the program unless
input KC (card 21) is zero, in which case borrowing is not
allowed.
BETA See discussion under Optional Additional Inputs, below.
Card 17 PAYMX,GRJCT,GRBTCH <,PVSCN > (4F10.0)
PAYMX, GRJCT, GRBTCH See discussion under Preliminary Screening, below.
PVSCN See discussion under Optional Additional Inputs, below.
Card 18
FR This array is used only by the exact MPV solution routines. It
represents the flowback vector discussed by Anderson (1).
Card 20
N0GE0F This variable should not be set FALSE if the simulation will use
other than strict annual batching (subroutine ONE). The exact MPV
solutions will fail if called from subroutine SEVRAL (the call
from SEVRAL is currently rendered inoperable in any case)
.
Card 21
KC This is the number of years, including the present year, in which
short-term borrowing will be considered in order to ease budget
constraints (these constraints are only considered up to MB years
ahead, see card 13). There is no reason to have KC > 1 unless
multiple-disbursement proposals are generated (THUES = 7).
MR The maximum number of linear segments to the borrowing function is
four.
Card 23
LFPRB The input set must have LFPRB(LMAX) = 1.
Cards 24, 26




PGR, PCST The input should have PGR(1) = 0, and PGR(NPTGR) = 1. An
input set with PGR(k) = PGR(k + 1) will cause a division-by-zero
failure. An input set with NPTGR = 2 and PGR(1) = PGR(2) = G will
generate growth rate G deterministically . (These comments apply
equally to PCST).
Optional Additiona l Inputs
Card 4 BDGINF,LPINF,SOLINF,DELINF,COLECT,RNINF <,NT> (6L5,4X,A1)
<NT> If this alphameric variable equals "T" then the title card, card
Ma, is read. If NT is blank, or any character except "T" , the
card following card 4 is assumed to be card 5.
<Card 4a COMT(i), i = 1, 20 (20A4)>
<C0MT> This 80 character array, read only if NT on card 4 equals "T", is
used to title the printed output.
Card 15 SIZE, IDELTA,MBAR, APGR,RBH <,BETA> (6F10.0)
<BETA> If any value greater than zero is input for BETA, the program
will automatically produce five points on the curve of ra vs. g,
like the curves discussed in Chapter V, for the firm being
simulated. The first point is based entirely on the input data
set. For the second point, both parameters MBAR and GRJCT are set
to the average value of MBAR and IDELTA. For the third point,
both parameters MBAR and GRJCT are set to twice the original
(input) value of MBAR. For the fourth point, both parameters MBAR
and GRJCT are set to 1.5 times the original (input) values of
MBAR, unless the value of g from the third point is greater than
(1 + BETA) times the value of g from the first point, in which
case they are set to 3 times the original value of MBAR. For the
fifth point, both parameters MBAR and GRJCT are set to that value
that represents the extreme point on a parabola least-squares-fit
through the first four points (it is assumed the extreme point is
a maximum but this is not checked). The random number seeds are
reset to their original (input) values for each step, so that each
step "sees" identical streams of proposals if no tuning of gp is
performed. Only whole percentage values of MEAR and GRCT are
generated. If the value generated at any stage equals a value
previously examined, the value for that stage is increased by one
percent. If tuning is specified by including cards 29, 29a, and
29b (see below) in the data set, each of the five points will be
individually tuned.
Card 17 PAYMX, GRJCT, GRBTCH <,PVSCN > (4F10.0)
<PVSCN> If any value greater than zero is input for PVSCN and sequential
decision making is selected (NOSEQD is false, card 20) then
preliminary screening is done on the present value of generated
proposals, as described under Preliminary Screening, below.
164

<Card 28 DVDS, ADIV,SADIV,GADIV,BDIV, SBDIV,GBDIV,LDNOEF
(A4,6X,6F10.0,L5)>
The parameters on this card govern the optional disinvestment
process. If the first four columns on the card following card 27
contains the characters "DVDS" then this card is assumed to be the
disinvestment card. Disinvestment is done on an annual basis and
proceeds as follows (if selected). Let MYT denote the sum of all budget
flows for year Y as seen at the beginning of year Y. In terms of the
vectors MT discussed in the text,
NDPY
MYT = I MY(t)
t=1
Then the total amount to be disinvested during year Y is determined by
Disinvestment at Y = Min {MYT, A(Y) + MYT*B(Y)}
A(Y) = (ADIV + r*SADIV)*(1 + GADIV)*-1
B(Y) = (BDIV + r*SBDIV)*(1 + GBDIV)^ 1
where r is a random variable uniformly distributed over C-1,+1). The
total amount disinvested during a year is assumed to flow uniformly over
the NDPY individual budget flows, unless the amount exceeds an individual
budget flow. In this case, that budget flow is reduced to zero and the
remaining total disinvestment is assumed to flow uniformly over the
remaining budget flows. If LDNOEF is true, these disinvestments are
regarded as investments into a money "sink" paying no return; otherwise
the disinvestments are regarded as returns from the business in the
manner of dividend payments.
<Card 29 TUNE (AM)>
If the automatic tuning option is selected, this card follows either
the disinvestment card, if present, or card 27. Columns 1 through 4
should contain the characters "TUNE" to select tuning, in which case





These parameters govern preliminary automatic tuning, "type A"
tuning, on the basis of a single replication, in a process similar to
that of Test II, described in Chapter III. This type of tuning is not
recommended unless the user has only very crude estimates of gp and MO.
In type A tuning, each tuning iteration consists of a single replication.
After iteration i, the values of the tuning parameters are reset for
iteration (i + 1) by
gp i+1 = DGPA*gi + (1 - DGPA)*gPi
M0 i+1 = DMTA*MHi + (1 - DMTA)*M0i
A maximum of MXTA iterations are run. If LRNCA is true then all random
number seeds are reset to their original values at the beginning of each
iteration; this should normally be the case for type A tuning. If LOUTA
is true, values of the Tuning parameters are printed after each
iteration. The tuning process is terminated before MXTA iterations if
the tuning criteria for both gp and MO are met. Let PVMHj_ denote the net
present value of MH{ discounted at rate g\, and let PVMOi be the net
present value of the starting value of M0j_ discounted at rate gpj_. Then
the tuning criteria for type A tuning are:
M. - gi/gPil < ERGPA
11. - PVMHi/PVMOjJ < ERPMA
Type A tuning also allows the option of attempted bracketing of the
results. If LBKT is true then one complete type A tuning sequence is
run, starting and final values of gp and MO are compared, and the program
runs a second type A tuning sequence with new starting values of gp and
MO that are expected to bracket the tuned values. The output from the
bracketing are the average values of the two final sets of values.
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<Card 29b MXTB , ERGPB , ERPMB , ERPMB , DGPB , PMTB , LRNCB , LOUTB , KREPS
(5X,I5,4F10.0,2L5,I5)>
These parameters govern "type B" tuning. This was the tuning
procedure used for Tests III and VI of Chapter III, and all the tests
described in Chapter IV. Type B tuning performs the tuning algorithm
based on the average results of KREPS replications per each tuning
iteration. The type B tuning criteria for both gp and the present value
of M are to compute the t-statistic for each iteration and compare it to
the input ER value:
where x and S are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of
either g or the present value of MH' and b is either gp or MO for the
tuning iteration (KREPS is assumed greater than one). The other type B
tuning parameters correspond to the similar type A parameters. There is
no bracketing attempted with type B tuning. If KREPS is less than NREPS
then after the final tuning iteration -- i.e., after the type B iteration
which is the MXTB-th iteration or which is the iteration in which both
tuning criteria are met — then (NREPS - KREPS) further replications are
run with the final values of gp and MO.
Revised Proposal Stack
As Parra wrote the program, proposal characteristics were stored in
one of three distinct stacks -- the "normal" stack, the "high-priority"
stack, and the "low-priority" stack — depending on how the proposal was
classified. Each stack could contain a maximum of 60 proposals, and this
bound was generally restrictive in only one of the three stacks. For
example, strict annual batching accessed only the "normal" stack so only
60 proposals could be accumulated in one year, even though the total
reserved storage area could accommodate a total of 180 proposals. For
other than annual batching, only a single set of proposals resided in the
"normal" stack at any one time; proposals not immediately accepted or
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rejected were physically moved to either the high-priority or the
low-priority batch, thus it was the bound on one or the other of these
latter stacks that was restrictive in this mode. In order to accommodate
more proposals and make more effective use of the proposal storage area,
the program was rewritten so that proposals were stored in a single stack
with a capacity of 210 proposals. For simulations of strict annual
batching situations, the effect of this change is simply an extension of
the "normal" stack to accommodate 210 vice 60 proposals. For simulations
of other situations, the stack itself stores up to 210 (non-rejected)
proposals in the order in which they were generated; a separate pointer
array contains the indices of the stack in an order that indicates in
which of the three categories each proposal belongs. The indices of all
proposals in the low-priority batch occupy the lowest-order positions in
the pointer array, followed next by the indices to proposals in the
high-priority batch, and finally by the indices to proposals in the
current set of proposals just generated and being operated upon.
Preliminary Screening of Proposals
When operating in the strict annual batch mode (subroutine ONE), all
proposals generated within a year are accumulated into a batch, and all
decisions are made at the end of the year upon this complete batch. When
operating in any other mode (i.e., in subroutine SEVRAL) , it is possible
to do preliminary screening on sets of proposals as they are generated.
This preliminary screening is done in subroutine DDELAY.
If sequential decision-making is selected (NOSEQD is false, card 20)
subroutine DDELAY will perform optional prescreening of each set of
proposals as it is generated using any desired combination of four
screening criteria. The subroutine will mark for deletion from the set
any alternatives that are unacceptable according to the desired criteria.
It will also return to SEVRAL a flag variable whose value indicates the
immediate disposition of the set. If the flag has value one the set is
empty (i.e., none of the alternatives are acceptable) and need not be
considered further. If the flag has value two the set is to be batched
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for future decisions (which batch — low-priority or high-priority — is
determined by the sign of NBTCHY, card 13, as discussed above under
Notes). If the flag has value three the decision as to which, if any, of
the alternatives will be accepted is to be made immediately (i.e.,
sequentially). Subroutine DDELAY initializes the flag variable at value
three. The subroutine then proceeds through the four screening criteria
in the order shown below, screening according to the criteria indicated
by the user in the input data set. The subroutine assumes the principle
that each criteria (if selected) can reduce the value of the flag, or
leave it unchanged, but can never increase its value. Accordingly, if at
the end of screening by any criteria the flag has value one (i.e., the
set has been reduced to the null set) further screening is discontinued.
The screening criteria are considered in the following order:
(1) Screen on payback period if input PAYMX < 30 (card 17). All
alternatives with a computed payback period greater than PAYMX are
dropped. There is no rule for batching with this criterion; if all
alternatives have a payback greater than PAYMX the final flag value is
one, otherwise it is three.
(2) Screen on prospective rate of return if input GRBTCH > (card
17). All alternatives with a prospective rate of return less than GRJCT
(card 17) are dropped. Let GRMAX be the maximum rate of return of the
alternatives in the set. If GRMAX < GRJCT the flag is set to one and the
entire set is dropped. If GRMAX > GRETCH the flag is set to three;
otherwise the flag is set to two and the set is batched.
(3) Screen on first cost if SIZE > (card 15). There is no rule
for rejecting alternatives with this criterion, therefore if this
criterion is entered with the flag equal to two no screening is done and
the subroutine skips to step (4). Let CBT be the product of SIZE and the
expected cost of a proposal for the year being simulated, and let CMAX be
the maximum first cost of the alternatives remaining in the set. Then
the value of the flag is reduced to two if CMAX > CBT.
(4) Screen on present worth if input PVSCN > (card 17). Let Qj
equal either the net present value or the prospective present worth for
each remaining alternative, depending on whether input KYBTCH (card 16)
has value one or two (other values are also possible which will alter the
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definition of Qj slightly: see Table A.1 of Parra's dissertation). Then
if Qj is negative for all proposals, the flag is reduced to one. If Qj
is positive for some proposals, these proposals are retained. If Qj is
positive for at least one proposal but the net present value is negative
for all proposals then the flag is set to two. If neither of these two
conditions obtain, the flag is left unchanged.
The ROGR Criterion: Numerical Considerations
It is necessary here to consider the actual mechanics of the
generation of prospective growth rates for proposals. The distribution
of growth rates, F(g), is input with the growth rates expressed as
percents. The subroutine GROWTH generates values for prospective growth
rate by mapping a random number on the cumulative distribution F(g) and
considering that F(g) is linear between input points. This mapping gives
a floating point number that, in general, has a fractional part. The
subroutine returns a value for prospective growth rate that is a fraction
of one but is a whole percent by rounding the number obtained from the
mapping to an integer (which represents an integral percent) then
multiplying by .01. Because of the usual problems with number
representation, however, the value returned by GROWTH may not actually be
a whole percent but only an approximation of it — for example, the
product of the integer 7 and the fraction .01 may actually be .0699987
instead of .07.
Values for the Decision parameters GRJCT and GRBTCH are not entered
as percents, they are entered as true values. The decision routines that
compare the generated growth rates with these parameters use simple,
unsophisticated comparison routines, such as the FORTRAN relationships
"
.LT." or ".GE." with no error bounds. Somewhat surprising results may
then occur because the resident input routines (i.e., the routines that
read the input data) and the arithmetic routines used by GROWTH may lead
to different approximations to what should be the same number. For
example the routines that read an input of "0.07" may store a number
whose actual value is 0.0699892, whereas GROWTH may generate 0.0699987 as
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pointed out above. The user would think these represent the same number
and act accordingly; the machine would act somewhat differently. This
can lead to unexpected results. Assume the user is simulating the ROGR
criterion with an input GRJCT of "0.07." Run under the FORTRAN H
compiler, the simulation may reject all proposals with gj = .07 while an
identical simulation run under the WATFIV compiler would accept many
proposals with gj = .07: Also a simulation of ROGR with GRJCT input as
"0.07" might turn out to have identical results as another simulation
identical in all respects except with GRJCT input as "0.08".
These effects can generally be ignored. They were considered
negligible for all the experiments run in this research. However, the
user should be aware of them. If the effects are considered important
for a particular application, the comparisons in the screening and
decision subroutines should be altered so as to yield the desired results




INPUTS TO THE MODEL
The inputs used to define the complete capital budgeting situation
simulated in each test are listed in detail in this appendix; however
only those inputs that affect the results are listed. Inputs are listed
according to the classification scheme used in the text of this
dissertation: Control, Situational, Tuning, or Decision parameters.
Inputs are identified by the name by which they are called in the actual
FORTRAN program, except for certain Situational and Tuning parameters.
These exceptions are parameters that are discussed at length in the text
and they are identified by the more concise notation used there. The
corresponding FORTRAN names for these variables are also shown in Table
B.I.
Contrary to common practice, all the tables in this appendix will be
found grouped together at the end of the appendix.
Control Parameters
Control parameters are assumed not to affect the overall results of
the simulation. This assumption was tested only in the case of Control
parameter H, the horizon of the simulation. A value of H = 8 was used
for all experiments except for Tests XI and XIII and some observations of
Test IX. The values of H used for these tests are listed in the
descriptions of the tests in Chapter IV. The set of initial random
number seeds (IRNS) was reset to the original set of values at the
beginning of each 8-year simulation for Tests II and IV; in all other




Table B.I lists, for the more important Situational parameters,
either the parameter value or a code that identifies a vector of values
displayed in Tables B.II-B.VI.
As stated in the text, dependency relationships were not generated
because these relationships can be considered as being included in the
generation of mutually exclusive alternatives. Therefore, all tests were
run with MAXCNT = PDEP = 0. The probability vector used to generate the
cash flow vectors for all proposals in tests with parameter Th = 7 was
PPOS = (.90, .95, .90, .95, .90, .90, .85) (this vector is explained in
detail in Appendix B of Parra's dissertation: 60, pp. 130-133). The
optional parameters governing the disinvestment process were utilized
only for Test XV. For this test, BDIV = 0/.15/.30 (factor G of the
design); SBDIV was set at for BDIV = and set at .025 for BDIV > 0;
LDNOEF was true for BDIV > 0; and all other disinvestment parameters
(ADIV, SADIV, GADIV, and GBDIV) were zero throughout. Short-terra
borrowing was not allowed in Tests I, XI-XIII, XV, and half of Test XIV.
Borrowing was allowed in the other tests, at the values of iw and fw
shown in Table B.I.
Tuning Parameters
Values of the two Tuning parameters, gp and M0, are shown in Tables
B.VIII and B.IX, respectively. The values listed in these tables are the
values of gp and M0 that produced the results shown in Appendix C and
discussed in Chapters III through VI. In other words, the values shown
in these tables are the final values of gp and M0 after whatever tuning
process was performed for that test. Some observations of those two
experiments in which the IRNS were reset for each simulation, Tests II
and IV, resulted in cycling rather than convergence; for these cases the
values of the Tuning parameters for the final complete cycle are listed.
Decision parameters
The four parameters listed on "Card 16" (see Appendix A of Parra's
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dissertation; 60, pp. 1 1 9— "• 28 ) define the MOW to be used in the proposal
selection process. Variable KYPROC was set at 1 for all MPV and MNPV
observations and at 2 for all ROGR observations. The remaining three
variables on this card are operative only if KYPROC = 1. Variables
KYBTCH and KYSEQ were set at 1 for all MNPV observations and at 2 for all
MPV observations (KYSEQ was operative only for those observations of
Tests VIII and XV that involved other than annual batching of all
proposals). Variable KYOFPV was kept at 1 for all experiments. As was
pointed out in Chapter III, the exact MPV solution was never attempted in
this research; accordingly, variable N0GE0F was kept true for all
experiments.
All observations were made with Decision parameters m (MBAR) for MPV
or MNPV and gc (GRJCT) for ROGR set at fS, the theoretically correct value
as described in Chapter III. (Tests XIV and XV also included many
observations with m/gc set at values other than ni, as described in
Chapter V). Table B.X lists the values of m for all the experiments.
Only Test XV involved any screening of proposals to determine
whether the proposal should be decided upon sequentially or be batched.
Of the four screening criteria available, the only one utilized was
screening on initial cost. Variable SIZE was set at 1.571 for Test XV
"realistic" observations, which resulted in proposals with costs in the
largest ten percent being batched in these cases.
Most experiments were run using strictly annual batching of
proposals, i.e. with NDPY = NBTCHY = 1. The only exceptions were Test IX
— in which NDPY and NBTCHY were set at 4 or 2 for observations of
batching periods of 1/4 or 1/2 year, respectively — and Test VIII (NDPY
was set at 4 for all "sequential" observations of this experimant).
Variable NBPPY was set at 1 throughout the research. Variable NOSEQD was
left true throughout, except for the observations of Tests VIII and XV
that involved sequential decisions. Variable FSTDEC was set true for the
observations of Test VIII that involved sequential decisions; it was set
false for all other observations.
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Variable DUMP was set true for all observations in which no delay in
proposal acceptance was allowed (i.e. all observations for which F(D) is
indicated as having been set at level b1 in Table B.I) and was set false
for all other observations. Finally, variable KC was set at 1 —
indicating that short-terra borrowing was only considered to ease budget
restrictions at the time of decision — for all experiments in which
borrowing was allowed (Tests II through X and parts of Test XIV), and set
at for all other experiments.
Legend for Table B.I
Table B.I lists, for the more important Situational parameters,
either the parameter value or a code that identifies the appropriate
vector of values displayed in Tables B.II through B.VI. Parameters which
were given muliple values during an experiment and which -- either
explicitly or implicitly — were factors in the design of the experiment
are denoted in Table B.I by capital letters. These capital letters
correspond to the designation of the factors given in the description of
the experiment in Chapters IV or V. The roman numerals in the bottom row
are references to tables in the text that describe the experimental
design. (Only Situational parameters appear in Table B.I). If the
factor was treated at only two or three levels, the values observed
follow the capital letter designation in parentheses, separated by
slashes, in order from low to high level. In Tests X and XII more levels
of the factor A were treated than could conveniently be listed in Table
B.I. The various levels of these factors are described in the
appropriate sections of Chapter IV. Finally, in Tests IX, X, and XII
some Situational parameters were treated at two levels during the tests
but were not considered factors of the experiment. The values treated
are simply listed, separated by slashes, in these cases. The reader
should refer to the appropriate sections of Chapter IV for further
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0.607 1.0 0.723 0.531*
0.837 i.o 0.371 0.735





In ble B. 1 1
Di str i but ions of De ays - F(D)
y bl b2 b3 bk
C'o 9.359 0.30 2 0.1,68
Delay 0.930 0.357 0.667
Al lowed) 0. 90G 0.396 0.893
0.936 0.585 0.372
1.0 1.0 1.0
0.0 1.2 3.1* 2.0
<r F( G ) z F(s) <r F ( g
)
0.020 0.0 0.022 0.0 161 0.0
0.01+0 o.uo 0. 101+ 0.5 79 o 295 0.322
0.050 0.130 1.037 0.672 324 . 3 1
0.070 0.330 1.11+ It 0.933 3 5 6 0.905
0.100 . 5 1* 1.149 0.995 362 0.921
0.1U0 0.670 1.167 0.999 9 363 . 9 2 '*
0.160 0.730 1.193 1.0 369 0.969
0.200 0.820 370 0.9b2
0.2'tO 0.900 572 0.997
0.300 1.0 373 1.0
<r F(g) g F( S )
0'jO 0.0 01+ 0.0
6 . 1 60 0.100
100 0.300 100 0.500
106 0.5 20 125 0.771
123 0.585 157 0.368
11+1 0.590 351 0.375
200 0.7 39 1+63 0.991+
232 1.0 659 1.0
Tab e B.V
Di stri but ions of Liv s - F(L)
dl dl d3 .ii+ d5 d6 d7
.090 .231 .1+87 .1+33 .120 .000 .371
.270 .658 .565 .509 .370 .000 .097
.351 .999 .692 .623 .670 .000 .117
.1*15 1.0 .829 .900 .920 .000 .207
.1*79 1.0 .938 1.0 .000 .272
.610 .99 .000 .505
.686 .996 .000 .1*27
.853 .996 .000 .585
.897 .936 .231 .629
.900 .939 .1+87 .783










i stri but ions of Cost - F(CJ)
CJ* F(C.l) CJ F(CJ) cj F( CJ) CJ F(CJ) CJ F(CJ)
1 , G 2
1
0.0 0.560 O.J 0.148 . J 0.36li 0.0 0.236 0.0
3,21(2 0.050 0.655 9 . 3 S 0.726 0. 330 0.572 0.157 . 7 1 4 0.300
11,363 0.300 1.105 0.410 1.309 0. 803 0.927 0.571 1.070 0.639
6,(4811 0.60 1.215 0.586 1.990 0. 388 l.OGli 0.590 1.591+ 0.912
8,105 0. 700 1.220 0.953 2.187 1 .0 1.311 0.736 2.040 0.960
9, 726 0.350 1.23t+ 0.955 1.525 0.759 2.795 1.0











E(CJ) 6767.4 1.0 1.0
* Unnormal ized; amounts shown to nearest
1.0 1.0
t~ol e dol lar
.





Arithmetic ( I ncreas I ni») flowback
Arithmetic (decreasing) flowback
Geometric (? ncreas i nn:) flowback
Geometric (decreas i n<* ) flowback
Stochastic pattern of i nf 1 ows/ou tf lows
Infinite life, uniform flowback
* In every case the
further detai Is are
work and in Appendix
(60, pp. 130-133).
first cash flow is an outflow;
^iven in Chapter III of this




Table B. VI I I
of the Generation Process
Test gp Test ^P Test gp
1 .1625 IVcd .7422 VI Ibch .1550
1 l-A .7400 abc .6787 befgh .15 7 6
1 l-B* .3067 abd .3950 bc^ef .1748
.3056 acd .7402 bedeg .1741
.3044 bed .7361 bed eh .1601
1 i-c* .3093 abed .7606 bedefgh .1530
.3073 V(l) .4690 bdf .1757
.3089 a .8950 bdg .16 8 2
.3083 b .4690 bdh .1584
.3071 ab .8950 bdfgh .14 9 7
1 1-0(1)* .6982 Vl(l) .53 70 bef .16 2 5
.5976 a .7212 beg .1712
.6970 b .7100 beh .14 7
.6961 ab .7150 befgh .1516
.5949 VI lab .1868 c^ .1769
.6938 abfg .1932 cdfg .1737
1 l-D(2)* .7357 abfh .1606 cdfh .1525
.7360 abgh .15 9 4 edgh .15 61
.7363 abed .2011 ce .1714
1 l-E* .7407 a b cd f g .1938 cefg .1782
.7398 abedf
h
.1753 cefh .14 7 8
.7394 abedgh .1745 ce.^h .1601
.7400 a bee .2041 de .1736
.7408 a bc e f g .2026 defg .16 8 7
1 1 1 .6376 abeef .1303 defh .1548
IV(1) .4690 a bceg h .1732 dofrh .15 3
a .8950 abde .1856 (1) .1522
b .4690 abdefg .1853 fg .1708
c* .6662 abdefh .16 2 7 fh .1443
.6666 abdegh .16 4 2 gh .1536
.6661 acdef .2059 V 1 1 1 ( 1
)
.1599
.6665 acde^ .19 6 2 ab .1915
.6668 acdeh .1706 PC .1523
d .4690 a c d e fg h .1758 ad .1324
ab .3950 acf .2042 ae .1895
ac* .7148 a eg .19 5 5 af .2025
.7150 ach .1343 be .1528
.7140 acf gh .1809 bd .1801
.7144 adf .1858 be .1736
ad .8950 ac*Z .1822 bf .1825
be* .7139 adh .1627 cd .1560
.7143 adf^h .1652 ce .1475
.7145 aef .1851 cf .1520
.7147 aeg .1884 de .1678
.7149 aeh .1671 df .1747
.7150 aef^h .1620 ef .1782
.7151 bef .1835 abed .1709
bd .4690 beg .1752 abce .1525
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Table R. VI I ! (continued)
Test gp Test gp Test
VI 1 labcf .1628 XI MPV-8 .1502 XIV-E(MNPV)
abde .1891 MPV-12 .15 02 m= . / .1610
abdf .1918 MPV-16 .1502 .10 .1580
abef .2022 XI IROGR-1 .1530 .15 .1500
acde .1723 2 .1500 .16 .1307
acdf .1623 2.9 .15 2 6 XIV-E(MPV)
:
acef .1530 4 .1537 m=.0 4 .1566
adef .1850 5.5 .1573 .07 .1640
bcde .1660 8 .1500 .10 .1600
bcdf .1659 inf .1684 .13 .1600
beef .1513 IiPV -1 .1549 .16 .1600
bdef .1677 2 .1563 XI V-F(ROGR)
cdef .1652 2.9 .1486 m=.00 .1520
a bcde
f
.1653 4 .1500 .04 .1619
IX' 21' 1/4 .11*31 5.5 .1502 .07 .15 3 5
1/2 .1529 8 .1500 .10 .1698
2 .1405 inf .1626 .13 .1758
3 .1188 XI 1 1 .1500 .16 .1583
'ce'1/4 .1793 XIV--A .1620 XI V-F(MNPV)
1/2 .1813 XI V-B .1620 m=. 04 .15 4
1(20) .17 9 2 XIV--r .1660 .07 .1670
1(12) .1678 XIV--D .1660 .10 .1699
2 .1706 XIV--E(ROGR) .13 .16 6 3
3 .1550 n=.0 .1634 .16 .1571
X 5 .1817 .04 .1635 XI V-F(MPV)
:
10 .1736 .07 .1610 pi=.0 4 .1540
20 .17 9 2 .10 .1580 .07 .1625
40 .1834 .13 .1510 .10 .1694
80 .1834 .16 .1400 .13 .1710
XI ROGR .1573 XIV--E(MNPV) .16 .1599
UPV-4 .1473 m=.04 .1615 XV .1240
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Theoretical Marginal Growth Rates - m
Test m Test m
1 .07 IX '21'
. 7
1 l-A/D/E . 02S •de 1 .06
1 l-B/C .27 X .06
1 1 1 .023 XI .07
IV .023 XI 1 .07
V .023 XI 1 1 .06
VI .028 XIV .07
VI 1 (HBC=. 7) .10 XV(EBC= .7) . 10





OUTPUTS FROM THE MODEL
The output values of g from each simulation, which were used as the
measure of effectiveness, are listed in this appendix. Table C.I lists
the values of g computed for each replication of each observation of the
tests described in the text. Thus, there are ten values of g listed for
each observation, except for Tests I, II, and IV (which were based on a
single replication each), Tests III and VI (which were based on ten
replications, but for which the individual values of g were not recorded
— only the mean and variance), and for observation "80" of Test X (for
which three of the ten replications failed due to generation of excessive
numbers of proposals).
For these observations of the single-replication Tests II and IV
that resulted in cycling, the values of g are shown for each step of the
final cycle — just as for inputs gp and MO, listed in Tables B.VIII and
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